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cooperated to produce content: politically activist, exiled citizens - self-trained journalists -- from EastCentral Europe working in semi-autonomous language services (radios) broadcasting through the Iron
Curtain to the people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and, experienced
journalists from Western democracies working in the Central Newsroom, an internal news agency serving
the broadcast desks. This study outlines aspects of RFE and its Cold War context -- including journalists'
knowledge of the human rights and informational deficits of audiences -- critical to understanding these
groups of journalists. It differentiates group conceptions of roles at RFE and means of constructing
practice despite the paradox of doing news work from a position aberrant to Western journalism.
Research includes 100 interviews and correspondence with 70 former RFE employees gathered from
2004-2012; and, for the first time in scholarship, the voices of RFE's Western journalists. It incorporates
documents collected from and created by participants. It places these data in conversation with memoirs
and histories by RFE insiders, and with corporate documents from archives opened to researchers during
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and group negotiations of news work. It posits Ã©migrÃ©s as constructing national imaginaries available
only in RFE broadcasts, and Western journalists as constructing a hyper-vigilant practice that modeled
journalism for broadcasters and served as a credibility anchor for broadcasts. Translating different
conceptions of the mission - modeling a free press -- into practice, absent legitimacy and in view of
listener needs and risks, produced two different journalisms, each unique and hyper-vigilant. The study
suggests that the RFE historical case presaged challenges facing contemporary journalism and
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ABSTRACT
COMMUNITIES OF JOURNALISTS AND JOURNALISM PRACTICE AT RADIO FREE
EUROPE DURING THE COLD WAR (1950 – 1995)
Susan D. Haas
Carolyn Marvin, Ph.D.
This study describes the construction, maintenance and defense of news practices by
journalists at Radio Free Europe (RFE), an experimental U.S. government-sponsored
organization whose mission was to act as a “surrogate free press”, in effect, to disrupt state
media-controlled public spheres of totalitarian states during the West’s Cold War with
communism. At RFE from 1950-1995, two groups of journalists cooperated to produce content:
politically activist, exiled citizens – self-trained journalists -- from East-Central Europe working
in semi-autonomous language services (radios) broadcasting through the Iron Curtain to the
people of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria, and, experienced journalists
from Western democracies working in the Central Newsroom, an internal news agency serving
the broadcast desks. This study outlines aspects of RFE and its Cold War context -- including
journalists’ knowledge of the human rights and informational deficits of audiences -- critical to
understanding these groups of journalists. It differentiates group conceptions of roles at RFE and
means of constructing practice despite the paradox of doing news work from a position aberrant
to Western journalism. Research includes 100 interviews and correspondence with 70 former
RFE employees gathered from 2004-2012; and, for the first time in scholarship, the voices of
RFE’s Western journalists. It incorporates documents collected from and created by participants.
It places these data in conversation with memoirs and histories by RFE insiders, and with
corporate documents from archives opened to researchers during the past decade. It describes
both groups of journalists as “exiles” practicing in the absence of legitimacy in the contexts of
vi

both Western journalism and communist states. It describes organizational challenges and group
negotiations of news work. It posits émigrés as constructing national imaginaries available only in
RFE broadcasts, and Western journalists as constructing a hyper-vigilant practice that modeled
journalism for broadcasters and served as a credibility anchor for broadcasts. Translating different
conceptions of the mission – modeling a free press -- into practice, absent legitimacy and in view
of listener needs and risks, produced two different journalisms, each unique and hyper-vigilant.
The study suggests that the RFE historical case presaged challenges facing contemporary
journalism and journalists.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................. VI
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO RADIO FREE EUROPE AS A CASE STUDY IN
JOURNALISM ............................................................................................................................. 1
Radio Free Europe’s position and mission in Cold War International Broadcasting ........................... 2
Radio Free Europe’s governance and organizational structure .......................................................... 13
Rationale for Radio Free Europe as a case study in journalism .......................................................... 19
The Research Study .............................................................................................................................. 26

CHAPTER 2: RADIO FREE EUROPE’S COLD WAR CONTEXT AND
ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION ..................................................................................... 35
The birth of RFE during post-WWII occupation of Central Europe .................................................. 35
RFE’s founding, broadcasting model and strategy .............................................................................. 40
Evolution governance and mission, 1951-95......................................................................................... 47

CHAPTER 3: METHODS ........................................................................................................ 63
Existing secondary sources, insider histories and memoirs ................................................................. 64
Archives ................................................................................................................................................ 66
Absence as a guide ................................................................................................................................ 70
Methodological approach ..................................................................................................................... 73
Interview sample, texts created and collected during field research, and ongoing conversations with
participants ........................................................................................................................................... 78
Reflexivity: journalist-turned-academic interviewing journalists ....................................................... 92

CHAPTER 4: “THE EXILES” IN THE LANGUAGE BROADCASTING SERVICES 98
Conceptions of RFE’s mission .............................................................................................................. 99

viii

Cold War risk and retribution ........................................................................................................... 106
Broadcasters and audiences................................................................................................................ 111
Constructing the mediated nation ...................................................................................................... 115
Language service broadcasters and journalism ................................................................................. 128
Group relationships ............................................................................................................................ 132
“The Exiles” and “The Americans” negotiate conceptions of mission in practice ............................ 141
Language broadcasting services and the Central Newsroom ............................................................ 157

CHAPTER 5: WESTERN JOURNALISTS AND CENTRAL NEWSROOM PRACTICE
(PART I) ................................................................................................................................... 158
Western journalists and RFE’s mission and governance ................................................................... 160
Central Newsroom recruitment, demographics and conceptions of practice, 1950-95...................... 170
Generational and group relationships ................................................................................................ 187
Relationships with the Western press ................................................................................................. 194
The end of the Central Newsroom in Munich .................................................................................... 205

CHAPTER 6: CENTRAL NEWSROOM PRACTICE (PART II) .......................................... 209
Central Newsroom: Structure and function ....................................................................................... 213
Work products and languages of practice .......................................................................................... 218
The color-coded budget ...................................................................................................................... 221
The morning programming meeting: Newsroom relationships to policy and program control at RFE
............................................................................................................................................................. 226
Ring-fencing the newsroom and the news file .................................................................................... 230
The two-source rule and “getting it right” rather than “getting it first” ........................................... 233
Style as model and safeguard for accuracy and objectivity ............................................................... 242
Two stories of practice ........................................................................................................................ 246
Recurring struggles for newsroom autonomy: Two memos, a generation apart............................... 248
More on generational differences and practice .................................................................................. 253

ix

Central Newsroom practice: Conclusion ............................................................................................ 255

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 257
BIBLIOGRAPHY ................................................................................................................... 263

x

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AFP

Agence France Presse

AP

Associated Press

BAD

Broadcast Analysis Department, Radio Free Europe

BBC

British Broadcasting Corporation

BD

Broadcast Desk or Language Broadcasting Service, Radio Free Europe

CN

Central Newsroom, Radio Free Europe

CMD

Central Monitoring Desk, Central Newsroom, Radio Free Europe

DFL

Deutschlandfunk, West German surrogate international broadcaster

DW

Deutsche Welle

FEC

Free Europe Committee

NCA

News and Current Affairs Division, Radio Free Europe

RAD

Research and Analysis Department, Radio Free Europe

RFE

Radio Free Europe

RFE/RL

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

RIAS

Radio in the American Sector (Berlin)

RL

Radio Liberty

UPI

United Press International

VOA

Voice of America

CIA

U.S. Central Intelligence Agency

xi

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO RADIO FREE EUROPE AS A CASE STUDY IN
JOURNALISM
The world without a map is constituted by our actions.
--Klaus Krippendorff, Second-Order Cybernetics, 2001

Even the most casual observer of news accounts available in the West and the activities
of journalists covering revolutions during the Arab Spring in Egypt, Libya or Syria, from Al
Jazeera to The New York Times and the BBC, can glean an obvious celebration of resistance to
totalitarianism, and of the technological and physical border-crossings and media system
disruptions that defy restrictions on information gathering and reporting and commentary within
and without such states, and an alliance of hope for change in the direction of more open societies
among Western and BBC-trained (in the case of Al Jazeera) journalists and the activists, bloggers
and protesters inside, and diaspora outside, revolutionary states. If the historical clock were to be
rolled back 60 years, a similar kinship of democratic spirit, if you will, might be found within the
news working groups inside government-sponsored Western international broadcasters. At Radio
Free Europe (RFE), a U.S. government-sponsored broadcasting organization headquartered in
Munich from 1951-95; that kinship was actively acknowledged in a mission of free press
surrogacy and intention for democratic change. But RFE was sponsored first clandestinely by the
CIA and afterward with public funds from the U.S. Congress, and RFE’s structural contexts have
effectively relegated it to the propaganda heap of untouchable, outsider journalism history. And
that status has been a barrier to plumbing RFE’s Cold War iteration as a resource for
understanding journalists and journalism in the present.
Carey (2007) maintained that Western journalists don’t know their history. It follows that
journalists who don’t know their history might dismiss out of hand cases of journalism practice
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that do not conform to what appear to qualify in terms of legitimizing structural contexts for
Western news practice. This study describes the choices made by journalists who aspired to
sound practice despite the paradox of doing news work in an experimental, front-line, wartime,
state-sponsored, technologically-enabled border-violating context in which politically passionate
exiled citizens-turned-journalists from East-Central Europe and experienced journalists trained in
Western democracies worked together in the same organization. It investigates the construction,
maintenance and defense of practices by journalists working for RFE. It honors by inclusion for
the first time in scholarship the voices of Western journalists who chose to work for this
continually evolving broadcasting organization during more than forty years of the West’s Cold
War with the communist world. Most importantly, it describes conditions and challenges that,
while unique during the 1950s-1980s, presaged challenges facing journalism and journalists
today.
The contemporary availability of communication technologies, including satellites, the
Internet, Web sites, blogs and social media, makes transgressions of the borders of states and
disruptions of media systems by individuals, groups and organizations, including political
activists, journalists and news organizations, a mundane practice. Adaptations of these tools allow
actors to challenge governmental control of speech and access to information and shaping of
narratives inside not just totalitarian states, but democracies as well.

Radio Free Europe’s position and mission in Cold War International Broadcasting
During the Cold War, citizens inside totalitarian states had to circulate forbidden
information and commentary via word-of-mouth, samizdat (copies of forbidden domestic texts)
and tamizdat (texts smuggled from abroad). However, for flows of information that were timely
and alternative to government-sanctioned material, especially news narratives of conditions and
events both inside and outside totalitarian states, citizens had to resort to clandestine consumption
2

of foreign broadcasts accessed via the border-piercing technology of radio (and in some areas
during the latter Cold War, television). Reporter Robert S. Elegant of the Los Angeles Times
wrote of RFE as a byproduct of “’fundamental tensions’” offering “’free information and EastWest relaxation’”, “’by the best means yet known to man’” (Puddington, 2000, pp. 205–206).
Long before the Cold War, the Soviet Union initiated the use of radio as an instrument of
parlaying influence over foreign populations. In 1925 the Soviets broadcast messages to Romania
regarding a territorial tug-of-war over Bessarabia (Powers, 2009). And, from The Soviet Union in
1929, with Lenin’s endorsement of the “newspaper” power of radio, and “under a banner of ‘a
great and holy hatred of capitalism,’ Radio Moscow went on air, broadcasting in English,
German, and French” (Powers, 2009, p. 46). The Netherlands, followed by the UK, Germany, and
France (Browne, 2003), with Italy and Portugal following, initiated radio services to colonies
and/or territories politically strategic to national interests during the late 1920s and early 1930s.
And, “[i]mpressed by the impact that the Soviet Union’s German language broadcasts were
having within Germany, by 1934 Hitler and Goebbels had established their own foreign
language broadcasting services, focusing especially on the United States” (Powers, 2009, p. 48).
Indeed, by the 1930s, it was understood that radio could be used as “an adjunct of
national sovereignty” or a means to “subvert it”, an “agent of social change or of social control”
(Cawte, 1996, p. 2). During the mid-20th Century, radio technology allowed all industrialized
nations (Browne, 2003), including democracies; e.g., the UK, Canada, Sweden, France, the
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG or West Germany), and the U.S. among them, along with
religious institutions like The Vatican, to create international broadcasting organizations to
deliver news and other programming, and to promote sovereign interests in the process. Nationsponsored international broadcasters included, among others, the BBC’s External Services (est.
1932 as the Empire Service to broadcast to colonies, after 1965 known as the BBC World
Service), Canadian Broadcasting Corporation International Service (est. 1942; after 1970 Radio
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Canada International), Radio Sweden International (est. 1938), Radio France International (est.
1975, with predecessor est. 1931), Germany’s Deutsche Welle (est. 1953 in West Germany), the
Voice of America (VOA, est. 1942 as part of the U.S. Office of War Information, broadcasting to
Nazi Germany), and Vatican Radio (est. 1931) (Wood, 2000). Many of these organizations
broadcast programs to Germany to counter Nazi propaganda during WWII and some took part in
de-nazification programming immediately afterward.
During the ensuing Cold War, for all of these international broadcasters, radio would be
an agent of sovereign nations, piercing the borders of closed media systems for the purposes of
countering the preferred narratives of target states with information and programming supportive
of the sponsoring nations’ ways of life and policies. State-sponsored broadcasters produced
programming in an array of languages aimed at particular populations in nations with closed
media systems in East-Central Europe and/or the Soviet Union. These international radios,
headquartered in their home sponsoring nations and overseen by citizens of sponsoring nations,
broadcast programs and content produced in part by émigrés from nations targeted for broadcasts.
Western journalists, too, worked for government-sponsored broadcasters.
The Cold War mission of international broadcasters like Canada's Radio Canada
International (RCI), the UK's BBC External Services (later World Service) and the U.S.'s VOA,
e.g., to provide news and other programming that contained knowledge about and promoted
understanding of the sponsoring nations' political systems, everyday life, culture and foreign
policy (Nelson, 1997; Puddington, 2000; Short, 1986; J. Tusa, personal communication, August
8, 2005) while ostensibly serving the target populations’ need for alternative information. As
such, Western international broadcasters’ programs were inherently counter-communist. From the
national capitols, Ottawa, London and Washington, D.C., e.g., these radio services produced
programs with a Canadian, British or American worldview. Radio services by the Roman
Catholic Church (Radio Vaticana), and a large cohort of stations sponsored around the world by
4

American evangelical Protestant sects (Wood, 2000) (including radio Heralding Christ Jesus’s
Blessings, or HCJB, headquartered in Quito, Ecuador reaching North and South America),
anchored transnational flocks via institutional rather than national authority, also took an anticommunist position (Browne, 2003).
A very few Western international broadcasters came to embrace an alternate,
experimental and more overtly anti-communist mission: to serve as a surrogate free press for
peoples inside totalitarian states where media were controlled by the state or the communist party.
A mission of surrogacy meant broadcasting news and other content as a “home” radio, a model of
a free press in an imagined democratic state, as if to say, Here is what news and analysis would
sound like in a democracy. Surrogates were also founded with a hope of agency beyond the
provision of alternative information: eventual citizen action toward the removal of communist
regimes and replacement with democracies.
Two such surrogate broadcasters were RFE, the U.S. experiment, and West Germany’s
Deutschlandfunk (DFL), both of which were headquartered in West Germany. Communist East
Germany (German Democratic Republic or DDR) began radio broadcasts across the border into
West Germany during the 1950s; the FRG responded with its own broadcasts, culminating in a
declaration of a public broadcasting organization, DFL, in 1960, headquartered in Cologne; DFL
added language services in addition to German, including Czech, Polish, and Russian, in the years
that followed. DFL broadcast into East Germany in pursuit of eventual reunification of the two
Germanys in a democratic state (Nelson, 1997; Short, 1986).
Likewise, RFE’s mission of surrogacy carried an entailment of the eventual fall of
communist regimes in nations targeted for broadcasts: Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Bulgaria and Romania, and the replacement of these regimes with democracies (J. F. Brown,
personal communication, June 30, 2005). Broadcasts to these nations, beginning with the first
Czech language broadcast on July 4, 1950 (Holt, 1958), signed on the air as, e.g., the "Voice of
5

Free Czechoslovakia” with a broadcast preamble that informed listeners that RFE would continue
to broadcast until listeners ceased to be enslaved (Johnson, 2010). This hourly “preamble” was no
longer used by the Czech desk after the revolution of 1989-90 (J. Mekota, personal
communication, July 28, 2005).
The services were referred to both at RFE and inside target nations as "The Radios", or,
in brief, "Free Europe", signaling RFE’s dual meaning and mission: not only combative -- to
“free” East-Central Europe – but also constructive of hoped-for end results – to establish “free”
and democratic states. A longtime editor for RFE’s Polish language broadcasting service declared
adamantly in an interview for this study that the mission could be described as: “One word:
Surrogate! . . . I never considered the Polish government legitimate. . . . [Poland] was occupied by
the communists. . . . It was our lifetime’s work to remove them” (G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal
communication, July 14, 2005).
It should be noted that this study focuses on the period of RFE’s revised and evolving
mission as a “surrogate free press”. The organization’s mission at the outset was a conceived as a
propaganda effort to counter ongoing Sovietization of East-Central European nations, to give
exiles a base from which to satisfy desires for activist opposition to communist regimes, and, for
its more optimistic founders in the U.S. intelligence and diplomacy, to stoke the desires of
populations to rise up and overthrow communism. RFE was staffed in during the early 1950s by a
mix of exiled elites, including members of ousted governments living in the U.S., and, once
broadcasting production was moved to Munich, exiles recruited from displaced persons camps in
West Germany. Broadcasts during the 1950s were overtly anti-communist, including direct and
harsh criticism of communist leaders from government officials in capital cities to directors of
individual factories. RFE language services broadcast recommendations and instructions to
listeners for subversive action and defection. James F. Brown, a British-American who served as
director of RFE overseeing the broadcasting services (1978-83) noted that after the late 1950s,
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RFE was no longer a “what it had been” - a “crude propaganda machine” (personal
communication, June 30, 2005).
RFE’s mission of surrogacy was to be accomplished largely by émigrés from target
nations in radio broadcasts, with “guidance” (a term used inside RFE) from American policy
officials. This coincided with the goals of émigré broadcasters themselves: to provide
information, including cultural texts, political commentary and otherwise inaccessible news
narratives that would “unmask the lies” (K. Kasparek, personal communication, July 11, 2005) of
communist regimes, in the hopes that citizens would eventually rise up against communist
regimes. However, groups within RFE differed in their conceptions of RFE’s surrogacy mission
and how it would be fulfilled. Western journalists staffed the central newsroom, where the
outcome of journalism – “democratic society” (Dahlgren, 1992, p. 18) – and modeling a free
press, of producing credible, accurate news, “full stop” (R. Hutchings, personal communication,
August 11, 2006), for populations otherwise denied accurate news of themselves and the world,
was enough. This meshed uneasily with the Cold War political aims of American management
and émigré broadcasters – subversion of communist states and eventual democracy. In that
uneasy alliance lies the crux of this study, the construction and negotiation of hybrid, hypervigilant Western journalistic practices at RFE.
Aside from its mission of surrogacy, RFE differed in an important way from other
international broadcasters. The headquarters of other state-sponsored radios lay inside their
sponsoring countries, many in capital cities, at the heart of foreign policy and domestic political
scuffles, and near the officials and legislative bodies that determined their fates and budgets. RFE
operated instead physically far from American halls of power and politics, but also outside target
territories. This distance from the sponsoring nation’s capital along with a location nearer to EastCentral European target nations than the U.S. itself would have important ramifications on the
staffing of the central news room and language broadcast services, and on negotiations of practice
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on unmapped territory that represented “home” to neither RFE’s international cadre of Englishlanguage journalists nor the East-Central Europeans who emigrated from target nations or came
from the East-Central European diaspora in the West to work in RFE’s language services. In
short, RFE’s journalists and news production center lay between its sponsoring nation and its
target populations.
In order to accomplish their missions, RFE and other Western international broadcasters
vied with state media and with each other in target nations for the attention and allegiance of
listeners. RFE’s output and audience made it a powerful rival for international broadcasters
competing for audiences in East-Central Europe. By 1984, RFE broadcast a substantially greater
number of hours per week to East/Central Europe (558) than did the VOA (103), the BBC's
External Services (87.5), or DW and DFL combined (85.8) (Short, 1986, p. 20). That same year,
daily and weekly listeners to RFE language services in each target nation were estimated as
substantially higher than any other western broadcaster, while the surrogate DFL was lowest of
all. In 1984, weekly listenership in Czechoslovakia for RFE was estimated at 4.3 million, for DFL
at 0.8 million. In Poland, RFE drew 18 million weekly listeners, and DFL 2.1 million (Short,
1986, p. 21). Of the two experimental surrogate international broadcasters, RFE is the most robust
case available.
Much research interest in RFE focuses on the outcome of its mission – the “effects” of
broadcasts – attempting to answer the question: Did RFE bring down communism? Michael
Nelson, former chief of Reuters during the latter years of the Cold War and author of “War of the
Black Heavens”, a history of Western international broadcasting to East Central Europe and the
Soviet Union, when asked about the significance of RFE versus other international broadcasters,
cited RFE’s mission as a surrogate free press in contrast to the missions of most Western radios:
[L]ike a surrogate national broadcaster, RFE had a concentration on domestic news of the
target country, and that is a big distinction between RFE/RL on one hand and the BBC
and VOA on the other. That’s why RFE was considered most important. Another reason
8

it was considered more important was that . . . they broadcast more hours than the BBC.
They did 18 hours or so a day, and the BBC broadcast six hours a day.
[O]f course the big dispute in my book is the whole thesis that they were
important in the downfall of Communism. It was only a view which I came to towards
the end of my research and interviews, but I became convinced of its importance. [I came
to this through] interviews [with citizens] and by statements by people like Gorbachev,
his statement to Margaret Thatcher, that it was not the U.S.’s Star Wars campaign but the
desire for freedom. And how did they know of freedom? From The Radios. It was 50
years of drip, drip, drip. (M. Nelson, personal communication, August 3, 2005)
There is agreement from RFE journalists on the drip, drip, drip source of RFE’s effects. “I was
once asked whether the radios were the cause of the collapse of communism,” remarked Stuart
Parrott, former CN London Bureau chief:
Of course not. Communism would have collapsed. But the contributions of The Radios
is [sic] that it created the idea of civic society in Eastern European societies. . . . When
the revolutions came, they were largely peaceful. Without The Radios, they could have
been more bloody. . . . Over the years, The Radios said a lot about nonviolence. . . . There
was a drip feed of this kind of information or propaganda if you like. (personal
communication, July 28, 2005)
Powers cites Wood (1992) and Holt (1999):
RFE/RL’s mantra, deeply stoked in the Western ideals of democracy promotion and the
development of civil society, was adopted from the UN’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights: ‘Everyone has a right to seek, receive and impart information regardless
of frontiers.’ (Powers, 2009, p. 60)
It is unlikely that the specific magnitude of RFE’s contribution to the fall of communism in EastCentral Europe can be measured statistically, reliably, in hindsight. Rather, it is more important to
acknowledge that RFE a unique part of a larger array of border-crossing drip-feeds of Western
media available to listeners, that RFE had become something of an icon in target states,
commonly acknowledged by former listeners, including listeners among the communist party
leadership, to have had some effect, and that the study of journalism in RFE’s unique,
experimental, siege-like context may speak more importantly to contemporary questions
surrounding news organizations and practices. News work and journalists, from professionals to
self-taught citizens, are under pressure globally, struggling to find ways to fund the production of
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reporting, analysis and commentary, and to challenge limits on access to information and the
array of voices and competing narratives available in the public sphere.
Rapid technological change affords individuals and groups the means to collapse time
and space (Hassan, 2008), dissolving previous boundaries and barriers to network and community
formation, information production and distribution, and the participation, collaboration and
conversation that happen in news space. As people adapt new communication tools, they
construct spaces that challenge existing media systems, policies, laws and norms. They compress
and alter the news cycles that previously distinguished among the phases of news production,
delivery and deliberation. Citizen and group use of alternative and social media challenge
mainstream media control over agenda setting and framing of news and opinion, eroding previous
barriers of mainstream media gatekeeping and blurring distinctions among journalists, sources
and audiences. Across the globe, media development programs originating in dominant nations
attempt to evangelize traditions of journalistic practice to other nations and cultures. Business
models that served Western news organizations during most of the last century, and which the
West also has attempted to transplant into developing and emerging nations, are struggling, and
the journalistic field is replete with experimentation.
Contemporary experiments in how to construct the organizational contexts for doing
news work, and the rapid adaptation of news work to global and hyper-local contexts, along with
the increased opportunities and risks that accompany innovation and challenging a complex of
borders and limitations, make journalistic practice in challenging conditions an everyday
proposition. These conditions of practice are particularly acute in the contexts of global reporting
on local unrest and conflicts inside totalitarian states, where state control over production,
dissemination and access to information is challenged by organizations, groups, individual
activists and journalists—self-trained and professional--who communicate using technological
tools that transcend geographical, regulatory and normative borders.
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State responses to these contemporary border-piercing practices include regulation and
the surveillance, the policing and censorship of media content and the voices of journalists and
citizens producing, consuming, sharing and commenting on content, and the blocking of
technologies that carry media. These conditions were also present beginning in the late 1920s,
through the 1930s and WWII, when radio offered a new means of reaching large audiences
instantaneously and simultaneously with identical content, shrinking time-space and transcending
the borders of nations. During the 1920s and 1930s, amateur broadcasters, political opposition
groups, corporations and European and Soviet governments rushed to experiment with wireless
communications. During the 1930s, governments competed for allegiances using medium-wave
and short-wave radio broadcasts in an array of languages to target audiences in colonies and
home territories, including East-Central Europe (Cawte, 1996). Competition and propaganda
efforts intensified during the late 1930s and 1940s, when European partisan group-run radios
broadcast to sympathizers in the hopes of challenging Nazi occupations. Counter moves included
increased regulation, confiscation of transmission towers, signal jamming and the arrests and
imprisonment of broadcasters and listeners. An array of actors would continue to use radio as a
means of transcending borders of all kinds, subverting regulation, reaching remote or barricaded
audiences, organizing resistance, contesting political allegiances, and propagandizing for many
purposes, from profits to politics, in the same way that media content reaches populations in
totalitarian states via human adaptations of other border-piercing technologies today.
During the Cold War, state-sponsored radio organizations, international broadcast
spectrum regulations, national frequency licensing, and the technologies to both geographically
target transmissions and to jam unwanted signals had all matured, normalizing international
broadcasting as a siege-like undertaking, but an instrument of political contestation nonetheless.
Cold War competition included target state jamming of the radio signals of Western international
broadcasters, especially those of RFE, and especially in the national capitals of East/Central
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Europe (Johnson, 2010; Nelson, 1997). East/Central European governments denounced “the
voices”, RFE’s émigré broadcasters, in state-controlled media (J. F. Brown, personal
communication, June 30, 2005; O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005), and
disciplined broadcasters’ family members through denial of opportunities in education and work
(P. Pechacek, personal communication, August 17, 2004). States threatened listeners to Western
radios with imprisonment, and monitored listener communications, e.g. letters and telephone calls
to RFE. Intelligence services of target nations also attempted to infiltrate the radios – sometimes
successfully -- with spies, including some who gained employment for a time, then returned home
to denounce RFE in highly publicized media events. Over the course of the Cold War, the
murders and attempted murders of RFE BD chiefs and prominent broadcasters and the bombing
of RFE in 1981 were attributed to the intelligence services of target nations (Cummings, 2009).
For journalists, individual activists and news consumers then and now, technologies that offer
border-crossing opportunities also make experimentation, adaptation, risk and uncertainty part of
everyday work.
Under such conditions, questions of journalistic legitimacy come into relief. How do
journalists -- whether self-trained or professionally trained -- construct, maintain and defend
conceptions of what it means to be journalists and to practice journalism while working in
contexts that defy boundaries – including those of states, laws and normative news practices?
Fundamental questions arise: Who is a journalist? What counts as journalism, under what
conditions of practice, and in terms of what relationships to power and to journalists’ conceptions
of news work? How do journalists of disparate national, cultural and group affiliations, with
disparate journalistic traditions, training and experience, conceive of what they are doing and
why, and how do they negotiate competing allegiances and conceptions of mission in practice?
These questions are by no means new. They certainly make Radio Free Europe (RFE) during the
Cold War an essential case study.
12

Radio Free Europe’s governance and organizational structure
Inside the U.S. during the 1950s and 1960s, RFE publicly represented itself as a nonprofit citizen-run organization governed by an independent Free Europe Committee (FEC) in
New York City (Cummings, 2010; Johnson, 2010). It was, however, surreptitiously -- unknown
to most of its fundraisers and journalists – advised and funded through the U.S. government via
the budget and policy “guidance” of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) until 1973. RFE
officials, management and other selected employees were made “witting”, however, and knew
full well that the organization was CIA-sponsored and that CIA employees were on staff (J. F.
Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005; R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13,
2005). In 1967, public revelations of RFE’s CIA ties published in the American alternative and
mainstream press led to media debate, eventually to congressional hearings and ultimately to
changes in RFE’s funding source, governance structure, mission statement, and broadcasting
policy.
During the 1970s, the U.S. Congress took responsibility for RFE’s funding and
established an ostensibly independent and bi-partisan broadcasting board (Johnson, 2010;
Puddington, 2000). Congress ordered the merger of RFE with another American surrogate
broadcaster located in Munich, Radio Liberty (RL) (broadcasting to, and in the languages of, the
peoples of the USSR), to form RFE/RL in 1976. RFE/RL offices and operations merged in RFE’s
headquarters building in 1978, and remained in Munich through the fall of communist
governments in East-Central Europe beginning in 1989, the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. during
the 1990s. A protracted U.S. political debate over the future of The Radios followed revolutions
in the broadcasting areas, with Congress ultimately deciding to shrink the organization’s size and
budget and move it to Prague in 1995.
The general organizational structure of RFE during the 1970s and 1980s was as follows:
One tier below top organizational management (which included American-appointed president of
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the radios and day to day administration by a vice president for policy and programs), a director
of RFE managed the group of radio broadcast desks (BDs) (Note: Another director managed
Radio Liberty’s services, but those radios and the practices of their exile broadcasters are not a
part of this study). Each RFE radio service was to constitute a surrogate source of news and
cultural, educational and political programming for the population inside a target nation, vying
with domestic state-controlled media to be perceived by listeners as “home” radios (J. F. Brown,
personal communication, June 30, 2005). Each broadcasting service operated semiautonomously, segregated by language (Polish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Romanian, with the
Czechoslovak service having two radios/desks, one broadcasting in Czech, the other in Slovak).
Other, smaller language services were added during Cold War, and all services were referred to
commonly as The Radios. Each language service or BD had its own director, editors, reporters,
program directors and other staff, and maintained its own offices, production studios and research
files.
The BDs were staffed in the main by individuals who had escaped or emigrated from
target nations, with a few staffers drawn from the diaspora of target nations (e.g., the Polish
émigré community in London). Some hires had been writers and editors in home nations, but
many émigrés had little or no journalism training or experience, and most had no broadcasting
experience prior to arriving at RFE, but were hired for their language, voice and writing skills and
talents. Over time, however, the training and experience of language service journalists rose with
years of tenure working at RFE and with the recruitment of younger, experienced journalists who
emigrated during the latter decades of the Cold War.
Across all BDs, the formatting of each broadcast hour included 50 minutes of language
service-produced programming (e.g., history, literature, music, sports, religion and political news
and commentary) developed by the BDs with the assistance of its own reporters and the central
newsroom’s wire copy, along with information reports from the Research and Analysis
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Department (RAD; see below). Programming differed in each BD according to the judgments of
desk chiefs, editors, reporters, commentators and broadcasters via their conceptions of what
populations in their nations of origin needed or wanted to know or hear. This study includes a
description of the ways that émigré broadcasters conceived of their work at RFE and the ways in
which journalism practice served as a means of constructing, legitimizing and authenticating
themselves and their broadcasts as home radio services.
The other ten minutes of each radio service’s programming hour were reserved for news
at the top of the hour. This content was drawn from the news produced by RFE’s Central
Newsroom (CN). The CN served as an internal wire service for the East-Central European BDs.
The CN, staffed by experienced journalists from primarily English-speaking Western nations,
produced an identical and continuous flow of news, features, commentary, and background
information to each of the language broadcasting services. Following the 1976-mandated merger
of RFE and Radio Liberty (RL) to form RFE/RL, the CN served the BDs of both organizations.
By 1988, the internal wire service supplied 21 radio services broadcasting in 23 languages (Radio
Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988, p. 5). This study takes into account
the conceptions of journalists who staffed the language broadcasting services, but focuses in
particular on journalism in the CN, the conceptions of its journalists, the construction of hybrid
Western practice unique to RFE, and the construction, maintenance and defense of practice from
the influences of the policy goals of American management and the political passions of émigré
broadcasters. Western journalists keyed on ideals of practice, adapted for the needs of the BDs
but focused on the human rights and informational needs of The Radios’ audiences.
Other organizational units at RFE had varying influences on the content of radio
programming. The Research and Analysis Department (RAD) performed a function critical to the
provision of credible information to listeners in East/Central Europe. Research staff – including
some Westerners, but a majority of émigrés from East/Central Europe and the Soviet Union -15

included academics, language and country experts and others. Research staff analyzed domestic
conditions inside target nations, including economies and social and cultural demographics, and
tracked the evolution of communist party leadership in each nation, and the creation and activities
of opposition groups and their members, including arrests and other state action against
dissidents. The department’s “Situation Reports” and “Country Reports” constituted a foundation
of information that compensated for a lack of access to target nations by radio service
broadcasters and journalists, CN journalists (note: until the mid-1960s, RAD reports were banned
from the CN by newsroom policy), and RFE management. The department’s reports were also
distributed to thousands of individuals outside RFE and were standard fare in the offices of
intelligence agencies, think tanks, American newspapers like The Washington Post and The New
York Times, and especially the offices of Western academics studying East-Central European
nations and the Soviet Union, particularly in U.S. universities (e.g., M. Feshbach, July 27, 2006;
R. Traycey, personal communication, December 4, 2010).
A Broadcast Analysis Department (BAD) periodically reviewed recordings of language
service programming -- after broadcasts -- to monitor whether language service staff continued to
follow RFE’s broadcasting policy. The sheer volume of broadcasting content prevented
previewing all programming scripts or monitoring broadcasts as they happened, although this was
attempted and quickly abandoned during RFE’s early years (R. E. Walter, personal
communication, July 13, 2005) prior to the establishment of the BAD. The BAD was managed by
Americans and staffed by émigrés, many of them former staff members of the language
broadcasting services. Broadcast analysis staff issued memos regarding broadcasting techniques,
tone and content, citing any violations of broadcast policy (e.g. after RFE’s Hungarian language
service broadcasts were blamed for inciting unrest during the failed 1956 uprising in Budapest,
RFE’s revised policy prohibited broadcasting recommendations for citizen action, the use of
derogatory adjectives and commentary describing communist leadership, personal attacks on
16

individual communist leaders, and the like). BAD memoranda were issued to American
management, including director of RFE overseeing the broadcasting units, and to the director of
the broadcasting unit whose programming was reviewed; with discussions sometimes following
(M. Bachstein, personal communication, July 10, 2005, and February 5, 2006).
Some departments had no involvement in news production and programming content or
their evaluation, but were critical to enabling reporting, credibility and listener access. A security
department provided a defensive rear guard, screening employees to weed potential agents of the
intelligence services of target nations from among employment applicants, and investigating
threats and other actions against language service employees (R. Cummings, personal
communication, July 13, 2005). Hundreds of technical staff, a mix of German nationals and
émigrés, assisted program production inside each language broadcast service. In Europe, five or
six transmission facilities employed hundreds of citizens in Portugal, Spain and West Germany
(Wood, 2000, p. 237), to accomplish by technological means the border-crossings and evasions of
signal jammers in target states. But RFE’s ability to report and produce program content also
depended on information gathered via border crossings in the opposite direction. In Schlessheim,
near Munich, a technologically sophisticated monitoring station relayed news media and
information sources originating in communist East-Central Europe, Soviet republics and China,
to RFE. RFE also monitored reception in target states to the extent technologically possible, from
locations near borders, and made adjustments to transmissions as necessary (Wood, 2000).
The organization’s top tier of management – RFE’s president and vice president
overseeing policy and all divisions and departments -- were often not former journalists but were,
without exception during RFE's history, American citizens. The director of RFE reported to this
tier of management. All language broadcasting units, and, until the mid-1970s, the CN, reported
to the director of RFE. After RFE merged with Radio Liberty (RL) was mandated by Congress in
1976, the CN was given divisional status as the News and Current Affairs Division (NCA),
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reporting directly to executive management (the vice president for policy and programming) on a
par, for example, with the directors of RFE, Research, Broadcast Analysis, and security;
divisional status carried consequences for autonomy and news practice.
Experimental aspects of RFE’s surrogate broadcasting organization lay partly in the
location of its headquarters and programming operations in West Germany. RFE’s Munich
headquarters was positioned outside the territory of the U.S., its sponsoring Western nation (for
all but its initial establishing years of 1950-51), and outside the nations to the East to which it
broadcast. In addition, RFE’s mission -- the violation of sovereign state borders to deliver mediaborne information in the hopes of transforming the target states themselves -- was aberrant to
Western journalism. RFE’s stated internal mandate in fulfillment of that mission, as commonly
understood by employees across decades in the CN, was to produce news on an “American
model” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005; T. Iliff, personal communication,
May 27, 2010; N. Kingsley, personal communication, September 28, 2006; G. Mater, personal
communication, August 28, 2006), but RFE’s BD and CN journalists also worked in
experimental spaces. In the BDs, Czechs, Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and Bulgarians were
émigrés not only from their home nations but also from previous professions; they learned
journalism for the most part on the job at RFE. BD staff delivered news to nations to which they
no longer had access, while characterized by government media narratives at home as traitors in
the pay of an enemy state. RFE’s central newsroom journalists, trained in many nations of the
West, produced a news feed for émigré broadcasters and ultimately for listeners in nations they
knew little about, while constructing practice in an organization that had no normative model or
peers in Western mainstream news traditions.

18

Rationale for Radio Free Europe as a case study in journalism
Given the above description, the choice of news organization for this research might
seem--on the surface -- anathema to the term journalism itself. From the start, RFE’s mission and
its intent to practice on an American model carried inherent violations of that model, most
importantly the foundational expectation for a separation of practice from the influence of
government. In the North American Liberal tradition of journalism, locations of practice must
achieve -- structurally or by some other means -- an independence or “critical distance” from
government (Curran, 2005, p. 123). According to Schudson (2005), the “North Atlantic or liberal
model” is “found in its extreme form in the USA and in more moderate form in Britain and
Canada” in which:
professional autonomy is high and jealously guarded, the favoured journalistic model
centred on providing information rather than providing commentary or advocacy,
although the British model welcomes commentary more than the American. . . . There is
a greater divorce between the media and political parties than in other systems. The role
of the state is more limited in the liberal model than in the other models, . . . even where
public broadcasting is powerful, as in Britain, it is relatively well insulated from political
control by the state. (p. 180)
Thus, in what RFE’s journalists referred to as an “American model”, legitimacy for news
organizations is assumed if certain structural prerequisites, such as functional barriers between
news practice and the influence of corporate owners and/or government, appear to have been
met. However, as two generations of news industry scholars and critics have noted, claims of
journalistic legitimacy thus understood do not mean that in practice, news production is free of
influence, or that violations of ethics and norms do not occur (Tuchman, 1978), nor that
reinforcement of hegemony is not mainstream journalism’s outcome (Gitlin, 2003). Conversely,
if a news organization violates expectations for structural conventions that confer such
legitimacy, does it automatically follow that tenets of practice are absent? How do journalists
working in such organizations construct practice? In short, how do they conceive and establish
their legitimacy as journalists?
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Current conversations about journalism reform in the U.S. include questioning
assumptions about structural characteristics, in particular the governance and financing of news
organizations, and the ability of journalism practice to shield itself from influence. As the
business model of American news declines, and, “[i]nside corporate-owned newsrooms, as profit
pressures have increased, informal ‘walls’ protecting the editorial side from business interference
have crumbled” (Benson & Powers, 2011, p. 9). At the same time, there has been resistance to
consideration of organizational structures that include government subsidies for journalism.
Those concerned about government involvement in journalism have legitimate concerns
about the ways federal funding can open the door to undue political pressure. While there
is broad agreement that the current situation in American journalism is a classic case of
market failure, remedial action has been stymied by the fear that any public policy cure
would be worse than the disease. The proper response to these concerns, however, should
be to identify how best to insulate journalists and newsrooms from political pressure, not
to throw the baby out with the bathwater. (Benson & Powers, 2011, pp. 2–3).
Not throwing the baby out with the bathwater also applies to decisions about which historical
models or experiments in news production might inform current questions as case studies of
journalism’s response to interference via structure and/or governance. And, once RFE is
examined beyond surface assumptions, at the level of its everyday journalistic practice, its value
as a case study in response to interference emerges, just as resistance to—and complicity with—
corporate, government or political interests and interference emerge on closer inspection of
everyday journalism organizations.
Indeed, paradoxes arise continually in a case study of RFE. Western journalists began
their work at RFE conscious that organizational governance and funding were murky (A.
Breslauer, personal communication, August 9, 2010). It should be noted, too, that U.S. media
leaders and practitioners themselves did little to expose or denounce CIA involvement during
RFE’s first generation of operation. For example, in an interview with Stacy Cone, Sol Stern, the
journalist whose March 1967 Ramparts investigative report exposed RFE’s CIA connection, cited
the complicity of the American mainstream press as a reason for the lack of watchdog rigor
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regarding the Radios’ governance and budget (Cone, 1998). In fact, the mainstream US media
system, including owners, publishers and journalists, were participants in a Cold War mindset
during the 1950s and early 1960s that kept anti-communist sentiment in the news and a
government watchdog role largely out of it (Liebovich, 1988). Complicity of the mainstream U.S.
press included the publishers of Time, Life and Fortune Magazines and the management of CBS
Television. In addition, the journalistic icons Edward R. Murrow and Walter Cronkite, along with
newspaper and magazine editors and publishers across the U.S., whether aware of CIA
involvement or not, participated in promoting and fundraising for RFE (Cummings, 2010).
Indeed, CBS president Frank Stanton was also a director of the Free Europe Committee and
participated as a corporate member of the Free Europe Committee’s Crusade for Freedom
campaigns to raise funds for the radios from US citizens from the 1950s through 1962. In 1957,
with Stanton’s permission, CBS news anchor and prominent journalist Walter Cronkite traveled
to Munich “on his vacation time” to narrate Towers of Truth, a film about RFE produced for
publicity and fundraising purposes and shown in Europe and the U.S. (Cummings, 2010, p. 161).
Yet, even as the watchdog function of western journalism was asleep relative to RFE in
news organization performance inside the U.S., an important watchdog function was alive and
well in Munich inside RFE itself, in the guise of fulfilling a mission of free press “surrogacy” on
behalf of radio listeners. Émigré broadcasters, research department personnel, and central
newsroom journalists saw themselves as not only gathering and reporting information alternative
to that in state-controlled media narratives inside target nations, but also challenging the “lies”
(O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005) of communist government information
through research and sourcing practices. RFE offered access to prohibited, illegal and otherwise
inaccessible cultural production including historical, literary, religious, musical and political
texts. The research department’s comparison of official communist states’ information with
demographic and other data gathered from many other sources, provided broadcast desks and
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audiences with alternative and, according to Western scholars and demographers of the time,
more accurate information on economic, social and cultural developments. This function, given
also RFE’s violation of sovereign state borders and its enmeshment in a U.S. government political
project, is a paradox – at once an embodiment and violation – of the watchdog function of
journalism.
However, that paradox, assessed through the lens of Western journalism practiced inside
democratic states where a plurality of information sources and a range of journalisms co-exist,
does not diminish the functional – and valuable -- outcome of RFE’s broadcast content for
listeners living in totalitarian states, that of serving as an alternative press (Andersson, 2004;
Puddington, 2000; Short, 1986) along with other international broadcasters. Nor does it diminish
the magnitude of RFE resources invested in the intensified practices of sourcing and factchecking, resources beyond the everyday norms of Western news organizations. Despite RFE’s
sponsorship and structure, the organization’s well of otherwise unavailable information on the
Communist world was regularly plumbed by reporters working for mainstream Western news
outlets. RFE’s association with government also does not diminish its effects on the communistcontrolled press inside target states, where availability of The Radios’ competing information and
narratives, as well as its popularity, challenged state media credibility and resulted in changes in
communist media coverage over time (e.g., in Czechoslovakia, see Shanor, 1968). Specifically
with respect to RFE’s central newsroom, it does not acknowledge Western journalists’ efforts to
ring-fence practice, wire service content and the ten minutes of news at the top of each broadcast
hour from inaccuracies in Western news media reports and from corrupting influences inside RFE
itself.
Contemporary experiments in the formation of news organizations and in news work
compel an examination of prior experiments, especially those previously positioned outside the
borders of journalism-with-a-capital-J because of their lack of compliance with institutional and
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normative expectations. News workers in surrogate international broadcasting organizations -- for
their work in contexts that violated prevailing norms, e.g., relationships to the state, to political
advocacy and conflict, and to all kinds of borders -- have been relegated by an assumption of taint
to the propaganda heap (with the term “propaganda” used here in its pejorative American
connotation rather than the traditional European usage denoting persuasive intent, as noted in the
following chapters). RFE’s journalists therefore exist on the fringes of journalism and journalism
history, for both Western journalists (by sanction) and scholars (by lack of study of RFE
specifically as a news organization (e.g., see Andersson, 2004). It’s time to take a look at the
conceptions and practices of journalists in one such surrogate broadcaster.
Rather than dismiss RFE as a worthy model because its contexts -- its state sponsorship,
its position on the front lines of ideological contestation, and its mix of trained-on-the-job and
professional journalists—were aberrant to the normative culture of Western news work during the
Cold War and therefore leave RFE without “home” journalistic turf, this study recognizes those
attributes as historically important to contemporary organizational experiments and contexts of
practice in journalism. It also recognizes the paradox that whatever violations of the structural
contexts of engagement were present, RFE shared the goal of journalism as conceived and
practiced in the West -- “democratic society” (Dahlgren, 1992, p. 18). And, further, if Herman
and Chomsky (2002) are right, and all Western journalists are tools of advertisers and/or
government, not to mention evangelists of anti-communism -- in effect, propagandists -- the
BBC, The Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, CNN, Australia’s ABC, and RFE, then, are
situated, along with RFE and other Western international broadcasters, in the same journalistic
field.
It may, however, remain tempting to dismiss RFE as a place of irredeemable and aberrant
practice, where journalists prostituted themselves as tools of government in exchange for tainted
paychecks. But such a dismissal would be an act of arrogance anathema to both scholarly
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research and journalism. It is unconscionable to assume knowledge of individual and group
intentions and actions based on surface appearances without asking questions of the targets of
those assumptions (Krippendorff, 2009). Did the prospect of fulfilling U.S. government goals and
intents draw experienced journalists from seven western democracies to jobs at RFE? This –
again, on the surface -- seems implausible.
There is a jarring contrast between the summary dismissal of RFE by Western journalists
who were “not there”, particularly American journalists who lacked international reporting
experience, and the Foreign Relations Committee testimony about RFE’s news production and
value as a check on government media in East-Central Europe. Mike Revzin, who ran a one-man
RFE bureau in Hong Kong, renting space from United Press International (UPI), and who later
worked for CNN, recalled “one frustration”. “People I met who knew about RFE, they tended to
have a favorable impression -- if they had worked in Europe or knew more about it. Usually, the
less experienced the journalist, the more they would put RFE down” (M. Revzin, personal
communication, November 29, 2010). American journalist and historian David Halberstam, who
was expelled from Poland for his reporting during the 1960s and who, along with many other
Western journalists working East-Central European beats, maintained professional relationships
with RFE journalists, visited RFE’s news desks and used RFE’s research department reports.
Halberstam noted RFE not only supplied alternative information, but made it necessary for
communist authorities “to be accountable, too”. Indeed, ‘the radios’ most eloquent defenders
turned out to be foreign correspondents with experience in the Soviet Bloc” (Puddington, 2000, p.
207) whose experience and networks placed them in direct contact, if not with RFE’s journalists
themselves, with the products of their news work by audiences in everyday life inside communist
states.
This study also speaks to larger questions. An assumption of taint-by-association seems
somewhat alien to the idea of journalism itself: everywhere, every day, there are journalists –
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again, self-trained through professionally trained -- working to gather and provide information
despite the challenges of borders, and under all manner of constraints, challenges, compromises
and risks. If there is a need for otherwise isolated populations to receive news and information
alternative to that provided or permitted by their own governments, or alternative to that filtered
through mainstream corporate news organizations, and if media systems, speech and press
regulations, and organizational structures for doing that work do not conform to Western
expectations for normative institutional structure, is any notion of journalism at all then to be
abandoned?
Such questions, along with the contexts given above of rapid technological change and
journalism’s global quests for reinvention, compel a re-examination of historical experiments.
They reinforce Nerone’s (1990) contention that there is no single linear or chronological history
of journalism, no solitary narrative explanation for the development and evolution of the press in
a particular locale or nation. Instead there are news media, which are not things, but networks of
relationships.
When we talk about journalism, we should be talking about it not as an autonomous set
of practices, but as a claim to identity that congeals around a given position within a
network of relationships. . . . [T]here have been many available positions, and therefore
many different journalisms. (Nerone, 1990, p. 22)
"Journalism", then, is not a fixed notion, but an identity constructed in a network of journalisms.
That network exists in what Zelizer (2005) describes as a:
culture of journalism [that] presupposes a wide range of internal and external conventions
that identify certain activities as journalistic but without the honorific aura attached to
‘being professional’; by definition, this opens journalism’s definition to activities that go
under the radar of professionalism – in alternative venues. (p. 201)
Hartley (1996) also contends that there is not single journalism, but journalisms that co-exist and
co-narrate the present, over time co-evolving the roles and practices of the press, and therefore of
journalists themselves. Journalists define practices and adopt identities that require boundaries
and discursive maintenance of those boundaries (Dahlgren, 1992).
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Whether news work takes place in mainstream or alternative venues (e.g., blogs), no
journalism is a-political. All journalists construct narrative accounts of the world, and all accounts
are by nature political acts (Nerone, 1990). By these accounts, all journalists and journalisms
engage in nation-building (Carey, 2007) or community-building. News work – any news work -is characteristically competitive within and among organizations (Schlessinger, 1999) and laden
with conflicts between professional norms and mission (Bantz, 1999). Scholarship reveals
journalists of disparate training and practice finding common values across national systems or
forms; e.g., tabloid and mainstream, or when commingling journalists from both sides of the Cold
War, East and West (Boyer, 2005; Hagen, 1997; Kilborn, 1993; Schudson, 2005).

The Research Study
This study examines RFE in terms of the conceptions of its news workers – those who
arrived at RFE as journalists with professional experience in the West and those who came to
RFE from other professions and self-trained on the job -- who, with varying degrees of trust,
cooperation and conflict, challenged a complex of professional, political and national borders in
order to offer alternative narratives to peoples living in totalitarian states. It also conceives of
RFE as an organization where different journalisms necessarily co-existed and co-evolved
internally. It recognizes connections of RFE journalists to other networked positions of practice
via their previous news experience, and their Cold War connections to Western journalists
covering East-Central European beats for mainstream news organizations. It recognizes their
(relative) disconnection via assumptions of taint (by government-sponsored news work) from the
larger network of Western journalisms. It also acknowledges that while RFE was established to
breach the Iron Curtain barrier between East and West, it was necessary at the same time to
construct and maintain a wall inside RFE to insulate the central newsroom, its journalists and
practices from interference of American management.
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For me, as a former journalist, studying RFE presents a troubling paradox—news work in
an organization sponsored by one government in order to counter the limits on access to
information and control over news accounts by other governments. My approach to RFE as a case
study does not ignore the historical, political and organizational contexts that made this
broadcasting organization an outlier among journalisms in the west during the Cold War. No
matter how it’s couched or nuanced in language, RFE was founded and funded to engage in
ideological warfare using the tools of news, analysis and information, and its mission mandated
the violation of sovereign boundaries of nation states. But it also existed to provide news to
populations denied access to information other than that produced under sanction by their own
government-controlled media, and that mission required the participation of sources and news
workers, citizen and professional, inside and outside the borders of totalitarian states, during an
era when Western nations initiated and achieved international agreement on universal human
rights to information that transcended geographical and state boundaries (“Helsinki Declaration,”
1975). Helsinki was both a justification for RFE in the West (Mahoney, 1976; Redlich, 1977) and
grounds for challenges from the communist world (Scott, 1976). RFE, in terms of Western
journalism, was at once an aberration and a humanitarian pursuit.
I wanted to “get the story” of RFE’s journalism in ways that included asking questions of
the journalists who did the work. I wanted to know who worked at RFE and why, and what news
practices looked like in an organization whose mission was to serve as a “surrogate free press” for
the nations to which it broadcast, even as RFE’s very structure violated the expectations for the
establishment of a free press in its sponsoring nation. Why would journalists join or continue
working at RFE after revelations in the U.S. press of the organization’s CIA funding during the
late 1960s? Why and how would Western journalists embed themselves in global ideological
conflict, cold or not, as participants with agency? In short, how did journalists at RFE think about
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their work and construct practice to meet their conceptions and expectations of what it meant to
be journalists?
Journalism in any context, but especially in wartime, as Zelizer noted above, is “messy”,
with ideals compromised and practice adapted to conditions every day, in “alternative venues”.
As a former journalist, I did not accept the premise that Western journalists who worked for RFE
were, at one extreme, unthinking government-controlled propagandists, or, at the other, simply
Cold War heroes. Hannerz (2002) acknowledged such polarities and the gap between them in
depictions of journalists, with the macro sociological view that describes journalists as puppets of
hegemony, while individual journalists are described as “strong” individuals or heroes. I wanted
to investigate RFE journalism using methods that avoided both polar positions, to describe RFE
in the gap between the two, in short, to describe a network position or conceptual space for
understanding how journalism happened at RFE. This study assigns to the journalists who did the
work at RFE the same courtesy assigned to research participants in any study – the dignity of
having minds of their own. It also assumes that news workers at The Radios, like journalists
anywhere, no matter the contexts or constraints, had some measure of individual and group
autonomy and agency to act upon their conceptions of journalistic practice in terms of not only its
legitimacy but also its authenticity in spirit. And, it offers a counter-intuitive conclusion: that
while journalism at RFE took place in contexts that can be described as “messy”, the response by
journalists was to construct practice that can be more aptly described as hyper-vigilant.
Perhaps most importantly, this study investigates journalism in a network position or
conceptual space – a thin space, indeed – in which RFE’s Western journalists constructed a
unique, hybrid and hyper-vigilant practice. In order to respond to the human rights to information
needs and the mis-information of state media in totalitarian states using the sole means available
at the time – international broadcasting, CN staff had to respond to a mandate to practice on
American-style journalism in an organization that by its mission might have made that inherently
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impossible. They had to perform journalism between worlds that assigned taint and risk to their
work – between the tenets of journalism in the West and the ears of listeners at risk in EastCentral Europe, and, inside RFE, between the policy goals of American management officials and
the political passions and learned-on-the-job journalisms of émigrés on the broadcast desks. The
thinness of that space of practice rendered CN news workers residents of journalistically
uncharted territory, in other words, professionally stateless. As such, it is important to
conceptualize CN journalists, like their newswire clients in the BDs, as exiles.
What did these challenging contexts of practice at RFE demand of journalists who did the
work? Historian and journalist Timothy Garton Ash (The Frontline Club, 2010), in an interview
at The Frontline Club for foreign correspondents in London, asserted that the quality of news, of
journalism itself, ultimately rests with the individual journalists themselves. It will be show here
that the absence of alignment with normative organizational structure and governance – a cocoon
that confers assumptions of authenticity on the practice and the work of individual journalists in
the West, earned or not -- drove RFE’s Western journalists to intensify rather than to abandon a
quest for authentic practice. The analysis shows that the struggle for legitimacy, sometimes
referred to in this study as authenticity because it involved not only assumptions conferred (or
not) by organizational structure and relationships, but more importantly conceptual and
performative aspects, was a central driver for the ways that RFE journalists constructed, adapted
and defended practice. It also suggests that studies of other experimental or transnational or
global news organizations past and present might reveal continual group struggles to construct,
maintain and defend different conceptions of what being a journalist and doing journalism in now
commonly “messy” contexts means in practice. And, it suggests further study of the dynamics of
practice when groups formed from a global mix of professionally trained and self-trained
journalists work together.
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The story of RFE published to date has privileged the voices of American managers and
the East-Central European directors and especially prominent personalities of the BDs. Most of
the general histories of the organization (Holt, 1958; Johnson, 2010; Michie, 1963; Mickelson,
1983; Puddington, 2000; Urban, 1997) have been written by Americans who are former RFE
insiders who held management positions, and most are reflections or memoirs focusing on RFE’s
role in the politics and events of the Cold War. A few more recent insider histories, e.g.
Puddington (2000), Johnson (2010) and Cummings (2009, 2010), have employed exhaustive
examination of archival documents, including RFE corporate and research department collections
made available during the past decade. Other analyses by insiders focus on the organization’s
political goals, the roles and effects of broadcasts for listeners in East-Central Europe, memoirs of
particular broadcast desks, questions of ideology and propaganda, international broadcasting’s
role in “public diplomacy”, or RFE’s role in specific Cold War crises, e.g. the Poznan riots and
the Hungarian uprising of 1956. New examinations of aspects of RFE by scholars independent of
employment or oversight associations with RFE are emerging, but none focus on the work of
Western journalists in the central newsroom in Munich, or on its bureaus.
Thus, some voices at RFE, voices never heard in radio broadcasts, those of journalists in
the CN, especially those below the rank of newsroom director or deputy director – the everyday
reporters and editors – are absent almost wholly from RFE scholarship; in addition, no CN
journalists have written memoirs. Journalists trained in the practice traditions of at least seven
Western nations – Australia, Canada, the UK (including British, Irish and Scottish journalists),
the U.S., New Zealand, Ireland, and West Germany, with a small number of East-Central
Europeans staffing the central monitoring unit’s incoming news feeds from media in communist
states – worked together in the CN in Munich and in up to ten bureaus in North America and
Western Europe. CN journalists were aware of the critical role embodied in its practice and in the
accuracy and credibility of its news file; the CN served as a model of Western journalism practice
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for the staff of the BDs inside RFE as well as, through news copy that anchored each broadcast
hour of BD programming, radio listeners in totalitarian states. This is the first examination of the
CN from the point of view of its journalists and their conceptions of RFE’s mission and practice.
And since RFE – and international broadcasting in general – use journalism as a means, and since
RFE’s mandate was American-style journalism, with the CN the anchor and source not only for a
daily news budget but for news practices constructed to maintain hyper-vigilant standards within
an experimental organization in which pressures came at news from all sides, a study of the CN is
essential for an understanding of RFE itself.
The official organizational name for the RFE’s internal wire service changed as the
structure of RFE and RFE/RL evolved; initially it was the CNR (Central News Room) within the
department of news and information, and later the CND (Central News Division); still later, the
CN was part of a News and Current Affairs (NCA) division, but for the purposes of this study, the
term Central Newsroom or CN, the slugline used at one period in its newsfeed, will be used. At
the time of the revolutions in East-Central Europe in 1989-90, RFE/RL had a budget of $190
million and employed almost 1,800 workers overall (Kamm, 1990). The CN, then part of an NCA
of under 100 workers, included 30 editors and writers and 12 support staff (Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988, p. 15).
This study incorporates new data including in-depth interviews and ongoing
correspondence and conversations with former employees, and documents created and collected
from personal papers during those conversations. During trips to Germany, Hungary, the Czech
Republic, the UK and the U.S. during 2004 – 2012, I located former journalists, broadcasters and
managers who had worked at RFE and RFE/RL between 1951 and RFE’s closure in Munich on
June 30, 1995. The data include more than 100 in-depth interviews and, in many cases, ongoing
correspondence, with 70 individuals who worked in Cold War international broadcasting; many
also had worked in Western mainstream news organizations. The research also incorporates
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documents from RFE/RL archives, published and unpublished memoirs, and histories of RFE and
other international broadcasting organizations.
Critical to this study are the theory of the social construction of reality (Berger &
Luckmann, 1966; Dourish, 2001; Shotter, 1985) and Anderson’s (1991) idea of media’s
relationship to the imagined nation. I used a pastiche of methods of including historical
ethnography (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Clifford, 2012; C. A. Davies, 1999; Reddy, 1992, 1999)
and adopted an approach to analysis where social construction and narrative analysis intersect
(Bruner, 1991, 2004). I placed RFE interviews and documents contributed from personal papers
and created during research, along with memoirs and published histories in conversation with
each other to reveal group and individual conceptions of RFE's mission and on journalism
practice over time. I collected data and completed and tested preliminary analyses in conference
papers and in ongoing conversation with participants, side by side from 2004-2012.
The following chapters describe RFE, it’s historical context, internal groups practicing
journalism, and the conceptions and practices that evolved over 40 years at RFE during the Cold
War. Chapter 2 describes, albeit briefly and in broad strokes, the Cold War contexts for
journalism at RFE, and outlines the structure and history of RFE as an organization in terms of
developments and turning points important to the evolution of its news practices. Chapter 3
describes the methods used to complete this study. If focuses on the problems inherent in a first
study of journalism at RFE where previous analyses and opportunities for ethnographic
immersion in newsrooms were absent. It outlines the production of primary data and analysis of
that data in conversation with available primary and secondary sources to arrive at an
understanding of news work where ethnographic immersion in RFE’s newsrooms was no longer
possible. Chapter 4 focuses on conceptions of émigrés working in the language broadcast
services. It positions them as exiles and trained-on-the-job journalists producing content unique to
the Cold War. It describes group relationships in and among the BDs, and between the BDs and
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other RFE groups, particularly American management and Western journalists. It describes the
ways in which exiles’ experiences in home nations prior to emigration, their conceptions of
culture and the nation and the needs of listeners, along with RFE’s mission manifest in the
creation of a unique, radio-mediated, surrogate free press for imagined democratic nations.
Chapters 5 and 6 describe the conceptions and practices of Western journalists who worked in
RFE’s internal wire service providing news to the language desks. These two chapters, together
with Chapter 1, posit Western journalists also as exiles, by virtue of organizational positioning,
structure and governance aberrant to Western journalism and the assumption of taint by outsiders.
They describe the mix of journalists working in the CN and their negotiations with groups inside
and outside RFE relative to practice. Together, they describe the construction, maintenance and
defense of a unique, Western hybrid and hyper-vigilant practice. Most critical to this study overall
are journalists’ knowledge and understanding of the human rights and informational deficits of
RFE’s intended audiences, and the risks borne by those who chose to listen. Chapter 7 concludes
the study, suggesting that the RFE historical case, and the ways in which two groups of outsider
(exile) journalists negotiated conceptions of their roles at RFE in news practices, constitute an
experiment that presaged the environment in which journalists practice today.
At the outset, I offer two journalists’ answers to questions facing those who chose to do
news work at RFE. Michael Nelson led Reuters during the latter Cold War and afterward
assumed a role as an historian of international broadcasting; his research benefited from singular
access to the briefly opened archives of the former Soviet Union during the early 1990s. When
asked about the propaganda aspects of journalism work at RFE, Nelson responded, “They knew
what they were doing” (M. Nelson, personal communication, August 3, 2005). In contrast, Stuart
Parrott, a native New Zealander who grew up following his journalist father around the world,
and whose prior professional practice included stints at British and Australian news
organizations, worked for RFE’s central news room over several decades and in multiple roles,
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including reporter, editor and London bureau chief. From London, for instance, Parrott delivered
safety precautions for listeners after the Chernobyl nuclear disaster in the Ukraine in 1986 when
Soviet government media withheld news of the disaster for almost three days. When asked why
he chose to participate as a journalist at RFE, to be paid from the coffers of the U.S. Congress, he
responded not in terms of worry about what other Western journalists might think, but in terms of
the needs of listeners in totalitarian states, stating simply, “Someone had to do this job” (S.
Parrott, personal communication, July 28, 2005).
The whys and hows of “they” -- the someones who knew what they were doing – who
were aware of the risk of professional taint yet also the audience’s state-imposed isolation and
need for alternative information – yet did this job anyway, are the subject of this case study. The
outcome of their efforts and professional risks in the pay of one state in order to counter the limits
on citizen access to information in other states, turns on struggles over practice, and on the need
to construct ways of being journalists and doing journalism in uncharted territory, where border
crossings achieved via technology, and where a mix of self-trained and professional journalists
from disparate cultural origins and motivations addressed the everyday messiness of working
together in a news organization that was at once “propaganda” and a “surrogate free press”.
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CHAPTER 2: RADIO FREE EUROPE’S COLD WAR CONTEXT AND
ORGANIZATIONAL EVOLUTION

The past, which as always did not know the future, acted in ways that ask to be imagined before
they are condemned. Or even simplified.
– Paul Fussell (1988)
People forget what the Cold War was like. It really was a war, and we were a weapon in that
war.
– James F. Brown, former Director, RFE, interview with author, June 30, 2005

Carey's (1974) cultural approach to journalism history suggests that part of the task of
understanding is to recover "forms of imagination" behind past actions (p. 3). To understand the
use of wartime vocabulary inside Radio Free Europe’s (RFE) Munich headquarters, for instance,
where employees referred to the building’s cafeteria as a “canteen”, and to understand why a
participant in this study announced that it would be impossible to write about RFE without
mentioning “Captive Nations Day”, it is necessary to acknowledge that RFE’s journalists
reported world news and the domestic news of “target nations” while embedded in the events and
rhetoric of the Cold War. War, as an establishing metaphor, introduces structure (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980). RFE’s founding, mission, geographical positioning, broadcasting model,
selection of target audiences, and changes in governance and funding over time cannot be
understood without mapping the organization’s historical and conceptual space. Understanding
the construct of war and enduring siege-like conditions in which Free Europe journalists worked
requires reiteration of a Cold War imaginary.

The birth of RFE during post-WWII occupation of Central Europe
The post-WWII occupation map of Europe led to RFE’s conception, its broadcasting
model, and the strategic selection of populations targeted for broadcasts. By 1946, post-WWII
European military occupations placed peacetime armies and the ideological, security, economic
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and other interests of Western European nations and the U.S. in direct contact and competition
with those of their former wartime ally, the U.S.S.R. Four former Allies (the U.S., the U.S.S.R.,
the United Kingdom and France) occupied the nations that comprised a geographical buffer zone
between the Western democracies that were allies on the former western front and their uneasy
alliance with the communist Soviet Union to the east. After the war, all four allies occupied a
defeated Germany, Austria and Romania, while the Soviet Union alone occupied parts of Poland,
Hungary and Bulgaria. In a 1946 speech from Fulton, Missouri, Winston Churchill famously
declared that an “Iron Curtain” now divided “free” Europe from enslaved Europe. By 1948,
Soviet-allied communist parties moved to silence rival political parties in five nations of Eastern
Europe; communists took power in Soviet-occupied Romania, Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria,
while a coup brought the communist party to power in Czechoslovakia. As many political
partisans in East-Central European nations fled west, new communist regimes took control of all
media, including news. The press would be, in Soviet Leninist terms, an instrument of change for
the communist project.
These newly communist party-controlled states were referred to in the West as “captive
nations” (Michie, 1963, p. 2), a term used also inside RFE during the Cold War. Descriptors such
as “captive nations” and “enslaved peoples” were ritualized in annual observances of “Captive
Nations Day”. East-Central European nations and peoples were considered by the Western
democracies as historically and culturally part of Europe rather than the Soviet Union. They
included nations that had been receptive to democratic ideals in recent history (e.g., pre-war
republics in Czechoslovakia and Poland). The West referred to these nations as “captive” because
communist ideology and party control had been imposed during Soviet occupation or through
coup d’état without the majority consent of citizens.
American strategists, with the assistance of communities of East-Central European
émigrés living in the US, began to plan propaganda activities in the hopes that popular uprisings
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would unseat communism. Though a coherent plan for the “basic goal of ‘peaceful liberation’” of
captive nations had not been agreed upon, a “propaganda instrument” was to be part of strategy
(Holt, 1958, pp. 18–20). RFE emerged as an experimental part of this strategy, and five nations in
the buffer zone between the Soviet Union in the east and European democracies in the West –
Poland, Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria (and briefly, Albania) -- would be
“targets” of RFE broadcasts.
The high stakes brinkmanship of the Cold War included developments more hot than
cold. Communists took power in Eastern European nations by 1948 and China by 1949, with
other nations, for example, Cuba (1959) and Angola (1976), following. Battles erupted to contest
across many potential territorial stake-holds of communism too numerous to mention
comprehensively here. For example, the 1950s featured the Soviet occupation of Korea and U.S.
military response in the South. Alliances of nations of the West in NATO and the Soviet Union
and East-Central Europe in the Warsaw Pact faced each other in a standoff in Europe by 1955. A
nuclear arms race included tit-for-tat development and testing of ever-more-powerful weapons,
with the U.S. and the USSR both wielding atomic bombs by 1949, with Britain, France (1960)
and China (1964) and others following suit. Progressively escalating arms development, e.g., the
development and installation of ballistic missiles countered by anti-ballistic missiles, continued
throughout the Cold War, with periodic international arms control agreements intervening. Soviet
or Warsaw Pact military interventions occurred during uprisings, e.g., in East Germany (1953),
Poland (1956), Hungary (1956), and Czechoslovakia (1968). The U.S. intervened in other
nations, e.g., in the Dominican Republic (1965). Threat-of-war brinksmanship erupted over
events in Berlin, including the Berlin Blockade, 1948-49, Soviet demands for Western occupation
troops’ withdrawal from the city (1958), and the construction of the Berlin Wall (1961), and, in
Egypt (British, French, Israeli invasion during the Suez Crisis in 1956, with the U.S.S.R.
threatening to bomb those nations’ capitols), and, in Cuba, the Bay of Pigs invasion (1961) and
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the real possibility of nuclear war that accompanied the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962). Protracted
wars in Korea (1950-53) and Vietnam (1954-75) featured financing, military strategy and arms
and/or ground troops supplied by opposing Cold War powers and allied nations.
The Cold War’s hot war features injected fear into everyday life, with citizens in each
world made aware of advancements in nuclear weaponry and induced to prepare for eventual
attack by the other side. For example, during the 1960s, on President Kennedy’s advice, many
Americans built fall-out shelters. During the 1950s, state radios in East-Central Europe told
listeners that Americans were dropping insects infected with deadly bacteria over North Korea
with the help of “war criminals” from Japan (Shanor, 1968, p. 156). Even children participated in
both worlds, for example, marching in drills toward hiding places in school basements in a small
town in Czechoslovakia during the 1970s to evade chemicals that would someday fall on the
population from American planes (L. Vitcovicova, personal communication, March 29, 2003), or
practicing “duck and cover” drills in classrooms in the U.S. to prepare for future Soviet bombings
(for more on Cold War manifestations in the U.S., see Whitfield, 1996)
On the “cold” side of the Cold War, surrogate battlegrounds emerged for public
performance and contestation of ideological superiority through intellectual and physical prowess
of citizens. In a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Space Race, the Soviets preceded the Americans into Earth’s orbit
with the launch of the satellites Sputnik I and Sputnik II in 1957 (sparking U.S. fears of satellite
nuclear attack launch capabilities), and sent the first man, Yuri Gagarin, into space on Vostok I in
April 1961. Americans countered a month later with Freedom 7 carrying Alan Shepard, and with
John Glenn’s mission into orbit in 1962. Apollo 11 planted two American men and a flag on the
moon in 1969. Both nations established space stations and shuttled astronauts, scientific
experiments and military satellites into space. In Earth-bound competitions, the Olympic games
provided global media events with proxy wins and losses by individual athletes and national
teams. The Olympics also featured background contests over the rules of engagement, from
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disputes over designations for amateur and professional athletes groomed under different systems,
to challenges over the credentials of journalists as representatives of sovereign states (in
particular, those of the journalists at RFE).
But another feature of the Cold War made “captive nations” and “enslaved peoples” more
salient than as mere rhetorical devices of propaganda in the West, and situated RFE’s mission as
more significant in a humanitarian sense than a limited conception of The Radios as media-borne
extensions of ideological warfare: the real barriers around the communist project that included
not only prohibition of physical travel and emigration beyond the Soviet sphere, but also the
systematic establishment of cultures of surveillance, fear and punitive action. The “target” of RFE
news work, for its journalists, were realities of life under 20th Century communism that included
the routine arrests, incarceration, relocation to labor camps, and/or murders of millions of people
in East Central European nations and the republics of the Soviet Union, and the brutal
suppression of speech and access to and circulation of information about the world, and with that,
the prohibition of human imaginings and expressions of other ways of being in the world.
While citizens in Western nations might read news of Cold War brinksmanship, or works
by dissidents emigrating to the West, e.g., Andrei Amalrik’s memoir, Involuntary Journey to
Siberia (1971) or his essay, “Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984?” (1969), or Aleksandr
Solzhenytsin’s bestselling novel, One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich (published in the USSR
in 1962; English translation published in the West, 1963), RFE employees were aware of Cold
War developments in intimate ways that journalists and populations in Western democracies were
not. Broadcast Desk staff members had lived in their nations of birth under communism and had,
by some speech or action, run afoul of surveillance states. They were embedded in continually
replenished émigré communities in Munich that kept news of conditions inside target states close
at hand. At work, employees in the language broadcasting services (broadcast desks or BDs)
received letters and telephone calls from citizens inside target states responding to program
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content or reporting anecdotal events or conditions. Reports and updates from RFE’s Research
and Analysis Department (RAD) on the suppression of speech, the arrests and harassment of
dissidents and opposition groups, removal of citizens to forced labor camps or gulags, purges and
show trials of communist party members, and other conditions inside communist states, were
everyday fare for BD and Central Newsroom (CN) journalists. The vigilance required to ferret
false or planted stories from news wires East and West, the knowledge of the harm that could
come to listeners who shared or acted on inaccurate news or news unreported or delayed in target
states (as in the case of the release of radiation after the Chernobyl nuclear power plant failure in
the Ukraine) kept RFE journalists embedded in a Cold War realities in ways that were understood
by Western journalists assigned to beats in communist states (Amalrik, 1971; Puddington, 2000),
but that were not felt intimately by Western journalists working solely on home turf (Revzin,
personal communication, November 29, 2010). RFE journalists, in short, practiced in a different
wartime world.

RFE’s founding, broadcasting model and strategy
The conception of media, including radio, as weapons of political contestation was
certainly not new, as noted in the introduction to this study. Nations use media to exert and
expand cultural and economic influence (Heyer & Crowley, 1995). Research by Schiller, et al.
(1989) describes the U.S.'s de facto post-World War II information policy as ubiquitously and
ideologically anticommunist, while pursuing markets for U.S. goods, including media, so that
American policy conjoined a free market mentality with a doctrine of freedom of information.
Communication research at mid-20th Century regarded radio as one-way delivery system for
targeting messages that could produce short-term powerful effects (Katz, 1987), and some of
RFE’s founders and early managers adopted this conception. It is more apt for the purposes of
this study to specify communist regimes as “targets” rather than nations or peoples. RFE’s
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journalists themselves did not conceive of their audiences as “targets” or the effects of their news
content and broadcasts as productive of direct, powerful effects after the early 1950s.
RFE had no clear mission at the start—what it would "do" and to what “effect”-- other
than to offer employment to émigré leaders in the West, especially the U.S., and to help defeat
communism using direct communication that would maintain and inspire resistance inside target
nations (Mickelson, 1983; Johnson, 2010). Founders had hoped that the peoples of captive
nations would rise up, oust communist party-led governments, and replace them with democratic
regimes. During the early 1950s, RFE's founding strategists, including the Free Europe
Committee and U.S. policy and intelligence officials, as well as émigré broadcasters, expected
these powerful effects to be achieved through broadcasts advocating political change (Johnson,
2010; Puddington, 2000).
RFE was officially a child of The Free Europe Committee (FEC). The Committee was
founded in 1949 and headquartered in New York City. The FEC’s early ill-defined mission arose
in part from the need to respond to calls from émigré groups for official American responses to
political developments in East-Central Europe (Johnson, 2010; Nelson, 1997; Puddington, 2000).
The establishment of the FEC was an extension of a 1940s strategy of maintaining
communication with émigré communities in the U.S. (Johnson, 2010). The existence of the FEC
would shift émigré agitation from the door of the U.S. government in Washington, D.C. to a
private organization in New York City that could coordinate among groups and efforts.
A year into its existence, the FEC formalized a relationship with the new U.S. Office of
Policy Coordination (OPC) and the fledgling Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the post-WWII
successor to the US Office of Strategic Services (OSS), for the purposes of policy guidance and
funding. The OPC was “loosely connected” via offices and funds to the CIA, but “responsible to
the secretaries of state and defense” (Johnson, 2010, p. 11),
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‘to plan and conduct covert operations’ to counter Communist activities directed against
U.S. interests. Such operations, including ‘assistance to refugee liberation groups,’ along
with ‘propaganda’ and ‘subversion against hostile states,’ were to be so conducted ‘that
any U.S. Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and
that if uncovered the U.S. Government can plausibly deny any responsibility for them’.
(p. 11)
During its first few years, RFE was a confused child of a fledgling U.S. intelligence
community (Nelson, 1997; Puddington, 2000), whose overtures to the U.S. State Department for
strategic advisement and recognition were not immediately embraced (Nelson, 1997). RFE’s illdefined mission and structure evolved quickly during the early 1950s. The general propaganda
goal was to challenge communism through direct radio communication from émigrés to their
home populations in Eastern Europe. On the practical side, one US goal was to supply jobs for
political refugees who had fled nations where communist parties had taken control (Holt, 1958;
Johnson, 2010; R.E. Walter, personal communication, July 1, 2005). The FEC’s early goals were
to deliver information and propaganda to encourage resistance to communism in East-Central
Europe. They included, e.g., a series of mass balloon-launched message drops to Czechoslovakia,
dubbed the “Winds of Freedom”. The organization also initiated a massive book distribution
program and, a radio broadcasting organization, RFE.
A practical model for RFE’s broadcasting scheme arose also from the post-WWII
occupation scheme for a defeated Nazi Germany. In 1946 Germany was occupied by former
wartime Allies: the Soviet Union, Britain and the U.S. (and France in 1949). The capital city of
Berlin lay inside the Soviet-occupied zone, but the city itself also was divided into occupation
sectors. In Berlin, the U.S. and Germany jointly sponsored Radio in the American Sector (RIAS).
Germany’s media institutions, organizations and publications had been decimated by war, and
RIAS was conceived as a home or domestic radio service that broadcast news and other content
to German citizens, with an added task of encouraging de-nazification of the population
(Schlosser, 2008).
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RIAS was located inside Germany, broadcasting news and other programming in the
German language to fellow Germans, but Germany would soon be divided and RIAS would
become a cross-border broadcaster with an altered mission. In 1949, just as strategists in the U.S.
began to formulate ideas for RFE, two German states were formed from the occupation zones.
The Soviet-occupied zone became the German Democratic Republic (GDR) or East Germany,
while the remaining three zones comprised the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) or West
Germany. Berlin, too, became a divided city, with the Soviet zone as East Berlin and the three
other zones (French, British and American) comprising West Berlin. West Berlin, as part of the
FRG, would become an island of Western Europe inside the communist world, and RIAS found it
necessary to counter propaganda broadcasts from the GDR’s radios Deutschlandsender (East
German broadcasts produced as propaganda for Germans in the West) and Berliner Rundfunk
(Schlosser, 2008). RIAS from 1949 onward would have a “primarily political mission of
undermining the GDR’s government”, yet “it would be wrong to characterize both RIAS and
Berliner Rundfunk as simply propaganda stations that focused on refuting what the other said”
(Schlosser, 2008, p. 4). RIAS’s news was accurate, its jazz and orchestral music broadcasts were
popular, and it avoided the polemics broadcast by its East German competitors, but its
“’objective’ reporting was neither neutral nor unbiased reporting. It was factual reporting
designed to achieve a political end” (Schlosser, 2008, p. 6); it supported a mission of destabilizing
the GDR . “Truth” and entertainment otherwise unavailable to listeners were the weaponry of
RIAS. RIAS continued to broadcast after West Berlin survived and endured as a free city inside
communist East Germany, connected via air transport and a train corridor to West Germany.
RIAS was not only popular in the GDR (Short, 1986); it “became the preferred source of news
and information amongst East German listeners” (Schlosser, 2008, p. 2). [Note: Following the
reunification of Germany, RIAS, and West Germany’s international broadcasting organization,
Deutschlandfunk, along with a third station, merged to form Deutschland Radio Berlin in 1994.]
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RIAS’s American-managed, German-produced over-the-border broadcasting and
program model inspired the founders of RFE (Johnson, 2010; G. Mater, personal communication,
August 28, 2006; Nelson, 1997; Puddington, 2000). RFE, like RIAS, would be a surrogate home
or domestic radio service broadcasting in the languages of target populations. “Truth” that
countered the “lies” of communist state media, political commentary and entertainment otherwise
unavailable to listeners would be RFE’s weapons. But RFE’s task would diverge from that of
RIAS. RIAS, aside from its American management, had a nearly all-German staff, many of
whom had grown up in towns that now lay in the communist East, and RIAS journalists
considered the GDR “an integral part of their Germany and their homeland”, territory that was
simply – and temporarily -- occupied by a foreign force (Schlosser, 2008, p. 134). RIAS’s
German staff members conceived of themselves as broadcasting from “home”, to “home”.
Here, RFE diverges from RIAS conceptually. As surrogates, RFE’s language
broadcasting services were also in direct competition with state-controlled media in target states.
Broadcasters considered “home” nations as occupied territory (e.g. G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal
communication, July 14, 2005), and embraced a mission to make RFE’s services “home” radios
for listeners. But RFE’s radios competed from a position of between-ness, external to both the
territory of its U.S. sponsoring government and also to the nations to which it broadcast.
Positioned in Munich, RFE’s East-Central European staff members broadcast as exiles, from
territory that was “not home”, asking listeners to join them in a common space, a to-beconstructed democratic “imagined home” nation, a conception manifest and anchored in no
territory other than inside RFE’s radio broadcasts. They did so with necessarily foreign
sponsorship, and while having to substitute access to living nations with the periodic hiring of
newly emigrated staff and through hyper-vigilant monitoring not only of news, but of changes in
culture, language, politics and dissent. Thus, while RIAS broadcasters enjoyed the assumption of
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territorial “home” status and conceivable legitimacy and authenticity; RFE’s journalists faced
tasks that required the continual construction and pursuit of all three.
At RFE, a wartime context included the organization’s presence within an atmosphere of
Cold War intelligence intrigue in Munich. During its earliest days, the FEC had maintained
RFE’s headquarters--its programming, production and policy operations--in New York City, with
recorded programs delivered by air to shortwave transmitters in Frankfurt, Germany (Holt, 1958).
This system—particularly the time-delay necessary for production and delivery of recordings—
proved inefficient and limited RFE’s ability to deliver timely news and other broadcast content.
In 1951, while maintaining its policy offices in New York, the FEC transferred RFE’s news and
editorial broadcasting operations to an American-built headquarters in Munich, inside the US
occupation zone of post-WWII Germany. Medium wave transmission capabilities followed. The
move had the effect of further internationalizing the staff of the Central Newsroom, and of
recruiting broadcast desk staff from among East-Central European émigrés living in Western
Europe, including post-war displaced persons camps, rather than solely émigrés living in the U.S.
Like other occupied cities in West Germany and Austria, Munich was rife with
international intrigue (Cummings, 2009). The city’s neighborhoods included communities of
East-Central Europeans, communities that were home to both the language service employees of
RFE and to the intelligence agency operatives from RFE’s target nations. RFE itself was part of
Munich’s Cold War spy culture; it was funded by U.S. intelligence during its first two decades of
operation and was infiltrated by spies from intelligence agencies of target nations who sometimes
gained employment despite the screening efforts of the organization’s security department
(Cummings, 2009; K. Kasparek, personal communication, July 11, 2005; O. Kopecka, personal
communication, July 26, 2005). The murders and mysterious deaths of some of RFE’s most
recognized language service voices occurred in Munich.
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RFE’s relocation to Munich, inside the post-WWII American zone of occupied West
Germany, not far from the Iron Curtain border between the West and the East in Europe, between
democratic and communist states, a dividing line that held for nearly 40 years, made news work
at RFE a front-line proposition. By 1952, in terms of the conceptions of its founders and early
managers, RFE had positioned itself on the geographic front of a Cold War, with and array of
language desks broadcasting an assault aimed at target communist regimes (Holt, 1958; Michie,
1963) with the intent of liberating enslaved peoples (Cummings, 2010). RFE’s weaponry,
messages carried on an invasion of radio waves, were aimed at an array of contested territories,
nations and peoples that lay between Western Europe and the USSR.
Border crossings by radio were countered in target states in what Nelson (1997) called a
“War of the Black Heavens”. While it is useful to visualize RFE’s language broadcast desks as
individual radio stations broadcasting to distinct populations, it is important to note that RFE’s
broadcasts were not stationary on the radio dial for listeners. Target states jammed the
transmissions of Western international broadcasters; listeners looking for REF instead heard loud,
jarring noises. To counter jamming, an engineering staff monitored broadcast reception as near as
possible to the borders of East-Central European nations and adjusted broadcast frequencies to
counter successful attempts within the communist world to jam or override incoming
transmissions, especially in the population centers of national capitals and larger cities (Wood,
2000). As RFE engineers adjusted signals, listeners adjusted radio dials and antennae;
broadcasters instructed listeners in the jerry-rigging of alternative antennae (Wood, 2000, p. 124).
For example, an editor in RFE’s Polish service who had learned to build radios as a teenager
during Nazi occupation of Warsaw, designed a device that could defeat jamming, and then
broadcast instructions for assembling the homemade antenna from items found in Polish street
markets (S. Wysocki, personal communication, July 12, 2005). Listeners engaged in small acts of
revolution merely by creating safe spaces for listening, constructing antennae when necessary,
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tuning in, and adjusting their dials. In this way, listeners joined émigrés in the unique territories
of imagined home nations constructed via RFE broadcasts (see Chapter 4). State jamming was
achieved at immense costs to regimes, and was maintained inconsistently across target nations
and Cold War periods. During the 1980s jamming ceased in one target nation after another, with
all jamming in East-Central Europe stopped by 1988 (Johnson, 2010).
Throughout RFE’s history, each language service opened its broadcast with a reminder
that RFE would remain with listeners through their captivity or enslavement, until they were
“free”; following 1989-90 revolutions, these introductory passages were no longer used (J.
Mekota, personal communication, July 28, 2005). The Cold War functioned doubly as a
metaphorical structuring agent and vocabulary for fulfilling RFE's mission, and as a reality that
lent organizational work the urgency necessary for a sustained four-decade battle. Among
Western journalists, too, there was, according to former CN journalist and London Bureau Chief
Stuart Parrot,
a feeling that ‘we’re all in this together’ among the Canadians, NATO allies [working in
the central news room]. We were working among people who don’t like what we don’t
like about communism. We were all engaged in . . . a . . . war. We were engaged in some
conflict with the other side, the Warsaw Pact. (personal communication, July 28, 2005)
As a British-American former director of RFE noted, "People forget what the Cold War was like.
It really was a war, and we were a weapon in that war" (J. F. Brown, personal communication,
June 30, 2005).

Evolution governance and mission, 1951-95
During it’s more than four decades in Munich (1951-95), events in the U.S. and in EastCentral Europe challenged RFE’s mission and the interpretation of that mission in practice.
Structural alterations in governance and funding and revisions of operating policies and
journalism practice followed. The following are phases of RFE’s history drawn from the
interview and documentary data from this study; these phases do not necessarily represent
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divisions that might emerge from studies of RFE using lenses such as public diplomacy that are
other than the understandings of the journalists who did the work at RFE.

1950-1956
With the expectation for powerful short-term communication effects at mid-20th Century
was a sense—though not unanimous among US strategists (Nelson, 1997)--that RFE’s mission
would be temporary battle, an encampment or bivouac that would be dismantled on quick success
(R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). Some American policy officials
conceived of scenarios in which populations in East-Central Europe would in short order arise
and successfully oust their communist oppressors (Johnson, 2010; Puddington, 2000). Ralph E.
Walter, who began his career with the Free Europe Committee in its New York policy office
advising the Polish language service, moved to Munich and eventually ran the organization dayto-day as Vice President for Policy and Programs, recalled an incident during his early days as a
policy official in Munich. “Nobody had the remotest idea that it would exist, or be set up as long
as it [was].” Once, during the mid-1950s, a senior vice president of the FEC arrived from the New
York office to talk about extending the [West German] broadcast license for five years. “He said,
‘We should fold up our tents and go home anyway if we have not done our jobs’ by then” (R. E.
Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005).
During the Cold War high dudgeon atmosphere of the early and mid-1950s, RFE
broadcasters overtly criticized communist leadership. Radio content included reporting in a
celebratory manner resistance efforts and escapes by citizens from broadcast areas.
Newsgathering sometimes resembled intelligence operations. “Bureaus”, for example, were
located in European towns close to border crossing points on popular escape routes from the East;
escapees were interviewed -- or debriefed -- extensively, and not exclusively by journalists, for
the purposes of broadcast content (Holt, 1958; Michie, 1963). Indeed, James F. Brown, a British
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citizen who also held an American passport and who worked as a research analyst and research
department manager before overseeing the broadcast services as director of RFE during the late
1970s and early 1980s, described the 1950s manifestation of RFE as a “crude propaganda
machine” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005).
However, the occurrence of uprisings in East-Central Europe challenged the
organization’s mission and broadcasting practices and controls. In the 1950s alone, uprisings
occurred in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland. And, in 1956, a 12-day uprising in
Hungary turned bloody during a Soviet-led military invasion and occupation, ending in arrest or
death for thousands of citizens. At the time, authorities East and West blamed RFE’s Hungarian
language service broadcasts for fueling revolution by offering false hopes of Western military
assistance (Holt, 1958; Johnson, 2010; Matthews, 2007; Nelson, 1997; Perlez, 1996; Pulido,
2007). It was clear to U.S. strategists that the politically aggressive style of broadcasts typical of
the "Voice of Free Hungary" and the other RFE radios during the early 1950s might lose
credibility for listeners (Nelson, 1997; Puddington, 2000).
RFE, in the wake of 1956, six years into its existence, recognized that its aggressive
broadcasting style was in need of an overhaul. That overhaul is crucial to understanding this
study; it necessitated the re-examination of RFE’s mission, and the evolution of the
organization’s role as a surrogate free press and how that role would be fulfilled via news,
commentary and entertainment content, and how that news would be produced.
Johnson (2010) notes that American strategists recognized the need for a change in
RFE’s broadcasting approach before 1956, specifically after the uprising in East Germany in
1953; however, for the purposes of this study, the conceptions of RFE employees that 1956 was
the turning point holds sway. Nearly every participant interviewed for this study, including those
who joined RFE well after the mid-1950s, cited without prompting at some point during our
conversation the importance of the Hungarian uprising as a cautionary mantra in their daily work
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and in the organization’s collective working memory. While historians continue to re-examine
whether the specific textual content of RFE’s Hungarian language service broadcast programs of
1956 played a role, and if so what role, in the tragic outcome in Hungary, Pulido (2007)
demonstrated that for listeners, the integration of a wider array of Western international
broadcasts, including especially those of RFE, into the Hungarian public sphere and discourse
during the years leading up to and including 1956, fueled the perceptions and hopes of
revolutionaries.
Certainly there is no argument among former RFE employees that at the time, and for
decades afterward, in collective organizational memory as passed on to new employees, avoiding
“another 1956” was a powerful mantra for practice. The prospect of appearing to encourage open
revolt, or of reporting some inaccuracy (e.g. a fake news story planted by “the other side”) that
might lead to misinformed reactions or the potential suffering of thousands, imbued the work of
journalists who made minute-by-minute programming and news content decisions in the BDs and
the CN with caution and care during the 1960s – 1980s.
Thus the mission of RFE evolved from its early 1950s iteration -- Brown’s “crude
propaganda machine” or Shanor’s (1968) mix of “good reporting and bad propaganda” (p. 176) -with broadcasts that included recommendations for action against the regime, including sabotage
like slow work on collective farms or compromising factory production lines. Broadcasts also
included personal and political criticisms of individual communist leaders, from national figures
through even the directors of particular agricultural collectives or factories, interviews at border
crossing towns with citizens who had recently escaped, and the like. It also reportedly included
false claims that harmed individuals within broadcasting areas. For example, in 1952, RFE
“wrongly singled [Hungarian Socialist leader Anna Kethly] out as a resistance leader”, resulting
in the tortures of individuals supposedly associated with her in a “‘non-existent anti-Communist
plot’” (Shanor, 1968, p. 26).
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1957-67
By the late 1950s, RFE had begun the shift away from expectations for radio broadcasts
as a weapon to assist impending liberation, toward an understanding of RFE as a tool for gradual
change inside communist regimes (Shanor, 1968). By the late 1960s, BD staff understood RFE’s
role in a material and practice sense as a surrogate free press, and conceptions of BD staff and
American management coincided in the expectation that citizens of target nations would decide
whether and when to take action against regimes (e.g., K. Kasparek, personal communication,
July 11, 2005). RFE’s journalisms, too, both in the BDs and the CN, would evolve, resulting in a
hybrid Western-style journalism by the late 1980s.
During the years immediately following the Hungarian uprising, new overarching,
written “broadcast guidelines” were drafted, discussed, revised and issued to broadcasting
services by American management. New policies prohibited overt personal criticism of
communist leaders and forbade recommendations for citizen political action inside communist
nations. RFE also created a Broadcast Analysis Department (BAD) that would listen to,
transcribe and translate the content of selected programs, periodically and after they were
broadcast, to ensure adherence to policy.
RFE’s broadcast content certainly changed after 1956. Shanor’s (1968) Columbia
University thesis compared the style and tone of news and émigré political commentary broadcast
to Czechoslovakia before and after 1956. Early content is described as rife with polemics, while
1960s content fulfilled the bridge-building intents of changing American policymakers (Shanor,
1968). After 1956, RFE evolved to resemble less a vocally anti-communist propaganda machine,
and more an embodiment of its evolving mission to serve as a surrogate free press for populations
in target countries, or, as what some describe, as noted in the introduction, as an opposition or
alternative press as part of a wider mix of Western international broadcasters.
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American policy officials at RFE continued to issue written policy "guidances" or
recommendations on current issues to the broadcasters in the language services. “Guidances”, or
memos on policy that addressed periodic Cold War events; e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis, had
been issued to the directors of the BDs since RFE’s inception. The instantaneous nature of radio
broadcasting made it infeasible, though it was attempted during RFE's first two years in New
York (Puddington, 2000), for the CIA to pre-approve or to continually monitor and control BD
broadcast content (M. Bachstein, personal communication, July 10, 2005; Puddington, 2000; R.
E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). U.S. government-assigned policy employees
working in RFE’s New York office (1950s and 1960s) and later its Munich headquarters—some
of them graduates of foreign service and university foreign policy, Sovietology and Slavic Studies
programs, and some, according to research participants, suspected by employees to be employees
of the CIA—wrote and issued these guidances.
Guidances were not issued on a schedule, but daily or once or twice a week on particular
Cold War developments as needed (R. Rowson, personal communication, August 16, 2006).
Guidance topics might include, for example, the announcement of a new European Economic
Union or a crisis within the communist world (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13,
2005). Richard Rowson, who wrote guidances as a young “policy man” in Munich during the
1960s, recalled in an interview for this study:
They [the CIA in Washington, D.C.] left us alone. You didn’t have the feeling [they
were] looking over your shoulder. [During the Cuban missile crisis], I sent [copies
of] the guidances to the established liaison officer at the CIA who was charged with
seeing that there was information . . . as to what we were doing in the way of
guidance. . . . I was never called on the matt. . . . There was never anybody who
said anything about any of these guidances. (R. Rowson, personal communication,
August 16, 2006)
Routinely, RFE's policy director oversaw guidances, and the director of RFE (overseeing
all radios) received copies, which were distributed to the BDs. In reference to policy guidance,
Shanor (1968) found that all scripts were reviewed prior to broadcast until 1956, and that after
52

1956, including by 1967, political commentary scripts written in the language services were
translated into English and reviewed by American policy personnel. Shanor also characterized
daily meetings between American policy managers and directors of the broadcasting services as
more mutual discussions than one-way directives (see “How RFE Works” in Shanor, 1968).
Former RFE director Brown maintained that, "This is the closest that the front office [RFE's
policy officials] got to interfering with [émigré] programming. . . . This is where really the impact
of [RFE's alleged role in encouraging uprisings in] Hungary [in 1956] can be observed," in the
form of restraints on the political passions of émigrés (personal communication, June 30, 2005).
As to the CN, Western journalists maintain that guidances were not issued directly to
them in the CN regarding the content of its news file (e.g., T. Willey, personal communication,
September 4, 2006), and the 1967/72 CN practice manual notes that copies of guidances were
barred from the newsroom (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972). However, after this
period, RFE’s corporate archives include a “policy guidance” memo (Marsh, 1989) written during
the heat of the 1989 East-Central European revolutions to remind directors of the broadcasting
services to continue to use the CN’s two-source rule; in that case, copies were distributed to CN
managers.
The post-1956 overhaul of RFE policies and practices extended to the CN, with the 1959
recruitment of RIAS’s former news chief, American journalist Gene Mater. Mater moved to RFE
to direct the CN and to revamp the newsroom’s journalism policies and practices on “the
American model” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005; G. Mater, personal
communication, August 28, 2006), a phrase used throughout the latter decades of CN practice in
Munich (T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010). Nerone (1990) maintains that there is
no American model of journalism, per se, but social responsibility journalism typical of
mainstream broadcasting during the Murrow/Cronkite era.
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Mater was hired to succeed Canadian journalist and CN director Don MacKay, and to
refine CN policies and procedures. Aside from Mater’s experience at RIAS in Berlin; he had also
helped to shape a post-WWII media landscape in Germany, including the re-establishment of
urban newspapers (G. Mater, personal communication, August 28, 2006). As news director,
Mater had to establish practice without benefit of structural distance from government required
by the norms of U.S. journalism. Paradoxically, producing news American-style was also
accompanied by a mandate that RFE become “more European” in its programming (Johnson,
2010, p. 124). The CN would successfully navigate this territory over the ensuing decades
(including a period in which it was alleged that RFE had become “too European”; see Chapters 4
and 5), constructing a hybrid European-American practice.

1967-1980
In 1967 the American leftist magazine Ramparts published an investigative report that
included a list of media, including youth organizations, print publications such as Encounter
magazine and other ventures that were funded surreptitiously by the CIA (Cone, 1998). These
cultural, informational and commentary venues attracted the witting or unwitting participation of
American youth, academics, intellectuals and journalists (Johnson, 2010; Nelson, 1997).
Ramparts’ revelations, reported also in The New York Times (Cone, 1998) brought subsequent
media scrutiny to other CIA-funded ventures, including RFE. That led to Congressional hearings
that for a time threatened the continued existence of The Radios and ultimately to changes in
governance, funding and policy, and, by extension, newsroom practice. Revelations also
confirmed the talk inside RFE by rank and file employees – especially journalists who had not
been made “witting” by American management – that The Radios were funded overseen at the
policy level by the CIA. The organization’s growth during the 1950s and 1960s – with nearly
1,400 employees by 1967 (Shanor, 1968) -- along with doubt that domestic U.S. fundraising
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campaigns could not underwrite RFE’s budget, had confirmed for Western journalists working in
the CN the certainty of some funding source that had not been made public (A. Breslauer,
personal communication, August 9, 2010).
RFE’s funding would continue to come largely from the budget of the CIA until 1971. A
brief foray into RFE’s funding history is necessary to place journalists’ understandings of their
employment in context. From the first, the FEC represented itself and RFE to American citizens
as a privately funded effort rather than a government-partnered, CIA-funded organization
(Cummings, 2010; Holt, 1958; Johnson, 2010; Nelson, 1997). But soon after its establishment,
the magnitude of financing needed for RFE operations surpassed expectations and the potential of
public contributions to sustain them. RFE, along with other American projects aimed at
countering consolidation of communist control in East-Central Europe, was placed clandestinely
inside the operating budget of the CIA.
However, public campaigns proceeded in any case, though funds collected from the
American public never exceeded 19% of RFE’s operating budget (Puddington, 2000). From
1952-62, the FEC waged sophisticated public domestic “Crusade for Freedom” fundraising drives
for citizen and corporate donations with the help of a fledgling Madison Avenue advertising
industry. Appeals were made to fund the delivery of the news of freedom denied to peoples,
described in Churchill’s terms as “captive” and “enslaved” behind the Iron Curtain in communist
East/Central Europe (Cummings, 2010). Richard Cummings, who would lead RFE’s security
department during the 1980s, recalled seeing Crusade for Freedom advertisements while growing
up:
As a teenager, I’d watch ads on TV for RFE, especially after the 1956 Hungarian
revolution. They were very interesting ads showing people listening to the radio, people
broadcasting. I saw ads in the subway in Boston. [RFE] had a post office box in New
York, number 1776. . . . I believed what I was watching and listening to. I heard, ‘We’re
not free.’ It was the teenage years, where you believe in what you are hearing and seeing
and listening to in America. The message from the Committee was, ‘People are dying,
they were not free, and they could be listening to freedom. Why can’t the whole world be
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so?’ (personal communication, July 13, 2005)
In contrast, British-American James F. Brown, who joined RFE in the late 1950s and was director
of RFE overseeing the broadcast services from 1978-83, recalled seeing the same advertisements
as an adult while traveling in the U.S. In the early days, “We often tended to have an exalted view
of our importance in the realm of things. I remember going over to New York and seeing some
commercials in the subway for the Crusade for Freedom.” On recalling a photograph of “a little
boy with a chain around his head, with a lock, and a slogan,” Brown said, “You just wanted to
throw up!” (personal communication, June 30, 2005).
RFE collected dimes and dollars across America with the help of news organizations,
corporate executives, school children, Boy Scouts, Hollywood film stars like Ronald Reagan and
politicians including Gen. Dwight David Eisenhower. Support included, most significantly, news
media executives, including newspaper and news magazine publishers and editors across the U.S.
in the form of leading drives, publishing advertisements and airing public service announcements,
and publishing editorial pleas for support (Cummings, 2010).
Crusade for Freedom campaigns ended in 1962, with RFE’s budget continuing to come
largely from the CIA until 1971. A former RFE official whose employment with the FEC and
RFE spanned the three decades beginning in the 1950s characterized the “Crusade” as “a benign
fraud on the American people” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). “Benign
fraud” is a descriptor that was adopted and repeated by American management, including
participants during the research for this study (e.g., Cummings, personal communication, July 13,
2005), but the phrase is not present in the narratives of Western journalists or language service
employees.
On June 30, 1971, when CIA funding of RFE ended, Congress took responsibility for
RFE’s budget, revised the organization’s mission and established an ostensibly independent and
bi-partisan broadcasting board. On March 30, 1972, CIA oversight ostensibly ended with a
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congressionally mandated separation, transferring the organization’s governance to a new Board
for International Broadcasting (BIB) (Johnson, 2010) whose membership would include
professional journalists and require congressional approval. RFE also received a revised mandate;
programming would be “not inconsistent with” U.S. foreign policy (rather than an instrument to
communicate and promote foreign policy to listeners, as was true of the VOA, the BBC and other
Western international broadcasters) (Johnson, 2010; R. E. Walter, personal communication, July
13, 2005). Both American management (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
and CN journalists (e.g., B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005) cite the phrase “not
inconsistent with” as an advantage for the central news operation’s level of autonomy. By the late
1970s, RFE directors overseeing the language services took the CN’s news output “for granted”
(R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006).
Congressional budgetary processes brought uncertainty about organizational funding that
would plague RFE operations throughout the remainder of the Cold War. Periodically, U.S.
election campaigns and federal budget debates featured proposals to cut RFE’s funding, close The
Radios or consolidate RFE and the VOA. The effects of uncertainty manifest in the newsroom
from the late 1960s through the early 1990s as continual worry among journalists about job
security and whether RFE as an organization would continue to exist (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, July 13, 2005).
By 1976, in order to conserve funds, Congress ordered the imminent merger of the
operations of RFE and Radio Liberty (RL), a separate Munich-based US international
broadcasting organization. RL’s language services targeted the peoples of the Soviet Union; e.g.,
Russians, Ukrainians, Georgians, and many others. A Munich headquarters had been built for RL,
but the merged organization RFE/RL formally joined RL and RFE in daily operations in RFE’s
headquarters building in the Englischer Garten. Both RL and RFE added other language desks
over time before and after the merger, but the merger itself of the two organizations did not
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extend beyond certain financial, management and operating efficiencies: RFE remained RFE (J.
F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005; R. E. Walter, personal communication, July
13, 2005).
By all accounts gathered during this research, it is evident that RL and RFE cannot be
compared as equivalents. Although RL journalists and editors were interviewed for this study for
triangulation, what is derived here from documents and interviews about perceptions and news
practices in the language services applies only to RFE and should not be extrapolated to apply to
RL. After the merger, the CN established at RFE served both RFE and RL, but the two
organizations, differed in ways that prohibit generalizing the results of this study relative to
émigré and policy management to RL.
However, CN news practices in this study describe the CN over time, including after
RFE’s merger with RL. The newsroom that served RFE clients survived the merger, with the
additions of only a few staff members from RL’s own central newsroom, so that the practice
constructed in the CN during its years of service to RFE held sway following the merger (J. F.
Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005; B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13,
2005; L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006). A single news policy and practices
manual, revised forward from the CN in 1967, 1972 and 1988, guided CN internal wire service
operations through the newsroom’s relocation to Prague in 1995. And, by 1990, Terry Willey, a
former Research department analyst and former RL newsroom journalist who learned news work
“on the job” was directing the News and Current Affairs Division of RFE/RL (T. Willey,
personal communication, September 4, 2006).
However, U.S. media revelations of RFE’s CIA oversight during the late 1960s,
followed by the establishment of RFE's new governance scheme during the early 1970s,
described by Nelson (1997) as semi-independent and by Street & Matelski (1997) as
independence, coincided with the revelations of intelligence infiltrations of the U.S. anti-war
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movement and the emergence of the Watergate scandal. In addition, the media publishers
who had embodied a Cold War consensus were ceding press oversight to others (Liebovich,
1988). This signaled a shift in U.S. journalism to a government watchdog stance (D. R.
Davies, 2006; Liebovich, 1988), and a general wariness of RFE among American journalists.
There was wariness inside RFE as well; despite changes in organizational governance,
mission and structure over time, assumptions among CN and BD workers of continuing CIA
involvement at RFE persisted throughout RFE’s history in Munich, with employees
speculating and worrying about who might be an intelligence agent from the U.S. (not to
mention other nations, including Germany and the nations to which RFE and RFE/RL
broadcast) (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005; G. Iranek-Osmecci,
personal communication, July 14, 2005; O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26,
2005).

1981 - 1984
During the first administration of President Ronald Reagan in the early 1980s, the risks
taken by Western journalists in choosing to participate in state-funded surrogate broadcasting
were manifest when carefully constructed and honed barriers between politics and the CN were
challenged by an abrupt shift in U.S. foreign policy away from détente with the Soviet Union
toward a stance reminiscent of the early Cold War that seemed to reverse post-1956
organizational caution. RFE's independence was reframed as its orphan status and the
organization was perceived to lack close ties to U.S. State Department policy (Urban, 1997).
Radios whose practices had moved closer to RFE’s mission – to serve as a surrogate free press
for nations in East/Central Europe – and its mandate – journalism on an American model but
acknowledging practice in Europe for European audiences -- were reframed as "weak"
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(Shakespeare, 1986, p. 68) and "too European" (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30,
2005).
The period also included abrupt management changes at RFE/RL, from the chairmanship
of the broadcasting board to the presidency of RFE/RL, through its vice president (running the
organization in a more hands-on way, day-to-day), and the directors of both RFE and RL and
some language service directors. According to language desk editors, the situation had taken a
turn for the better: more aggressive rhetoric would be allowed in broadcasts. For the CN,
however, the era would include attempts – with varying success – by American management and
the BDs to erode the walls between policy and the CN and the political passions of BD journalists
and CN practice. It would also mean fulfilling of what CN editors saw as unwritten directive (e.g.
M. McCarroll, personal communication, November 24, 2010) – the hiring almost exclusively of
American journalists in the CN. During the late 1980s, RFE/RL employed almost 1,800 workers
overall (Kamm, 1990; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988); of that
total, the CN, then part of a News and Current Affairs Division, employed 30 editors and writers
and 12 support staff (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988).

1985-95
By the mid-to-late 1980s, all jamming of RFE broadcasts in target nations had ended.
From 1989-90, the nations receiving broadcasts from RFE’s six longest-standing language desks
had supplanted communist party regimes with fledgling democracies. The period immediately
before and following the capitulations in East/Central Europe (1988-90) featured the
establishment of new media institutions and an independent press. Radical change inside target
nations in turn altered the conditions for journalism practice at RFE in Munich. Suddenly, the
Cold War siege was broken; news reporting and production and more importantly, listening, lost
their clandestine character. Journalists now saw the possibility of access—including the
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establishment of reporting access and bureaus--to the nations for which they had sought to serve
as a surrogate domestic free press, and RFE news and programming no longer competed for
credibility only with state media monopolies and other Western international broadcasters.
Western news organizations, too, gained freer access to the same nations; wire services that had
been limited previously to a few reporters whose activities had been monitored could now assign
reporters to the same territories for which RFE’s research department, BDs and CN had been
monitoring communist party changes and dissent, and sifting fact from rumor for 45 years.
Was RFE's mission in East-Central European target nations still viable? Had it been
fulfilled with population access to alternative media flows and the displacement of communist
regimes, and should The Radios dissolve? On the other hand, if the mission was to model a
surrogate free press for potential democracies in a free East/Central Europe, was not that mission
critical to fledgling republics transitioning to democratic institutions and eventual European
unity? Shouldn't RFE maintain broadcasts?
A compromise resulted: Congress reduced RFE/RL’s budget, and the organization
accepted Czech Republic President Vaclav Havel’s invitation to relocate its headquarters to the
former Communist Party Parliament building near Wenceslas Square in Prague. RFE/RL’s 1995
move to Prague prompted the resignations and retirements of a majority of journalists working in
the News and Current Affairs division, including the CN. The move affected émigrés in language
services, too. All of the original language broadcasting services continued broadcasts for varying
lengths of time, but all eventually ceased operations, replaced by expanded or new radio services
to other regions of the world.
The following narrative concerns only the history of RFE and RFE/RL relative to RFE,
and includes only the years of its operations in Munich from 1951-95. It focuses on the original
and enduring language services of RFE, and especially the English-language, Western journaliststaffed central newsroom. In other words, it incorporates the voices of the journalists who worked
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in RFE’s longest-standing newsrooms. It examines journalism in an organization beyond the
surface assumption-by-structure that something called “journalism” could not and did not happen
there.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODS
This study incorporates conversations conducted 2004-20012 with former RFE
employees and other participants in other organizations engaged in Cold War news production
and broadcasting. It includes more than 100 conversations with 70 participants (including 80 indepth interviews with 60 individuals), along with many more mail and email exchanges with key
participants who worked in Cold War international broadcasting. It incorporates documents
created during those conversations, along with documents from personal papers contributed by
participants. Those materials were placed in conversation over time with documents from
RFE/RL corporate archives, published and unpublished memoirs and histories of RFE. I tested
preliminary descriptions, understandings and analyses in conversations with participants and in
conference papers from 2005-2012.
New scholarship is emerging on RFE, but none focuses on the organization’s CN
operations while RFE was headquartered in Munich. Andersson's paper (2004) positions RFE as
a whole as an alternative press. More recently, Johnson (2010) completed an exhaustive insider
history of RFE in part via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests for government
documents that are now being made available, little by little, online. But, as mentioned in the
introduction, the story of RFE published to date has privileged the voices of American managers
and the East-Central European directors and especially prominent personalities of the language
broadcast services. Most of the scholarly works and analyses by former RFE insiders are focused
on the organization’s Cold War history and political goals, the roles and effects of broadcasts for
listeners in East Central Europe, histories of language broadcast services, and questions of
ideology, propaganda and public diplomacy. Published works also include biographies and
memoirs of prominent broadcasting personalities from East-Central Europe who were regarded as
heroes by many in their nations of origin. The selection and organization of the contents of RFE’s
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corporate archives at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University in California and RFE’s
research department files at the Open Society Archives in Budapest reflect these emphases of
interest.
Documents related to journalists in the CN, especially those below the rank of newsroom
director or deputy director – the everyday reporters and editors -- are absent almost wholly from
RFE archives, scholarship and memoirs. Yet journalism was the language of everyday production
at RFE. Broadcast content, including news, was the subject of RFE’s morning programming
meeting of American policy officials, BD chiefs and departmental managers. The CN, in its
practice and in the content of its budget (news file), served as a model of Western journalism
practice for émigrés in the BDs, many of whom learned journalism on the job while working at
RFE. News at the top of each broadcast hour was drawn from the CN file; the CN also sought to
serve, through the credibility and style of its news file, as a model of a Western-style free press
for listeners in target nations. The accuracy of the CN file, and therefore the five to ten minutes of
news selected by individual language services from the file for broadcast, can be seen as an
anchoring credibility for whatever content came next in each hour’s radio programming. Yet no
CN journalist participated in the culling of materials retained for RFE’s corporate archives at the
Hoover Institution at Stanford University.

Existing secondary sources, insider histories and memoirs
RFE/RL secondary sources for this research include histories of the Cold War and the
evolution of U.S. intelligence organizations (e.g. Hersh, 2001) and interactions with media (e.g.
Bernstein, 2007). In addition, histories and other studies of Australian, German, American and
British journalism, and journalism's role in democracies (e.g. Curran, 2005; Curthoys & Schultz,
1999; D. R. Davies, 2006; Gans, 2003; McPherson, 2006; Patterson, 2008) and readings on target
populations' nations and cultures. RFE and RFE/RL have been included in analyses of Cold War
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international broadcasting in general (e.g. Cull, 2008). These organizations have been positioned
in political science as part of a quest for ideological, cultural and economic hegemony, and in
histories in a mix with other international broadcasters (Street & Matelski, 1997; Washburn,
1992).
More numerous are books and articles on the politics and histories of Cold War
clandestine broadcasters written by former international broadcasting officials (Nelson, 1997), the
BBC's External Services (e.g. Tusa, 1999) and the VOA (Heil, 2003). Recent works by RFE
insider Johnson (2010) joins those by others that analyze RFE's role in, e.g., the Czechoslovak
Crisis in 1968, and in Hungarian uprisings in 1956 (e.g. Granville, 2004). Recent work, for
example by Johnson focuses on American "policy guidance" within RFE and whether broadcasts
by the Czechoslovak Service conformed to that policy (A. R. Johnson, personal communication,
August 17, 2004) in retrospective analyses, rather than focusing on journalistic concerns or
practice. Insiders have analyzed the effects of RL (rather than RFE) on Cold War politics and
target audiences (Parta, 2007). While Michie's (1963) early history of the organization is suffused
with Cold War rhetoric, it also supplies a structural and policy overview, along with many
examples of the kinds of sourcing and stories propagated during the 1950s and early 1960s.
Insiders Puddington (2000) and Johnson (2010) provide the most comprehensive and carefully
researched overall histories of RFE and RFE/RL to date.
The published memoirs of individuals who helped lead RFE and/or RFE/RL, e.g. Holt
(1958), Mickelson (1983) and Urban (1997), correspond to the years and crises of mission in
Munich. Memoirs of RL by Critchlow (1995) and Sosin (1999) allow comparisons of leadership
attitudes toward the missions and policies. However, though memoirists interviewed RFE and RL
colleagues, these might be thought of as American Cold Warrior memoirs; none focus on CN
journalists and journalism practice per se. Memoirists like Urban (1997), whose book is subtitled
“My War within the Cold War”, employ the language of journalism to relate and explain
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decisions made at flashpoint moments in RFE history that CN journalists, on the other hand,
recall as infamous attempts at interference and censorship. Memoirs by these former insiders also
can be thought of as part of what former RFE/RL broadcasting board chairman Shakespeare
(1986) described as a slim veneer of American managers like himself who came and went, while
writers, editors and producers of news and programs stayed for decades. [An exception is the
memoir of long-time employee and former RFE director James F. Brown (2005).] Shakespeare's
remarks were published in Short's (1986) transcripts of a Cold War broadcasting conference
where officials of Western radios including RFE/RL compared missions, broadcasting strategies
and operations.
Memoirs by former directors, editors and personalities from RFE’s language broadcast
services have emerged during the past two decades, and some former BD directors are at work on
memoirs at present, but English language translations are lacking. Interest in research on RFE is
increasing in the nations formerly targeted for broadcasts as a result of the availability and
duplication of country-specific archival collections from RFE; they include studies published or
in progress that focus on the BDs.

Archives
Limited availability of archival sources until 2004 has contributed to thin scholarship on
RFE and RFE/RL in any discipline. A Columbia University content analysis (Shanor, 1968)
offers case comparisons of the styles and tone of émigré political commentary versus those of
state media in East-Central Europe, especially Czechoslovakia, before and after the mission crisis
of 1956, up through 1967, analyses completed just as public revelations of CIA involvement at
RFE emerged. Shanor’s study is invaluable for any examination of the interplay of RFE broadcast
content as competition and change catalyst for state-controlled radio content inside, e.g., Poland
and Czechoslovakia. Former Reuters chief Michael Nelson (1997) compiled the only English
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language international broadcasting history that incorporated materials from Soviet archives
opened briefly after the breakup of the U.S.S.R (and then closed soon after). Nelson documented
expenses and efforts expended to monitor broadcasts, jam signals and destroy the credibility of
émigré broadcasters and Western radios.
Two large repositories of RFE/RL corporate documents have opened to researchers
within the past few years. First, the Open Society Archive (OSA) in Budapest holds RFE's RAD
archive from Munich. I visited the archives in 2004, noting categories of reports and memos and
obtaining copies of sample documents on Czechoslovakia. Second, the Hoover Institution at
Stanford University holds RFE's corporate archives (excepting those of Research) including
materials critical to this dissertation: those of the émigré services, the CN, the BAD, policy and
management, and the like. However, in addition, the posting of documents online by both Hoover
and OSA are ongoing, and, arrangements for duplication and transfers of collections of various
archival documents related to RFE to secondary repositories in specific nations (documents
related to the Romanian Service to an archive in Bucharest, e.g.) are ongoing. In sum, the
availability of materials on RFE is expanding rapidly.
Limitations for any future studies, however, also include the rearrangement and culling of
institutional memory in RFE's BDs. During operations in Munich, each department and language
service's librarian organized and maintained files that supported daily program and news
production. Those files comprised a cumulative 40-year history of key domestic figures,
samizdat, research, sources and other materials whose organization and logic supported
extraordinary routines (O. Kopecka, personal communication, August 17, 2004) necessary to the
operation of an external surrogate free press by exiles working as trained-on-the-job journalists
without access to home territory. This unique system was dismantled, and the loss of the
organizational filing system of the émigrés on the broadcast desks is a loss also of some of the
processes of day-to-day journalism and logic of radio content production.
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In addition, though thousands of audiotapes exist of language service broadcasts, I
confirmed during a conversation with a Czech media scholar at an international media conference
that no archive in the Czech Republic has accepted catalogued materials not bound for Hoover.
Desks routinely re-used broadcast tapes to save money; even broadcasts from the Velvet
Revolution are sparse. Kopecka confirmed, e.g., after checking her indexes, that no reports by
Ludmila Vitcovicova, a stringer who reported live for RFE from inside the Civic Forum (when
Pavel Pechacek, RFE’s Czech language desk director, was deported after briefly gaining entry to
Czechoslovakia in November 1989) during the revolution, and who was interviewed for this
study, survived tape re-use. Nonetheless, the Hoover institution holds tens of thousands of
surviving tapes from RFE language desk broadcasts that are now being catalogued.
Rather than await periodic releases of documents at OSA and Hoover, I met with A. Ross
Johnson, a former RFE official now in Washington, D.C. who had overseen the transfer, sorting
and culling materials for Hoover. My conversation with Johnson confirmed former CN
journalists' contentions that the collection strategies for the corporate archive did not retain some
documents important to journalists and journalism practice.
For example, the CN required two independent sources on each story. RFE borrowed this
rule from BBC practice long before the American press itself adopted it. For CN journalists,
accuracy in pursuit of credibility was currency, and the two-source rule was its gold standard. The
two-source rule “saved” (T. Willey, personal communication, February 8, 2008) the CN from
broadcasting inaccuracies, rumor or stories planted by "the other side" (K. Bush, personal
communication, August 2, 2006; B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005).
Inaccuracies, even those reported in Western wire reports, if repeated by RFE, gave the
communist press fodder for attacking RFE's credibility. Although corporate documents include
memoranda related to retention or disputation of the two-source rule as it pertained to groups, the
CN’s internal documents included documents more specific to many of the recurring
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organizational battles over the two-source rule. These included examples of the wire stories
themselves, and versions of the stories issued by the CN over the course of a news day or days,
reflecting changes in status (on background, or for broadcast, e.g.), and departmental memos
related to two-source rule disputes.
One former news director, Terry Willey, recalled her efforts to transfer critical files from
the News & Current Affairs (NCA) office (including the CN) to the Hoover Archives through
Johnson.
When the radios were being transferred to Prague I learned that files from the various
departments were being preserved. Since NCA had such extensive files dating back
almost to the existence of the radios, I called Oleh Zwadiuk, then Washington Bureau
Chief, and asked him to tell Ross [Johnson] about our files. Oleh asked me what kind of
files were involved and I told him about the two-source rule file and the various files
about NCA's interaction with the BD's. Oleh later told me that Ross wasn't interested in
preserving these files. . . . I kept these documents in my apartment storage area for some
ten years but then destroyed them when it became clear that they would never see the
light of day.
The two-source file contained many items which justified delaying reports until
we had two reliable sources. And, yes, it also contained instances where management and
central news were arguing over whether to maintain the two-source rule. I was not the
only one who preserved this file, part of the extensive files kept in the News Director's
office. (T. Willey, personal communication, August 8, 2012)
The former news director held a group of these documents in a basement storage locker in
Munich when the CN was dismantled and moved to Prague. Willey left them in Munich for a few
years, then discarded all but a few (Willey, personal communication, February 8, 2008). Willey
forwarded copies of some of the remaining documents to me for this study. Indeed, many of the
documents contributed by Willey and other CN journalists from their personal files were related
to incidents that already had been cited by other CN journalists in research conversations as key
to their memories of defending practice.
At Hoover, the RFE corporate collection is in process. I visited the archives and spent a
week there, examining documents related to management, the BDs, and the CN. There are
documents filed under the Central News moniker at Hoover, however, there was little overlap
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with the documents submitted by journalists for this study. On the other hand, many of the
documents related to the CN were in temporary files, not yet arranged in a final sorting by
archivists, and therefore the archival references in this bibliography must necessarily be taken as
also temporary not only in reference citations but in scope – I just do not know, and could not
know, at the time of the completion of this study, exactly what had been retained from the CN
and what had not. It is important to note, however, the assertion of the former NCA chief that the
newsroom files were not a priority. No narrative of RFE’s journalism could be constructed
without the only resource available to me at the time of this study: the journalists themselves.

Absence as a guide
The absence of a journalistic perspective in deciding what to preserve in the corporate
archives of an organization that posited news as “our business” (Michie, 1963) means that much
of the information critical to constructing, maintaining and defending journalism practice in the
CN – from the point of view of its journalists – is absent from the documentary and historical
record. In addition, no CN journalists have written memoirs of their time at RFE. Thus, future
researchers who rely solely on archival sources and existing histories and memoirs written by
insiders from among RFE’s American and BD leadership would be exposed to a narrative record
constructed to privilege American management and the central, crucial role of the BDs, but not
the organizational unit that produced content for the ten minutes at the top of each program hour;
however, that ten minutes of content set the practice and credibility bar at RFE firmly in Western
journalism. Thus, any examination of news at RFE could not fairly represent or fully explain the
struggles over journalism referred to in administrative memos and other documents or memoirs
without including voices from inside the conceptual and practice world of CN journalism.
Available documents reveal only partial official accounts of CN journalism. One can read
the official broadcast guidelines, memos addressing specific policy as issued in “guidances” to
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language desks, read BAD reviews and critiques of program content post-broadcast, and perhaps
(if tapes or transcripts survive) listen to broadcasts, and review CN news file content (rarely
preserved for any but momentous Cold War events or sticking points of organizational practice),
but the day-to-day decision-making and tensions are lost without research interviews. For
example, the printed newsroom manuals of CN practice were found to differ in some respects
from the narratives of practice in interviews conducted for this study. Despite the losses and the
considerations of time, memory and the creation of accounts that might differ from those that
might have been observed among the same respondents if gathered contemporaneously, research
conversations provided information about individual and group intent, identity and relationships
that are missing from the existing record.
As in any organization, much of what happened at RFE concerning news production and
program content happened in conversation, not in official documents, and would not have been
preserved in any case. For example, Ralph Walter, RFE/RL’s vice president for policy director
during the 1970s noted that the interaction of American management and language desk chiefs
discussed programs on diplomatically or historically sensitive subjects by office telephone or
face-to-face.
There were no documents. There would be conversations. . . . Polish desk chief] Nowak
would call up and say, ‘I’m doing this program on the Oder-Neisse Line. . . . We ought to
talk about it.’ I read a translation of that, and I would say, ‘There’s one sentence you
ought to change. And he had a terrible temper. If I’d change a word or so, . . . he’d say,
‘Well, if that’s the way things work around here, I’m not so sure I can work here
anymore!’” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
That single unwritten interaction reveals much about a dyadic power struggle at RFE, and the
focus of the documentary record, including previous interviews and analytical narrative of RFE
do indeed focus on the dyadic relationship between the émigrés and American management.
They do not take into account the internal wire service role of the CN, where, for
instance, one story, with its context and language, had to suffice for all desks, and where desks
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were prohibited from making editorial changes in tone or fact. Because the CN and its work
products were less critically monitored, but also because there was no CN participation in culling
corporate records to maintain any narrative about RFE from the CN journalists’ position, fewer
documents are available addressing particular struggles from the viewpoints of CN journalists.
An understanding that there were different journalisms in play at RFE, different news practices
that necessarily developed among groups where non-journalists became journalists (the language
services) and the CN, where practice was constructed and adapted for a unique organization by
seasoned journalists from the West with experience across formats (broadcast, print, wire
services) and international reporting, and management, where policy, politics and goals aimed at
change beyond modeling Western journalism, “full stop” (R. Hutchings, personal
communication, August 11, 2006), must have come into play, is missing from the record.
The methods of this study therefore begin from a position of absence. In addition to the
absence of sufficient documents from which to construct a working knowledge and understanding
of Western journalists and journalism practice in the CN and the absence of accounts in the form
of memoirs written by CN journalists, the most glaring absence at the outset of this study was
interviews with the everyday journalists in the CN below a very few at the level of newsroom
director or assistant director.
Considering these absences, there is the research problem of choosing from among
available methodologies. The prospect of assembling a bordered “pile” of digital documents and
then “doing something” to the data using a discrete method to extract knowledge and
understanding seemed not only insufficient and dimensionally limiting in a case where the
researcher is facing a black hole, but also a potential betrayal of the participants themselves,
where a first study could begin to deliver justice to voices where the documentary record clearly
would yield either only distortion or silence.
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Methodological approach
One could say, from a social constructionist perspective, that employees created through
their interactions (discourse) philosophy and tactics of war within a culture of journalism. Talk
and (inter)action at RFE established boundaries of journalisms. To illuminate discursive struggles
to construct journalisms and perform journalistic authenticity at RFE, I used a mix of methods
and grounded theory to complicate those discursive struggles by producing missing elements
during the research study.
In Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of
Political Reality, Washburn (1992) surmised that Western scholars paid little attention to radiobased propaganda broadcasts because alternative media streams proliferate in the West, obscuring
the importance of those broadcasts to societies with monopolistic state-controlled media.
Washburn recommended a social constructionist approach to the study of international
broadcasting.
In journalism studies, a social construction approach to scholarship is well established
(Johnson-Cartee, 2005). Cohen & Young's (1973) edited collection, The Manufacture of News,
proposed journalism and news as agents of social construction. Tuchman's (1978) landmark work
followed.
The . . . act of making news is the act of constructing reality itself rather than a picture of
reality. . . . Newswork transforms occurrences into news events. It draws on aspects of
everyday life to tell stories, and it presents us to ourselves. By accomplishing this second
task, it serves as a basis for social action. But the process of making news is not
accomplished in a void, and so a second theme is that professionalism serves
organizational interests by reaffirming the institutional processes in which newswork is
embedded. (p. 12)
Sociological studies of news production have taken a social constructionist view of
western urban or national (the BBC, e.g.) news organizations, comparing journalists' conceptions
of their work with newsroom observations (Gans, 1979; Schlessinger, 1999). Sociologies of news
production present journalists as workers with little of the autonomy they claim or seek, and
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journalism as wielding little power to counter its primary function: reinforcing political power
and hegemony (Elliott, 1980; Gitlin, 2003). Along the lines of Schiller's institutional study of US
information policy after WWII, one could conceive of RFE as a vehicle for the U.S. government
to engage disaffected East/Central European elites and altruistic western journalists as cogs in a
war for ideological and cultural hegemony.
However, that single slice through the RFE body might deny agency—and the dignity of
consciousness of self-making and world making (Krippendorff, 2009)--to the individuals who
invested their professional lives, who sometimes risked their lives, those who did the work of
news production and broadcasting journalism. Krippendorff (2006) describes discourse as a social
construction evident in text and artifacts. Practitioners in discursive communities, including those
of journalism, recognize and test each other as members, rearticulate texts, and legitimize practice
and guidelines. Significant to this study:
A discourse justifies its identity to outsiders, especially when its members come in
contact or must work with nonmembers . . . Successful discourses . . . justify themselves
in their (a) construction of reality (truths), (b) virtues (values), and (c) competencies
(expertise). A discourse that fails in this respect may lose its respect, its members, what
they are able to accomplish, and, hence, its viability" (Krippendorff, 2006, p. 25).
In order to mitigate the silences of CN journalists on those fronts, it was necessary to locate CN
journalists who did the work and to place their voices in conversation with those of others
preserved in archival documents or entered into the historical conversation about RFE through
memoir and insider histories. Their voices complicate assumptions about journalists and news
practices at RFE; they challenge and augment the existing record, and offer an alternative
understanding of RFE’s mission as it evolved in practice.
This study is the product of an evolving collage of methodologies. Narrative analysis
offers a means to understand and respect participants' understandings of themselves. The theory
of the social construction of reality (Becker, 1991; Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Dourish, 2001;
Shotter, 1985), Anderson’s (1991) idea of imagined communities, the imagined nation. and
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methods of historical ethnography (Clifford & Marcus, 1986; Clifford, 2012; C. A. Davies, 1999;
Reddy, 1992, 1999) and where social construction and narrative analysis intersect (Bruner, 1991,
2004) guided this study. Waisbord (2007) sums research foundational to part of the approach to
this study:
To press historians and media sociologists, the press has played a crucial function as a
builder of both nations and civic societies. It is widely accepted that the press has made
unique, remarkable contributions to nation-building. Historically, news organizations
have shaped cultural and political identities thought spreading common languages and
establishing a shared sense of time and space. By addressing audiences as members of
‘imagined communities,’ the press has outlined and nurtured national identities. (p. 122)
Brunner’s constructivist approach, in which, “‘world-making’ is the principal function of mind”
and that “‘stories’ do not ‘happen’ in the real world, but, rather are constructed” by people “as a
continuing interpretation and reinterpretation of our experience” (Bruner, 2004, pp. 691–692). It
also incorporates aspects of grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) in which themes and
categories emerge from the data, and in which data collection and analyses are conducted sideby-side.
Understanding had to evolve over time, as data were collected, and as conversations with
participants continued via mail and email, and as accounts and understandings were checked
against other accounts, memoirs and archival documents, and clarified or corrected as the study
proceeded. I thought of the process as pastiche, an ongoing narrative and conversation analysis
with input from ethnographic methods and social network theory and analysis, and historical and
archival methods. I paid particular attention to emerging themes, categories and understandings
typical of grounded theory.
As in any narrative, “the context”, “the conditions on telling” (Bruner, 1991, p. 10) were
important here. Why and when the narrative is related, and how both the research participants and
I interpret each other’s “background knowledge” (p. 10), in this case of journalism practice, of
RFE as an organization and of Cold War as experience and history, joined our mutual knowledge
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that any story of news work at RFE, begins at “breaches of the canonical” (p. 12). In other words,
going to work at RFE, a government-sponsored organization with a political mission, as a
Western journalist, is an event that constitutes “a putatively delegitimizing precipitating event in
the plot”; a “breach of conventional expectation” (p. 12) necessitates the construction of an
explanation.
Early on in this study, after only a few interviews with individuals who had worked in
different departments at RFE, it was clear that conversations with research participants that
focused on journalistic lives and news work would be constructed necessarily in relation to the
tellers’ consciousness of outlier status. In this way, our conversations take place within the
language and culture of journalism but our conversations are about and in reference to what
happened when conditions of practice appeared to professionally delegitimize both the tellers and
their work.
Taking from Bruner’s (2004) narrative examples of family, this study rests on the
importance of “home” as a “central axis” (p. 703) for narrative construction and reference. “The
Exiles” at RFE were exiles from “home”, but constructing imagined “home” nations in which
they hoped audiences would join them in conversation, and, in the process, repatriate themselves
as citizens in good standing. Western journalists were émigrés from “home” journalism turf,
voluntary exiles in an experimental, unmapped “home” in which practice would have to be
constructed. RFE was an island inside Germany where authentic “personhood” is constructed
through performance as Czechs and Poles, as authentic Western journalists. As such, the
narratives in this study are variations on the theme of legitimation, of authenticity.
My comfort with a collage approach to theory and methods, bringing any tool to bear on
the study that appeared likely to bear fruit, is in large part a product of having been a journalist.
“Journalists are the junkyard dogs of ethnography” (Harrington, 2003, p. 90). The exploration of
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unmapped territory benefited from a junkyard dog approach -- whatever looked appropriate and
promising at a particular juncture, I put to use.
In the absence of prior studies, it seemed more important to try to offer a description and
understanding of the conceptions of journalists and journalism practices at RFE in ways that
might allow others to find jumping off points for future research, rather than to offer a narrow
analysis from one methodological position that bypassed facets of the data that were obviously
rich with opportunities for future thicker description or more in-depth analysis. For this reason,
passages from interviews are more robust than might otherwise be expected, to give a fuller
account of participants’ positions and meanings, and to offer potential researchers more narrative
fodder.
I also chose to continue data collection, particularly interviews, long after saturation
points had been reached in discussion categories and within particular groups of actors at RFE. In
general, many former employees were in their seventies and eighties, and some died before our
interviews could be conducted (e.g. John P.C. Matthews, Glenn Ferguson) or following our
conversations and as the study proceeded (e.g. James F. Brown, Ralph E. Walter, Stefan
Wysocki, Karel Kasparek, Nathan Kingsley, and William Marsh). Almost all of the potential
participants in the CN and a few on the émigré desks had never been interviewed. I could not fail
to follow up, no matter how many interviews I had already collected, on an email or phone call
that informed me that so-and-so had been diagnosed with cancer, or that so-and-so had heard
about the study while I was in Munich and was lying in a hospital bed. Could I meet him in a café
after his release, that day, though I had a train to catch to the airport in a few hours?
I allowed the journalistic and historical urge to collect for posterity’s sake to trump
indications that data collection was sufficient for a single study. Near the end of the study, after I
had been told repeatedly that women had been almost wholly absent from the newsroom until the
mid-1980s and RFE’s last decade in Munich, I interviewed an editor who offered contact
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information for most of the women who joined the CN during that time. How could I allow them
to remain invisible, their experiences and understandings of the newsroom to remain
unacknowledged and unincorporated into any thick description of the CN?
In short, I did not so much have the data by the tail as the sheer size of the problem of
data absence and mounting collection possibilities had me by the throat. Whatever I have
assembled here is therefore insufficient, but a first effort to map the territory, to fill a void of
understanding of the thinking of Western journalists and the practice they built and adapted for
news work at RFE. For this reason, with the agreement of the Hoover Institution, I will assemble
all of the materials collected, minus materials not approved for deposit by participants, and
deposit them as a discrete collection in the RFE corporate archive, in hopes that others might
flesh out, counter and build on what has been collected, and the abbreviated analysis offered here.

Interview sample, texts created and collected during field research, and ongoing
conversations with participants
Since the research period spans the 1951 -1994, many former RFE employees are not
longer alive. All potential participants, even if they were as young as 35 when RFE/RL closed its
Munich offices, are now aged 50 or older, with most in their seventies and eighties. Aside from
age, assembling an interview sample for this study might be described as a diasporic challenge.
Many CN and language service broadcasters left RFE from 1989-1994 following revolutions in
East-Central Europe, dramatic reductions in staff, the removal of headquarters to Prague, and the
gutting or closing of some services. Many long-time employees stayed in Germany to maintain
benefits under the German pension system. Others left for nations that had offered them
citizenship while stateless; e.g., the UK, Sweden and the U.S. From a few early contacts, the
sample grew mainly by participant referrals, but the methodology included consideration of social
network theory, and I adjusted the sample to deepen complexity.
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During travel in Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the UK and the U.S. during
2004 – 2011, I compiled a list of former journalists, broadcasters and managers who had worked
at RFE and RFE/RL between 1951 and the last day of work for journalists in the CN in Munich
on June 30, 1995, when the CN’s operations moved to Prague. While traveling in 2004-08, I
compiled a list of more than 200 former employees of RFE and RFE/RL (1951 – 1994), and,
from 2004-2012, I conducted more than 100 interviews with 70 participants, and ongoing
conversations via mail and email. Participants were natives of New Zealand, Australia, Canada,
the UK, Ireland, the U.S., Poland, Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and the former Czechoslovakia,
East Germany and West Germany.
The sample includes former employees drawn primarily from RFE and RFE/RL
governance, policy (sometimes a euphemism for intelligence and/or foreign policy personnel),
management, language broadcast services, the Central News Division (CN), the Broadcast
Analysis, Research and Analysis, and security departments. For comparison, I also interviewed a
few individuals who worked for Radio Liberty (RL) or for both RL and RFE. Names of possible
interviewees were drawn and cross-checked from several sources: archival documents from the
RAD collection at the Open Society Archives in Budapest (2004), referrals during conversations
with scholars researching international broadcasting, especially the BBC's World Service, from
lists of interviewees in monographs on international broadcasting during the Cold War, RFE and
RFE/RL, and, primarily, from contacts offered by interviewees from their own digital email and
hand-written address books consulted in their homes near the end of our conversations.
In order to encompass all of RFE's broadcast years in Munich, interviewees were chosen
from the five original radio services (six language desks) that continued broadcasting, in most
cases expanding over time, through RFE's relocation to Prague. I concentrated on locating
individuals who served as directors, editors, broadcasters, program hosts and reporters in Munich
and in bureaus, for the largest language desk, the Polish service, which employed nearly 100
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individuals during the 1980s, and the Czechoslovak service, which at its zenith in 1989 employed
more than 80. The U.S. placed high strategic importance on the nations of Poland and
Czechoslovakia, which lay at the eastern borders of Western European democracies. Both had
supported free republican governments in their recent pasts; U.S. strategists in both the Free
Europe Committee and the intelligence community saw Czechoslovak people as most married to
democratic ideals (Puddington, 2000). These services were among the radios broadcasting the
most hours of original programming per day in 1984 (the smallest services broadcast as few as
four hours) and also the highest percentage of news content (41-44%) of any of the RFE services
(Buell, 1986). Thus, the Polish and Czechoslovak services at RFE were more resource-robust
than others.
These two services also targeted peoples whose national borders included historical
territorial conflicts with the peoples of Germany (RFE's host nation), which offered opportunities
to probe conflicts over historical and cultural terms and narratives used in broadcasts. These two
services were also larger than the CN in total number of employees, but similar in terms of the
numbers of writers/editors during the 1980s, with the CN having around 30). The number of
broadcast hours made these two language services comparable to the CN in terms of an
atmosphere of urgency with continual, around-the-clock deadlines (smaller language services
broadcast as few as three to five hours per day).
Early in the project, I interviewed each individual identified, when possible. As the
number of potential interviewees grew, however, I took into consideration certain characteristics
of social networks, selecting from across generations of journalists, tenures at RFE -- from those
who worked during its early years (a Pole recruited via a displaced persons camp when the Polish
service was founded, and a Pole with ties to London émigré and resistance communities who
joined RFE during a later decade, e.g.) to those who entered during the last decade before the fall
of communist governments in target nations (1989-91). I interviewed individuals who grew up in
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the first Czechoslovak Republic between WWI and WWII and during Nazi occupation, who fled
Czechoslovakia 1948-1953 during consolidation of power by the communist party, and some who
grew up during the establishment of a socialist system, and who reached Western Europe
following the end of the Prague Spring in 1968, e.g. These generational/experiential differences
offered a means of comparison of conceptions of mission and of journalism over time and
therefore conflicts within groups as well as conflicts among groups. I interviewed a few research,
contract and freelance workers; e.g., a Czech-Canadian researcher who observed the Czech
language service for extended periods in 1968 and 1972. The sample includes employees who
remained in Germany, repatriated or settled in other nations.
In the CN, by contrast, journalists who hailed from English-language nations, the US, the
UK, Ireland, New Zealand, Australia and Canada, and, also Germany, were hired only if they had
had at least five years of experience working in a major national or international news
organization. Most journalists interviewed had careers that began in Western news organizations,
including posts in the offices of foreign editions or bureaus. A few worked prior to or following
their RFE service for the Voice of America (VOA), the BBC's External (World) Service,
Reuter(s) or other international broadcasters or wire services during the Cold War and could
compare their experiences as journalists with their work at RFE. CN employees included
directors and assistant directors of news, reporters of news and features, copy-tasters, and
"rewrite men" and women.
In assembling the sample, I did not want to duplicate nearly identical lists of “the usual
suspects” -- interviewees found in appendices of a few of the memoirs (e.g. Urban, 1997) and
histories of RFE and international broadcasting (e.g. Nelson, 1997). I was conscious that histories
or quasi-historical memoirs had been written by RFE insiders, and that authority had been granted
to voices according to judgments by those individuals. I interviewed figures in key positions at
RFE, of course, but was careful to seek and include voices not yet heard. A cross-check of
81

referrals selected for interviews revealed no matches beyond a few prominent policy personnel
and news directors. Many participants remarked that no one had requested interviews previously
(e.g. M. McCarroll, C. Peciva, M. Wall, T. Willey), including all of the participating Western
journalists who joined RFE during the 1980s through the early 1990s.
The sample also includes a few individuals who worked in broadcasting services and the
Research and Analysis Department at RL, both before and after its merger with RFE. For
triangulation, I interviewed a few former British and American managers and émigré reporters
who never worked for RFE, but only for Reuters, the BBC’s External Service (later World
Service) and the VOA during the Cold War.
Other factors limit participation and/or interview data even with access to individuals.
Among émigrés, suspicion and paranoia associated with work at RFE during the Cold War
sometimes persists. Those who could be reached in person could be leery of telephone interviews
with an unknown researcher, even with referrals. One émigré, referred by two colleagues who
identified her as a 30-year employee, claimed never to have worked at RFE at all. Second,
individuals who were intelligence operatives may be bound by nondisclosure agreements; they
may agree to interviews, but limit their comments in certain ways. Some participants accused
colleagues – "That man was CIA!" or, "She was a communist!" – during interviews. These
interactions replicated the accusations that permeated the work itself at the time of the Cold War.
I note the persistence of suspicion rather than attempt to untangle an untangle-able (at least by
me, given available documents) half-century’s conflicting claims.
Participants helped identify other possible participants through their social networks. At
the end of each interview, I asked participants to cull personal address books and/or email address
books for former colleagues. During interviews, most volunteered to cull their contacts, scrolling
lists on their home computers, identifying possible participants aloud while I took notes, their
contact information. They volunteered descriptions, unprompted, of each referred individual. This
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most often included the nation of origin and the job title or category and departmental affiliation
of the individual: “So-and-so was an Australian reporter in the CN who did X or covered Y for
us.” They sometimes described the contacts as having had a particular attitude toward policy or
practice, toward the content of broadcasts, or noted anecdotes from the time of their employment.
They offered information as to the potential participant’s views toward management during a
particular era, or whether the individual might offer a dissenting view from the majority group
view. In other words, interviewees situated contacts by network position and personal and/or
political commitments.
The pattern of referrals informed the study analysis itself, revealing and confirming
conversations about the social world of work at RFE. “The interview does not merely reveal a
social world…The interview also effects a social world” (Presser, 2004). Participants from all
groups referred most from within their own RFE working group. But CN journalists and
management officials referred individuals across the organization, including secretaries.
Interestingly, CN personnel also offered referrals to individuals with whom they disagreed on
news practices or policy. CN individuals were also the source of the first connections to the
research department. BD journalists, on the other hand, rarely referred individuals from outside
their own services, and almost never low-level employees in their own services.
A few individuals interviewed had been networked to RFE but not employed per se, e.g.,
an American demographer, a Czech freelancer (stringer) who reported from inside the Velvet
Revolution in 1989-90, and a Canadian researcher who observed the Czech language service in
operation from a desk in its newsroom in 1968. In other words, I constructed a network sample of
individuals representing groups inside or associated with groups within RFE over time. One
glaring—albeit interesting for its network implications--omission is the lack of a single referral of
any of the native Germans who comprised the bulk of the technical and support staff; one German
who worked as a journalist in the CN monitoring foreign language wires was identified. Thus,
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conceptualizing the sample as a “snowball” would be inaccurate -- it’s a constructed social
network sample compiled from the living remains of quite a large bank of former RFE
employees.
To mitigate the insular social network of a traditional snowball sample (Lindlof, 1995), I
asked scholars of international broadcasting for referrals. The official employee identification
card catalog boxes in the Hoover Institution Archives had obviously been culled, with boxes only
half-full, and the total number of cards well below the 400 – 1,000 expected entries. However, an
anonymous source contributed a copy of an internal document, a partial list of language service
employees as of 1989, and went through the list with me, employee by employee, noting whether
the employee was alive or deceased, and in which nation and city the retiree was now living, and
that allowed me to move outside the interviewee-by-interviewee address book social network
sample.
A few other sources were consulted for existing interviews. The OSA research
department archive includes some filmed or recorded interviews with now-deceased RFE
officials. Other repositories, e.g., The National Archives and the University of Maryland's Library
of American Broadcasting, e.g., contain some materials.
The interview process indeed affected a social world. Many participants throughout the
years of the study talked with me and with one another before and after interviews. Across
generations, older participants, particularly émigré retirees, were less likely to be connected
digitally, than Western journalists to have access to technologies such as the Internet, e-mail,
Skype or affordable international telephone calling plans, but they did talk with one another by
telephone about their interviews. BD journalists followed up via handwritten letters and
submission of printed documents. One was accessible only by handwritten postal service mail.
In contrast, younger and still professionally active journalists were easier to locate. One
group in particular, former employees of the CN from the 1980s and early 1990s were younger,
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mostly American, and remained connected to one another via online social networks. One
American reporter noted that following an interview, “it went out over Facebook” that I was
interviewing CN journalists, and “that people were having fun” during their interviews
(Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 23, 2010). That accelerated the
interview request and consent process.
Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval for this research has been in place, renewed
and amended annually, from 2005-2013. The study received IRB approval for the use of personal
identifiers. A verbal script was used to explain the study and to discuss the use of identifiers;
however, a written consent form was in use as well. During conversations subjects clarified their
understanding of my intentions for the use of their accounts. All interviewees with whom I met in
person signed consent forms releasing interview content and documents produced or copied
during our conversations. Those consulted by phone provided verbal consent to the use of
identifiers and materials, and most of those individuals also provided written consent via mail
exchange.
Participants choose, verbally and/or in writing whether to be identified by name or to
remain anonymous. Those who wanted to be designated as Anonymous for all of their
conversations and materials are identified as such, but with the addition of REF departmental
group and employment era identifiers necessary for context in the study analysis and narrative
(e.g., Polish service, 1980s). A few participants requested that particular content from their
interviews be available for use in my research, but not attributed to them by name in the analysis
or in the record turned over to any archive. In one case, a transcript can be submitted to an
archive, but not the original voice recording of our conversation.
Interviewing former broadcasting services personnel also involved the necessity of
keeping in mind the personal experiences of participants. Many had been subject to traumatizing
events, from war to internment camps to continual surveillance to arrests, interrogation and
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imprisonment, and many knew of ongoing harassment of their own family members in home
nations as a result of their emigration and work at The Radios. Interviews sometimes veered
toward relating experiences that participants did not want to share in archival collections.
Audiotaping interviews normally includes some stopping and starting of recording, but some
tapes in this research were stopped and re-started to avoid recording or to eliminate passages
related to trauma witnessed or experienced. I also encountered a few individuals who, while
talking about particular aspects of their experiences prior to emigration or their time at RFE in
terms of the conditions endured by listeners under communism, expressed intense emotions.
Their preferences for what would be recorded, related, attributed to them by name, or otherwise
imparted in this study have all been honored.
In cases where anonymity was preferred, in deference to the worries of émigrés, and to
concerns related to the revelations of some CN journalists, I also disguised identity not only by
omitting names (“Anonymous”), but also by altering dates and places of interviews, since a
pattern of names and dates in the interview record reflects my own travel to various cities and
might allow one to deduce the identities of respondents (unless respondents specified, as they did
in a few cases, that dates and locations were permissible). For example, the pattern of participant
names and dates reveals that I was in Prague at RFE in 2004, London and Munich in 2005 and
2010, Budapest three summers between 2004-2011, and the Virginia - New York metropolitan
corridor during 2006. Where “Anonymous” designations are used in this study, therefore,
identifiers include department of work at RFE, but interview dates have been altered. I arbitrarily
chose to use November dates for those interviews, so that “Anonymous” individuals were all miraculously - interviewed on one of three dates in November, during any arbitrarily assigned
year of the study.
About half of the interviews in this study, including almost all conducted during 20042007, were conducted face-to-face in participants' homes or other locations of their choosing and
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were recorded on audiotape. Some conversations occurred in locations other than personal
residences; e.g., in interviewees' offices in Washington, D.C. (five), a Philadelphia coffeehouse
(one), Munich and London cafés (two), Munich beer halls (two, during daylight hours, no beer).
As the study progressed, and as my own understanding of the material increased, and as the
interview slate narrowed to mostly CN journalists, most interviews were conducted via telephone.
Some interviews were conducted with the same participants in different locations; e.g. with the
former Czechoslovak language service editor Olga Kopecka in Prague in 2004 and in London in
2005, with other encounters by email. I met with former Broadcast Analysis Department chief
Martin Bachstein in Munich in 2005 and in Philadelphia a year later.
Face-to-face interviews were recorded on cassette tape, and cassette recordings were
converted to digital files afterward, prior to transcription. One émigré reporter objected to tape
recordings, as he said he had "had enough of tape-recordings under communism", but consented
to typed notes during our conversations. Telephone interviews were transcribed by me during our
conversations, and fleshed out immediately after the interview to fill in abbreviated terms and
phrases.
Rather than keep a single formal journal, I used a method employed while I was a
journalist: recording impressions after each conversation, written as separate notes at the end of
the transcript of each interview. I kept notes on conversations related to setting up interviews, the
relative willingness of each participant, and the like.
Interviews were semi-structured by categories of discussion, including conceptions of
organizational mission and relationships among groups at RFE, journalism practice, professional
training and experience, life narratives, and more. Semi-structured interviews included question
categories for discussion with all participants. Documents were a crucial part of the interview
process as well as subsequent conversations by phone, email and mail with previous participants.
Sources for this study also include documents created during interviews (organizational maps,
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e.g.), documents contributed from the personal papers of study participants, and documents from
RFE’s RAD archive at OSA in Budapest were used during interviews.
For the most part, each conversation lasted between two and four hours. Participants,
proved willing and thoughtful. With a few exceptions, they were direct –as opposed to hesitant—
during in our conversations. One aspect of the interview process emerged as its own structural
category. Being journalists, many also interrogated me as to personal motives, the sources of any
research funding, and the ultimate disposition of the research results, before they permitted me to
get down to the business of our conversations.
Interviews also revealed attributes of social (group) and individual identity including
beliefs embedded in interpretations of history and of national, ethnic and cultural rivalries, and
the like. Subjects’ affiliations were recorded—nations of birth for subjects and their parents,
ideological stances and activities of parents and subjects, education and work histories, positions
held at RFE/RL and views on questions of policies and practice. Participants related pivotal life
experiences leading to emigration and/or work at RFE/RL. The accumulation of stories of
management and news practices as commitments embedded in group interactions were the focus.
During interviews, individuals reviewed documents I provided from RFE's research
department archives in Budapest in 2004. These research materials were used across the
organization, in language services, policy offices, and, during some eras, the CN. As such, they
symbolically join all departments under review in this research. Documents jogged memories
toward the flow of work at RFE; participants decoded markings that tracked the editorial use and
circulation of research materials to help me to discern the flow of work and decision-making in
the organization.
Participants were asked to critique any of the five historical memoirs of RFE or RL
published by 2005 against their own experience and understanding of the organization. These
quasi-histories (e.g. Urban, 1997), are common reading among former RFE employees; each
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retiree acknowledged having read at least one of these books, and many had read two or more.
Who among which groups had read which texts, and their reactions to those texts provided insight
into the conceptual positioning of working groups at RFE, particularly with respect to policy and
decision-making about journalism and the selection and status of broadcast content. Participants
were asked which of the texts, if any, described “what it was really like” to work at RFE. The
choosing and assessing the accuracy of narratives yielded stark lines of demarcation. All language
service broadcasters chose Urban’s account. Western journalists and some managers discounted
Urban’s narrative as a political text. “Urban’s book is really about Urban” (R. E. Walter, personal
communication, July 13, 2005). CN journalists cited Urban’s account as a justification for
journalistically suspect decision-making. American managers favored Puddington’s history, and
some journalists cited it as accurate to their experiences at RFE.
Some participants also created new documents during interviews. They were asked to
draw an organizational schematic of the working (rather than official) structure of the RFE/RL
news operations as they had experienced and remembered it, and to place themselves within it.
Those exercises helped spark conversations about the evolution of RFE, including especially
power, working relationships and conflicts among groups.
To mitigate the thinness of archival material related to directly to news practices and
journalists inside the CN, participants contributed items from personal papers, including many
internal CN documents; e.g., items from the CN news file, memos and letters written to CN staff
or RFE management. The items journalists chose to save tended to focus on their personal roles,
and/or key moments of some struggle to maintain or defend news practice. For example, an
assistant news director forwarded what he called a “seven-page rant” (L. McCoy, personal
communication, October 6, 2006) issued in an attempt to corral the CN’s journalists from many
Western traditions toward a unified conception of story selection and style relevant to the needs
of the BDs and their listeners – and therefore unique to RFE. When managers suggested merging
89

the newsrooms of RFE and the VOA, e.g., a news editor initiated a content analysis of stories and
headlines in the internal wire copy of both organizations; he forwarded a copy of his report. Such
documents have been resurrected from a garage in Chevy Chase, a basement storage locker in
Munich, an attic on Long Island, and a corner desk in a cottage parlor in Suffolk. Other
participants contributed copies of CN or CN-related documents, ranging from a few to a shipped
box-load.
Participants have been interested in this research; they have often continued creating
documents – correspondence by mail and email, forwarding remarks – even, for example,
unsolicited essays on émigré relations (M. Bachstein, personal communication, November 23,
2007) and Polish desk leadership (G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal communication, March 9, 2006) –
elaborating on questions touched upon in our conversations. A few followed up with further
correspondence via email or letter, telephone calls and, in some cases, second interviews. All
participants who were asked to clarify understandings or to read descriptive passages of, e.g.,
journalistic practice, following our initial conversations responded. Some interviewees
corresponded at times throughout the study. In a few cases, email conversations involved several
participants at once, as they cross-checked memories of events and added additional insights.
Concern of participants for purposes of study and outcomes – the resulting narrative –
and what it would say about RFE, and about them, was evident in some cases. For instance,
participant Martin Bachstein (personal communication, July 10, 2005), former director of the
Broadcast Analysis at RFE and RFE/RL, contacted another Walter regarding concerns he thought
I had had about a lack of East-Central Europeans in top management. Walter followed up with
commentary in a letter to me:
In thinking back over our discussion, I find myself rather uncertain what it was you were
really looking for . . . . On several occasions, you evidently were looking for illustrations
of the ‘culture’ of the radios. Perhaps that could be interpreted as the bonds that brought
us together in the organization on the basis of shared values, goals and concepts. But I am
not sure that is a correct interpretation. . . .
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Is it possible you seek to fit the radios into some kind of actual or theoretical
communications system, design or pattern? If so, I suggest you may be after something
which hardly, if at all, existed. No doubt I am on dangerous ground here, for you may
well think, or at least suspect, I am trying to tell you how you should approach your
work. . . . It is not unknown for the halls of academe to enjoy finding challenges in
developing theoretical models. It is also not unknown that at times such models have
little or nothing to do with the real world. Your own practical, working, journalistic
experience has in all probability endowed you with an [sic] built-in firewall against such
tendencies. (R. E. Walter, personal communication, August 6, 2005)
Although CIA involvement officially ended at the Radios during the 1970s, the
employment tenures of some policy personnel, managers and employees in the research and
analysis and other departments, along with news workers, spanned both periods at RFE, and the
suspicions and speculations of language service and CN employees as to who might be connected
to US intelligence continued throughout RFE’s tenure in Munich. I chose to approach the study
with an assumption that the U.S. intelligence not only had a stake in what happened at RFE
during its entire tenure in Munich, but also that RFE had to contend with screening employees,
with employee contacts with intelligence from “target” states, that intelligence operatives from
East-Central Europe tried to, and did, gain employment at RFE, and that therefore it was in U.S.
interests to place intelligence operatives at RFE. Some participants readily identified those they
knew who had been CIA employees. Gut instinct and the content of interviews with other
participants’ told me that four of the individuals I interviewed were probably CIA employees. But
I’m also a realist – confirmation of CIA relationships for individual employees could not be
confirmed by me using the methods of this study or the documents available.
On the other hand, a few participants seemed to be monitoring the progress of the
research, offering counter-narratives and cautions in response to their interpretations of the
meanings of interview questions or the directions our conversations took, to a degree more than
might be expected. Of that, I took note. I allowed the research methods to highlight levels of
concern with research progress (e.g. who I talked to and what they said) and outcomes (e.g.
interpretations of management decisions about incidents related to the newsroom) beyond those
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routinely encountered in ethnography or expected for this particular study (e.g. concerns about
representations of historical events, descriptions of news routines and individual
characterizations). Narrative analysis allowed the mix of voices and documents in conversation to
occupy the same plane, where more concerted participant efforts, particularly in conversation
over time, to monitor who I talked with, or to monitor research progress and to pre-empt or
counter possible interpretations, emerged. Some attempts to steer interpretation conflicted with
what emerged from the data via saturation, especially in reference to aspects of RFE’s group
relationships and organizational decision-making about news work.

Reflexivity: journalist-turned-academic interviewing journalists
The narrative at this point cues a necessary discussion of reflexivity. Waddington's
(1994) description of the ethnographer might apply to journalists: “[T]he ideal fieldworker is
someone . . . with a thick enough skin and an ability to depend consistently on their own
initiative” (p. 120). Harrington’s previously mentioned characterization of journalists as
“junkyard dogs of ethnography,” entails a desire to improvise and discover alternative, unofficial
paths in the field. But journalists lack the luxury of ethnographic immersion in a single case over
time. On the other hand, in a study of foreign correspondents' conceptions of work, Hannerz
(2002) “explored the sometimes curious and often obscure passages of news in roundabout ways”
(p. 60); I did the same with the documents created and located during this study. Hannerz also
noted links to anthropology. “Sometimes . . . I was approximating the parachutist practices of the
foreign correspondents themselves—moving in on a place, getting my stuff together, and then off
again” (p. 64). My work was both junkyard dog and parachute aspects, but as it took place over a
period of eight years, those aspects are mitigated, I hope, by depth and opportunities for checks
on understanding.

92

The ethnographer's end product is thick description; the journalist's task is often to
explain divergence. My study of RFE is a union of the two. Ethnographers mine the everyday for
patterns, ferreting meanings to join the margins and the mainstream; that is what I’ve done here.
But, the journalist-turned-academic in me relishes the discovery of discursive strategies that not
only construct spaces of practice, but subvert order to maintain them in the face of power as well.
This satisfies both the ethnographic impulse to understand marginalized voices, while the choice
of RFE as a case study itself satisfies the journalistic impulse to notice, investigate and explain
the divergent event.
When contacting research participants, I introduced myself as a former journalist
pursuing a doctoral degree. Being a former journalist was an advantage in this research, from start
to finish. In order to communicate a shared understanding of practice and a shared territory or
practice, I had to know the territory from which practice diverged. As a researcher, attempting
this study while not being a Pole or an Australian – my worry at the outset – revealed itself as less
important than attempting it while not being a journalist would have been.
“Former journalist” made a positive response to an interview request more likely, and
lent unanticipated depth to discussions of practice. For example, being an American former
journalist helped illuminate differences among terms and practices: CN participants sometimes
referred in interviews to the traditional “sitting in the slot” or “slot man”, but at other times
referred to this task using the British-ism, “copy-taster”, and the CN’s use of the BBC’s twosource rule stood out against RFE’s intent to practice on an “American model”. “Former
journalist” also allowed the use of journalistic terms and principles parlayed in the narratives of
non-journalist policy and management officials in interviews, published memoirs and “histories”
and organizational documents, to be interrogated against the understandings of journalists.
“Reading” RFE memoirs as a journalist illuminated the ways in which journalism “talk”, ethics
and practices were parlayed in narratives by RFE management that interview conversations
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revealed via anecdotes backed by documents to be justification for politically motivated decisionmaking. I “saw” what the Western journalists saw that made a particular narrative; e.g. Urban’s
memoir, an affront to journalism and to the truth – including narrative and motives -- of what
happened at RFE during the first Reagan administration. But I also understood, after
conversations with BD journalists, what made the same text accurate not only in rationale, but in
spirit, for them.
One instance where journalism experience was of benefit follows. Former RFE director
George Urban, in his memoir, justifies a decision to forbid BDs to broadcast a report that
President Reagan had joked into what he thought was a disconnected microphone that the U.S.
would begin bombing the Soviet Union in a few minutes. He tried to influence status of the story
in the CN news file distributed to the BDs, and the CN was adamant that the story should remain
in the file. Urban blamed “neighborhood” (RFE employee) opposition for leaking his decision to
The New York Times as a story of management interference in the CN. After hearing research
participants complain about Urban’s after-the-fact interpretation of the incident, I brought up the
subject of Reagan’s speech in subsequent interviews with residents of the “neighborhood”. One
former CN editor (nearly all employees in the newsroom were given some version of the title
“editor”, save directors and deputies), looked surprised, stopped talking, waved his hands and
smirked, then pointed to the tape recorder on the table between us. I turned off the machine.
Well. I had a relationship with some of the people at The Times….
It was you?
He then offered his account of the events and his intentions.
But you can’t use that. It’s off the record.
But I was a journalist and he was a journalist and we both knew that his “off the record” was
subject to clarification.
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Do you mean I can quote you but without attribution, that I can tell the story without
attribution, that I can use it ‘on background only’, or that I cannot use it at all?
Oh, use it. But not with my name on it.
Quote you?
Yes.
Had I been an academic without journalism experience, I believe that my effectiveness
throughout the data collection and analysis would have been deficient. That particular editor’s
interview has been recorded as “Anonymous”.
Hannerz (2002) encountered in news bureaus around the world journalists skeptical of
academic intent. Just as journalists encounter sources who suspect ambush-by-bloodhound, he
found it necessary to reassure interviewees that he did not intend his study as “simply an attack
on their work and its products” and “to forget the implications of such constraints as deadlines
and space limits”. Likewise, having been a journalist added a modicum of trust on the part of
participants that I would understand the journalistic process itself. It assisted with consent and the
issues around use of the materials. “I’m a journalist talking to an ex-journalist; I’m comfy making
this an interview without any conditions” (C. Smith, personal communication, December 4,
2010).
At times, however, it was difficult to tell whether any hesitation and discussion revolving
around assurances was derived from suspicion of an academic’s intent, or of an American
journalist’s intent regarding RFE’s outlier status – was I approaching the journalist with a preconceived conclusion, as if s/he was a propagandist? One participant noted, after insisting that the
interview be anonymous, “Now, look,” and reminded me that he, too, had been a journalist, and
that he was aware that some don’t abide by agreements with sources. “I’m putting my trust in
you. I’m being candid with you. That you understand something of this” (Anonymous CN
journalist, November 7, 2011). But it was delivered in a manner that would have made it seem
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almost a threat, had I not spent a decade interviewing politicians and the like, prior to academic
work. I logged the intensity in end-of-interview notes, made sure I had the agreement for sourcing
and attributing the interview correctly noted, and kept going.
With other RFE groups, focusing on the CN rather than on the more frequently studied
public diplomacy or the BDs sometimes turned discussions in fruitful directions. Robert
Hutchings, former deputy director of RFE (1979-1984), recalled the position of the CN in the
hierarchy of managerial worries.
This conversation actually reminds me, helps me focus on . . . how much we . . . took for
granted the function that Central News performed, because I didn’t have to worry too
much about the newscasts [at the top of the hour]. I worried much more about the
[language services’] ‘Political Blocks’, the commentaries, the historical series, the
question of whether there was an Iron Guardist [Romanian anti-Semitic National
Socialist (fascist)] who was going to be on [the Romanian desk’s] literary program next
week. (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006)
On the whole, being a former journalist provided a foundation for mutual understanding,
contributed materially to the depth and range of discussion, to ferreting and clarifying meaning,
and to cross-group questioning (similar to cross-reporting) cues that helped position
interpretations in Hannerz’s gap between the journalist as hegemon (“macro”) and the journalist
as hero (“micro”) referenced in the introduction to this study.
Documents created in conversation with participants, including initial interviews and
follow-up email, mail and telephone talk over time, and including documents created during
conversations and contributed from participants’ personal papers, were placed in conversation
with documents located in archives and with published memoirs and histories, to reveal group
and individual conceptions of RFE's mission and on journalism practice. Ongoing testing and
clarification of meaning and understanding found in data included conversations with participants
during the research and analyses. I also analyzed data along the way in research papers using
different theoretical approaches. What emerged from the study ultimately depended upon placing
new data and analyses into a wider conversation that included archival documents, memoirs and
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published histories of RFE to reveal group positions on mission and to reconstruct CN practice
over time.
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CHAPTER 4: “THE EXILES” IN THE LANGUAGE BROADCASTING SERVICES
While Western journalists might find rewarding alternative work in international
reporting at other organizations, for East-Central European émigrés, jobs at professional levels of
responsibility and pay available in Western Europe were few, especially jobs that entailed work
in their native languages. Most importantly for East-Central Europeans, work at The Radios
offered a chance to assist, via delivery of broadcast content, citizens left behind in their home
nations. For Ctibor Peciva, Political Block program editor for the Czech language desk, RFE was
a “dream job” (personal communication, July 14, 2005), a highly desirable position for long-term
rewarding work.
This chapter describes the conceptions of “dream jobs” among “The Exiles” or émigrés
in the language broadcasting services, specifically, their conceptions of the mission, group
relationships and tensions. Along the way, this narrative describes the conceptions and actions of
the language service employees who constructed and maintained authenticities in pursuit of goals
to bring information to those denied it, and most importantly, to combat communism in nations of
birth through construction of what amounted to alternative nations, alternative ways of being,
e.g., Polish or Czech, in broadcasts. This chapter also discusses relationship of groups of émigrés
or exiles within desks, among desks, with those they referred to as “The Americans” (M.
Bachstein, personal communication, July 10, 2005) in management, with Western journalists in
the Central Newsroom (CN), and with other Western-origin groups in the organization. An
understanding of these dynamics is necessary to establish the conceptual and material worlds of
work at RFE in which two groups of “exiles” -- émigrés in the language broadcast services or
broadcast desks (BDs) and Western journalists in the CN -- (re)constructed their own legitimacies
and authenticities through news work.
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Conceptions of RFE’s mission
If there is a general statement that can be made about the reasons exiles from EastCentral Europe came to work in the language broadcast services at RFE, it is this: “I wanted to
fight against the communists in general the [The Radio] was a tool to fight communism, and to
make a living at the same time” (Anonymous Polish Language Service editor, personal
communication, November 23, 2008). Polish desk staffer Stefan Wysocki concurred. “There were
many reasons. One, I wanted to do something for Poland. . . . [And] I wanted to earn some
money.” Wysocki wanted “to make [Poland] free from communism. I was sure . . . at least that
the Radio would . . . neutralize the influence of communist ideology” (personal communication,
July 12, 2005). Peciva recalled:
The Radio had given us a unique chance to work effectively against communism and for
millions of listeners who needed solid information. . . . We, in the Political Block
[program], were constantly reminded of ‘the balanced view’. But our main task and goal
were simple: To provide information where almost no reliable information was available.
(personal communication, July 14, 2005)
For BD staff, providing information otherwise unavailable and fighting communism were part of
the same task. Journalism, on a Western model, parsing a reminder for a “balanced view” with a
politically partisan mission, was a means of achieving it.
However, it was evident to exiles working in the language services of other Western
International broadcasters that RFE’s mission carried agency beyond the provision of news
otherwise unavailable to listeners. The goal of acting as a surrogate free press, an alternative
“home” radio, entailed providing listeners with much more than Western or American-style
newscasts. At the BBC’s External (World) Service, Milan Kocourek, an émigré working for the
Czechoslovak Section during the 1980s, submitted applications repeatedly to work at RFE,
because, “I could do more for my country, my people from there” (personal communication,
August 10, 2005). Like language service broadcasters in other international broadcasters, simply
by positioning their voices in the west, RFE’s émigrés modeled and embodied not only individual
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acts of self-liberation, but also group action on behalf of those left behind in nations of origin.
Beyond that, and the provision of news styled via Western journalism, language service
employees at other international broadcasters and RFE part ways.
The possibility of doing “more” lay in RFE’s mission, from the late 1950s forward, as a
surrogate free press, and official broadcasting guidelines that specified that program content
would not attack communists directly, and would be “not inconsistent with” American policy (see
Chapter 2). Other international broadcasters like the BBC’s Extension [World] Service or the
VOA or Deusche-Welle sported missions as extensions of sponsoring nations, focused on
propagating an understanding of and furthering the sponsoring nation’s ways of life and national
policy. RFE would be something more, a surrogate domestic free press for peoples in nations
targeted for broadcasts, necessarily posing itself as a counterpoint to communist state media, and,
by extension in political opposition to communism itself.
How that something “more” manifested in the conceptions of BD employees varied.
Peciva wrote, “I’ve no idea how many RFE-staffers would agree with me. We were, as I had said,
‘a bunch of brothers and sisters’, but this bunch was more pluralistic than an outsider would
expect” (personal communication, July 22, 2005). Olga Kopecka began working for RFE at age
24 in 1965 as a correspondent for the Czech desk from The Netherlands, where she had emigrated
with her mother after a five-year wait. While waiting to emigrate, she was prohibited from
attending university, but listened to RFE’s “University of the Air”. She rose to editor and
eventually deputy chief of the Czech desk in Munich. She followed RFE on its move to Prague a
five years after the Velvet Revolution. She recalled that there were differences in perceptions
among those constructing language service programming. For Kopecka, “It wasn’t an ordinary
job. It was a mission. . . . [A younger colleague who joined RFE years later] always said, ‘I am
not here to fight for Czech freedom. I am here to give information. I was a fighter for freedom.
She was not” (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005). Another of Peciva and
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Kopecka’s colleagues, Jan Mekota, laughed when asked, “Do you think of yourself as a freedom
fighter?”
No, I wouldn’t use the word ‘fighter’. It was not so deep. I would agree there was a [sic]
propaganda, but propaganda in the way that CNN, the BBC and other stations are
propaganda. Simply, we tried to make up for the non-existent information in
Czechoslovakia, to give the people the sort of information they didn’t have--normal,
ordinary information. Not communist. Not pro-fascist. Not just what information the
government wanted the people to know. It was democratic. It was everything. (J. Mekota,
personal communication, July 28, 2005)
BD employees acknowledge the political mission of RFE, but did not consider
themselves propagandists in the negative sense. “It wasn’t propaganda. Don’t call it that,” insisted
Kopecka, former deputy chief of the Czech language service. “There is a myth in America that
we were a propaganda station” (personal communication, August 17, 2004). The term
“propaganda” is a sensitive topic among BD staff members on two fronts: In the U.S.,
“propaganda” is a pejorative term used to denote information tainted by government sponsorship,
RFE’s clandestine association with the CIA during its first two decades, and, in general,
propaganda as implying nefarious intent and intentional lies. In the communist world, RFE was
constructed in media accounts as a propaganda station in the pejorative sense, with BD
employees as “collaborators” with capitalists, as criminals and traitors to the nation. When
language broadcast staff acknowledge RFE program content as propaganda, they qualify the term
instead in terms of its entomological roots and dictionary definition, as information constructed to
propagate, to persuade, either overtly or by intent.
Exiles knew from personal experience listening to state radio inside nations of origin, by
comparing what they saw on the street, and in their own lives, with what was broadcast, that state
media were not always truthful. Many writers have described the dual existence of life inside
communist East-Central Europe, the public world and the self versus the private world and self.
Frank Kaplan, a Czech who emigrated to Canada with his mother at age 12, became an academic.
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Part of his research in 1968 and again during the 1970s, was immersion at the Czech language
service at RFE in Munich; it also included trips to Prague to visit cousins and their families.
They tried to create this public or open society of Czechoslovakia by being able to be
inside it for a few minutes maybe a quarter of an hour, . . . the “free world”. [I]n a sense,
there was this above-ground and underground existence . . . . There was this [way] that
you spoke and acted while in public view, on the streetcar and in the café, you acted and
talked in a certain way. But then when you withdrew and were in your own home with
the music blaring [to cover the sound] and you listened to the BBC or RFE, then you
created your own reality. . . . From this drab entity outside, in Prague, you opened the
door and stepped inside an apartment and saw what was there; it was day and night. You
could almost see the transformation of the people as they came inside. They shed their
outside skins and became themselves. (F. L. Kaplan, personal communication, August
21, 2006)
A Bulgarian BD broadcaster, Roman Traycey, had been a writer for Bulgarian national
radio from 1962-66; he decided to obtain permission to travel to France in 1966 in the guise of
learning French. He described the “schizophrenia” he felt at age 24.
I had problems with communism. Particularly working in the news department of
Bulgarian National Radio, I had access to information not available to the average
Bulgarian citizen. I made up my mind that I didn’t want to have any more to do with
Bulgarian communism; it contradicted all my beliefs, all my ideology. . . . I knew the real
reports, the real information. I started being ashamed of myself, of putting crap on the
radio. It was a bit schizophrenic, and I just couldn’t take it any longer.
Many stories . . . had to be approved by somebody higher up. I’d have a story
prepared for the newscast, I would bring it to my editor, who signs off on everything that
is supposed to go on air. One day, Hemingway died; I got the news from foreign radio. . .
. I wrote the news item to read that, ‘The American writer Hemingway died this
morning.’ The guy who was supposed to sign off on it, he asks me, ‘Are you sure he’s an
American writer?’ I said, ‘Yes, he is American.’ And he says, ‘Well, we better leave out
the ‘American’. Just say ‘writer’. . . . Stuff like that happened almost daily. It was
ridiculous, of course, but what could I do? I had to comply. It pissed me off. (R. Traycey,
personal communication, December 4, 2010)
Traycey wound up in a refugee camp near Nuremberg, where RFE’s Bulgarian desk contacted
him. He knew the station because he had begun listening in secret when he was 15, during the
Hungarian Revolution of 1956. He took a writing test, a voice test, and was hired to work in the
Research and Analysis Department, joined the Broadcast Analysis Department in 1973, and
finally became director of the Bulgarian language broadcast desk in 1991. For Traycey and other
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exiles, not living a dual life inside nations of birth placed a premium on delivering “truth” to
audiences left behind via radio once they emigrated to the West.
But exiles recognized and acknowledged that the ultimate hoped-for result of providing
alternative information was regime change (post-1956, broadcast guidelines forbid directly
recommending subversive or other political action to audiences). A Polish desk editor who had
grown up in the London émigré community, and whose father had been a Polish officer from an
aristocratic family, described RFE’s mission: “One word: surrogate. . . . I never considered the
Polish government legitimate. [Poland] was occupied by the communists. . . . It was our lifetime’s
work to remove them” (G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal communication, July 14, 2005). Jan Mekota,
who worked on the Czech language desk from its first broadcast in 1951 through its move to
Prague more than 40 years later, put it this way:
Yes, at the end, it would be a final goal to bring down communism, but not with
weapons, or with military. . . . It would be a long time, a long march, with the radios,
with information. . . . First, we try to de-mask the lies of the communist regime. It was
our belief that the Iron Curtain would fall. (J. Mekota, personal communication, July 28,
2005)
Exiles working in the BDs from across generations and backgrounds – ethnic, religious,
educational and economic status -- viewed the “truth” as a kind of “propaganda” in the positive
sense. “Because communist news sources informed people in their way—they had to lie—it was
very easy for us to correct them” (K. Kasparek, personal communication, July 11, 2005). A Polish
editor echoed that conception. “We presented an alternative version of developments, anyone
could turn on the radio and hear our version of a story…very close to the truth. Without us, he
could never have this choice” (Anonymous Polish language service editor, personal
communication, November 23, 2008). “We must not exaggerate, the best propaganda is the
truth,” said former Czech desk chief Pavel Pechacek, “Even if it’s not popular or too pleasant”
(personal communication, August 17, 2004).
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Beyond the well-known Cold War mantra that fighting “lies” with “truth” might
eventually help bring down communist regimes, exiles understood RFE’s mission as having an
additional aim: “Yes, [it was] pro-democracy” (J. Mekota, personal communication, July 28,
2005). An exchange with a Polish language service staffer illustrates the idea that information
was broadcast in the hopes that it would alter perceptions of what was possible, and that listeners
would use the information in decisions about everyday behavior.
Wysocki: We have been doing propaganda in the proper way, telling something exactly
without lies, without leaving out important facts.
Interviewer: Propaganda in the good sense?
Wysocki: Yes, in the best one.
Interviewer: To influence people to do what?
Wysocki: Not only to do something, but also not to do something. Not to work with the
secret police and so on. And not to go to the party [meetings]. (S. Wysocki, personal
communication, July 12, 2005)
“Pro-democracy” was understood on the Czech desk, too, in a broad sense, beyond offering
citizens access to information alternative to that provided by the state. Part of RFE’s task was to
expand perceptions of possibilities related to individual options and power, including day-to-day
decision-making.
It was very important that each small liberty . . . every one citizen should take the
possibility to create a small freedom for him[self]. It was a relative term, but if he didn’t
visit the meetings of the communist party . . . , he was satisfied that it was a small liberty
he gained …. . Everybody in his small place could try to create a small liberty for
himself, and this, if you bring it together, is much more. (K. Kasparek, personal
communication, July 11, 2005)
Indeed, listeners engaged in small acts of revolution merely by creating safe spaces for listening,
constructing antennae when necessary, tuning in, and adjusting their radio dials as RFE engineers
adjusted signals/frequencies to evade state jammers.
Regime change would come not through the overt encouragement of broadcasters
conjuring hopes for liberation “’tomorrow at noon, or at least the day after tomorrow”, as had
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been RFE’s approach during the early 1950s (Shanor, 1968, p. 25), when RFE was “a crude
propaganda machine” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005). Part of RFE’s role
would be to disrupt the communist project, the walls around the public imaginary, injecting
awareness that other ways of constructing the nation were possible. Providing otherwise
unavailable information, countering the “lies” in communist state media, sparking citizen action
toward individual and collective liberation, bringing down communist regimes and modeling a
surrogate free press in broadcasts were all facets of a larger conception in the BDs. When
longtime broadcasters talk of helping listeners to maintain “hope” (e.g., P. Pechacek, personal
communication, August 17, 2004; C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005) – rather
than stoking expectations for imminent liberation – they describe a kind of vigil in which
broadcasters join listeners in private spaces, summed by one RFE director as “keeping them
company” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005), while offering, through their
own voices and broadcast content, evidence of an alternative way of life. In the process,
broadcasters would construct an alternative nation, one that would exist only in the voices and
programs of each radio service, and in which both voices and nation required authentication.
Constructing imagined nations was not alien to émigrés from places where invasion and
occupation, wars and treaties had shifted not only territorial borders but also national sovereignty
and ideological governance several times during the first half of the 20th Century alone.
Territories that comprised Czechoslovakia had shifted from monarchy (pre-World War I) to
republic (after World War I) to fascist occupation (from the West during World War II) to
communist coup d’état (from the East in 1948) in just 30 years. “I am born in a country which
does not exist,” said Kasparek (personal communication, July 11, 2005). Kasparek, born in a
Czechoslovakia in 1923, was among the first generation of recruits to the Radios during the
1950s. He recalled a childhood in the republic founded by Tomas Masaryk after World War I.
During World War II, his father had died a few weeks after having been taken from the family
105

home by a German Nazi occupation force. A decade later, Kasparek himself fled during the early
years of communism after an attempt to indict him on a conspiracy charge related to his student
activities as a member of a social democratic political party. Eventually Kasparek became chief
of news in RFE’s Czechoslovak language service. “It was my dream to do something for the
liberty of my country.” He understood doing something for “my country”, his mission at RFE, in
part, as invoking the history and spirit of Masaryk’s republic (K. Kasparek, personal
communication, July 11, 2005).
Cold War risk and retribution
For broadcasters, RFE’s American-sponsored Cold War mission of eventual regime
change, to be inspired listener by listener, either overtly in broadcasts during the early 1950s or
more subtly during the ensuing decades, carried risk. RFE’s media-borne assault attracted
battlefield responses from states targeted for broadcasts that were not limited to the airwaves.
Work at RFE carried taint and entailed material risk for broadcasters living in the West and for
family members and listeners in nations of origin. There were murders of language service
employees in Europe, vandalism to personal property in Munich, and threats delivered face-toface and by telephone and letter. There were successful and planned (but not carried out)
poisonings of RFE employees, as well as a nighttime bombing of RFE in 1981 by the
international terrorist Carlos, at the alleged behest of Romanian intelligence (Cummings, 2009).
Indeed, throughout the Cold War, broadcasters well knew that their work at RFE carried not only
personal risk, but also taint and penalties for relatives at home (e.g., M. Nelson, personal
communication, August 3, 2005; R. Cummings, personal communication, July 13, 2005;
Cummings, 2009).
An exile’s association with RFE could reverberate in home nations as denial of education
and work opportunities for family members (e.g. R. Cummings, personal communication, July
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13, 2005; Cummings, 2009; K. Kasparek, personal communication, July 11, 2005; O. Kopecka,
personal communication, July 26, 2005; J. Mekota, personal communication, July 28, 2005; S.
Parrott, July 28, 2005; C. Peciva, July 14, 2005). Kasparek, who had been a medical student and
writer for politically aligned newspapers as a young activist following WWII, escaped
Czechoslovakia in a nighttime border crossing after interrogation soon after the communist party
took power. After he joined RFE, his mother and sister were interrogated (K. Kasparek, personal
communication, July 11, 2005). Peciva wrote under pseudonyms -- “Honza” and “Pavel Brezina”
– fearing that his father might be hounded by the StB (Czechoslovakia’s department of state
security, Statni Bezpecnost, or secret police). When Peciva’s brother fled Czechoslovakia in
1964, landing as a refugee in Sweden, their father’s life changed. “He was criticized in his
workplace, interrogated by the StB in Prague. . . . They said he had a bad political education and
that my brother was a traitor. He was an old and broken man in 1968” at the time of the Warsaw
Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005). Peciva, too,
left, five days after the 1968 invasion, with his father’s approval, intending to reunite with his
brother in Sweden, but expecting that his parents would be punished. Years later, after joining
RFE in 1978, he adopted the pseudonyms – required by RFE to protect broadcasters in Munich
and their families and friends at home– in part to try to protect his parents from more intensive
punitive action.
According to the long-time leader of RFE’s employee union as well as The Radios’
former chief of security during the 1980s, employees in the language services could expect letters
from relatives, or visits from the relatives themselves, pleading with them to stop broadcasting
(R. Cummings, personal communication, July 1, 2005; Cummings, 2009; K. Kasparek, personal
communication, July 11, 2005). For example, two years after joining RFE, Traycey received a
request for a visit from his father, who was given a visa to travel from Bulgaria to meet Traycey
in France.
107

He came with a message from the [Bulgarian state] security service asking me to return
to Bulgaria to denounce the radio and the West. I turned that down, of course, and
reported it to RFE security. I told my father it was impossible. . . . The family trouble
started when he went back and reported that I turned it down. . . . A couple of months
later, the problems began. They cut off their electricity. They cut off the phone. They
intercepted all of their mail. . . . I wrote letters, sent pictures of my kids . . . and my
parents would get nothing of that. That went on for years. . . . My brother . . . was
expelled from the university, sent for military duty to the so-called ‘labor force’, not the
regular army. The ‘labor force’ was anybody politically unreliable. (R. Traycey, personal
communication, December 4, 2010)
Language desk employees knew that they were being watched both inside RFE and in
their Munich neighborhoods, and that they were characterized in state-controlled media in nations
of origin individually, by name, as propagandists, criminals or traitors (e.g. O. Kopecka, personal
communication, July 26, 2005; C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005). RFE’s former
chief of security, Richard Cummings, noted successful cases of RFE infiltration by the
intelligence services of target states. The goal was to obtain information, including information
about employees broadcasting under pseudonyms.
On September 18, 1988, RFE's Czechoslovak Service freelancer ‘Albort’ confessed to
RFE/RL that he had been spying for the Czechoslovak Intelligence Service (CIS), and
that he was under threat from the CIS for refusing to continue doing so. For four years
(1984-88), while employed as a freelancer, he reported on all activities of RFE/RL's
Czechoslovak Service, and other émigrés living in Germany. He met at least twenty-three
times with his handler, who was a diplomat out of the West German Czechoslovak
embassy in Bonn. He was paid about DM 25,000. (Cummings, 2013)
During an interview after his conversation with RFE’s security office, Albort revealed that
individual broadcast desk personnel and other members of Munich’s Czech émigré community
had been targeted.
‘Besides . . . documents, which I passed on to my contact officer, I also passed him
personal notes and information about people who worked in the Czech. Dept. or belonged
to Czech. émigré groups outside RFE. It was part of my tasking to collect all information,
personal and professional about these people. Additionally, I received specific concrete
tasking from either "Vladimir" or "Ludek" (Czech Intelligence controlling officers) to
gather additional information about particular people in whom they were interested.’
(Cummings, 2013)
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“Albort” also admitted to stealing RFE/RL stationary and envelopes, which were then
used in 1988 to send "anonymous" letters to RFE management to attempt to undermine a former
Czechoslovak service director and other employees (Cummings, 2013). When these letters
arrived, supposedly from “anonymous” member(s) of the Czech language service, they related
employee criticisms, as well as complaints supposedly received from listeners. American
management took these letters seriously, discussing them with leaders of the Czech service.
Broadcast desks managers tried to convince Americans that such letters were fakes, and that the
listener feedback related was not genuine. “Sometimes” their arguments succeeded, “sometimes
not” (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005).
In a memo to RFE’s vice president in Munich, Ralph Walter, an American manager
enclosed a translation of a December 4, 1976 Polish state media broadcast by Zolnierz Wolnosci
attacking RFE’s Polish service director and a colleague: “In tone, it is a real Cold War classic,
primarily concerning RFE's new sign-on statement, the radio's 'continued' control by the CIA, and
the nefarious activities of Jan Nowak and Zygmunt Michalowski" (Hemsing & Walter, 1976).
Language services sometimes used defectors from East-Central Europe as sources in
broadcasts, adding eyewitness accounts to reports of conditions inside home nations derived from
research department reports and other sources that conflicted with reports listeners received from
state media. Attacking the credibility of The Radios and its broadcasters included infiltration not
only via stringers, but also by regular employment in the language services. A few sensational
cases during different periods in RFE history involved intelligence agents of the broadcast areas,
particularly Poland and Czechoslovakia, who gained employment in language services, worked at
RFE for a time, and then repatriated, armed with documents including lists of broadcast desk
employees. They later broadcast interviews in state media about their former colleagues,
depicting exiles as tools of imperialist westerners producing content under the control of the CIA.
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These reports particularly angered broadcasters (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30,
2005; O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005).
American managers were assigned CIA ranks in such reports; James F. Brown, a BritishAmerican director of RFE, recalled one “depraved lot,” a Polish language service staffer who
returned to Poland as a celebrated “ace of intelligence”, broadcasting supposed revelations about
the radios. According to the former employee’s broadcasts from Warsaw, “I was a CIA colonel. I
was addressed in the corridors [by radio employees] as ‘Colonel Brown’” (personal
communication, June 30, 2005). Within RFE itself, exiles themselves suspected Western
managers of relationships with intelligence agencies. Brown’s office, overseeing the language
services, was particularly vulnerable.
Very few of my colleagues would believe that I came to the place by accident. . . . There
was a lot of inverted naiveté – a naïve person believes everything. An inverted version of
that is a man who believes nothing. . . . RFE was conspiracy-oriented. People would say,
‘Don’t give me that!’ No one would believe I was not working for the British. I
remember my response was, ‘The poor, bloody British!’ I was working for RFE . . . and
no one else. What I believed in was that these nations in Eastern Europe should have a
right of deciding for themselves, in terms of independence and in terms of democracy and
in terms of the majority decided. . . . I didn’t want to force it down their throats. It’s so
easy to get utter cornball about it. (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005)
BD employees who joined the radios after its earliest years had begun their own
associations with RFE as listeners inside target nations, and concern for the fate of their audiences
grounded their work in Munich. Émigrés knew that their broadcasts were taboo material requiring
some risk to those who engaged in clandestine listening and conversation about broadcasts. For
example, as a child, Kopecka, who would later help direct the Czech desk, heard RFE's first
Czech language broadcast on May 1, 1951.
From that day, my family listened daily, and since my mother and father and
grandparents were of the opinion that one shouldn’t lie to children, they allowed us
to listen. Not many parents [did that] for fear of the children talking at school. We
had to give our hand to my mother that we would not talk. . . . I was ten years old. .
. . We always closed the windows. That was the most important thing--so nobody
could hear that we listened to RFE . . . [to] know what's going on in the world. (O.
Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005)
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American journalist Gary Thatcher, who established and headed the “Current Affairs” section in
the News and Current Affairs division during the late 1980s, recalled visiting the town of
Jindricuv Hradec in the Czech Republic a few years after the revolution. The town’s mayor, Josef
Eder, on meeting him, said, “I spent four years in jail for listening to you” (G. Thatcher, personal
communication, August 31, 2006). Eder had been caught listening to the popular “Teenager
Party”, a contemporary Western music program of the Hungarian service’s Geza Ekecs, who
broadcast as “Laslo Cseke”.
Broadcasters and audiences
Once they were in the West and employed at RFE, broadcasters had little direct contact
with audiences in home nations, though the volume of direct listener feedback that arrived in
Munich offices varied over time for each nation and during different periods of the Cold War.
However, some means of assessing audience response were available. RFE was dependent partly
for indications of listenership on the reactions of the opposition, including stories in the
communist press countering RFE reports or attacking broadcasters, along with the intensity of
each state’s costly and urban-centered signal jamming.
We have no possibility, no chance at the time to find exact information about our
audience. In a way, we were dependent on the reactions of the communist regime, of the
communist governments, to our broadcasts. In this way, we knew that people are
listening. (J. Mekota, personal communication, July 28, 2005)
Broadcasters, the “voices” known to listeners almost by pseudonyms (in a few cases
given names were used), also received letters and phone calls from listeners. Some broadcasters
enjoyed considerable audience response; e.g. “Laslo Cseke” regularly received letters from
Hungarians living across East-Central Europe (Puddington, 2000). “Ekecs had drawers full of
letters from Hungary, asking, ‘Can you get [medication] for my mother?’ How do [émigrés] bear
up under this pressure? Anyone who worked who was at all known on the radio would get these”
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(B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005).
A CN deputy director recalled the reaction of the Romanian language service director to
feedback during an earthquake in Romania in 1971.
There was no internal communication [in Romania]. The only thing available to the
people was RFE. We opened phone lines in Munich. People were phoning in saying, ‘Hi
mom, I’m OK.’ And a member of the Communist Central Committee asked to talk with
Noel Bernard. He told him, ‘I think you’re a KKK fascist asshole, but you’re doing a
good job. Why not come back and work for us?’ And Bernard said, ‘When you allow me
to come and say about Ceausescu what you just said about me on the radio, I’ll come
back’ (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
Letters and telephone calls from listeners to language services provided some information on
audience preferences and needs, but for the most part, program planners, reporters and editors
could not validate or adjust their approaches via continual, direct access to listeners.
American management tried to mitigate the absence of overall evaluations requiring
direct access to audiences by contracting an audience research and analysis unit, functioning out
of Vienna, to survey listeners while they were in the West. Audience research was aimed at both
gauging public opinion inside broadcasting areas and evaluating radio program approaches and
content. American management used these reports to inform both policy and programming at
RFE.
However, directors of the radio services distrusted the regularly issued RFE-contracted
listener surveys as guides for programming decisions. Surveys consisted largely of interviews
with travelers from East-Central Europe, many arriving by train, e.g. in Vienna. Broadcasters
maintained that the interview samples included only individuals permitted to travel outside the
borders of the communist states, a small and select group that broadcasters felt was not
representative of the population. Language service directors also found fault with surveys that
included incorrectly translated program titles and information. Kopecka recalled a survey that
showed that respondents almost never listened to a particular political block commentary and
analysis program that broadcasters knew was popular from other listener feedback. The title of
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the program had been mis-translated for the survey (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July
26, 2005).
Audience Research reports were used by American managers as reliable information
during RFE’s early decades, and survey methodology improved as years passed (Shanor, 1968) as
Americans tried to gauge attitudes toward particular subjects; e.g., the Vietnam War, inside
“target” nations. But by the 1980s, American managers joined broadcast desk directors in
viewing them as having limited validity and usefulness specific to making decisions about
audience needs and preferences, and ultimately to programming. William Marsh, an experienced
American journalist who had directed RIAS and was hired by RFE/RL as executive vice
president for programs and policy in 1986, expressed doubts about the usefulness of audience
analyses.
I didn’t put great stock in the material produced by Audience Research. I just didn’t think
people coming out on visits could be relied upon to tell the truth. First of all, the sampling
was very small. Second, only certain privileged people were permitted to visit the West.
They were people chosen for some reason, and probably that some reason was loyalty to
the regime -- that a relative was being held hostage back home. People were very often
not allowed to take their families on visits, so the regimes had a hold on them—they’d
left their wives and children behind, or their parents. The survey information was not to
be relied upon 100%. . . . I thought we had to have it, but I didn’t use that as barometer of
our effectiveness. (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006)
Broadcasters relied much on their own experiences as citizens for their conceptions of
what listeners needed or wanted, and for anticipating the effects of broadcasts. Many had been
regular listeners not only to RFE but to an array of Western international broadcasting stations,
depending upon which transmissions could be received in a particular location at a particular time
of day and during a particular era. Peciva had listened to the BBC and RFE as a student in Prague
during the 1960s. He echoed a conception common to the BDs -- that maintaining the idea of
“hope” for change was a key function of the radios. What was at stake for Peciva was no less “the
blood of Czechs”. RFE enabled “the people” “not to live in frustration. The major part of the
nation in communism, they were living in a state of psychic depletion. It was a folk disease, a
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depression, and we tried and we succeeded to be a sort of hope”. Peciva, who attended Roman
Catholic masses in Prague with his brother [though “not my parents; they didn’t have the
courage”], used the “Our Father”, a prayer to “Give us this day our daily bread”, to describe the
relationship he had experienced himself, and his working conception of the relationship between
listeners and his own desk’s broadcasts. “I knew it was daily bread for them. They were living on
our programs” (personal communication, July 14, 2005). Kopecka recalled childhood and family
respect for the Czech voices heard in her home in broadcasts. “RFE was for us some mythical
things like demigods or something” (personal communication, July 26, 2005).
Sampson, interpreting Bakhtin and Mead, says: “We address our own acts in anticipation
of the responses of real others with whom we are currently involved; imagined others, including
characters from our own past as well as from cultural narratives; historical others; and the
generalized other” (Sampson, 1993, p. 106). While composing political block commentary,
Peciva, like other émigrés, imagined himself in conversation with familiar others. “I thought of
groups I had known, university groups.”
It was a big problem that sometimes one had the feeling of talking speaking to a vacuum.
. . . There was no direct contact, but on the other hand I knew how my generation was
thinking and I felt a contact between me and my colleagues of approximately the same
age in Prague. . . . When we covered the [Polish] Pope’s travels, the responses were very
alive and came so fast. And I had the feeling that now I am talking to the people I know
or I knew well. (personal communication, July 14, 2005)
Kopecka, like Iranek-Osmecki on the Polish desk, thought of “our people”. “I can’t say I thought
of individuals. It was the nation. . . . My grandfather was a great patriot. I felt a passionate
attachment to the Czech nation.” The Czechs had endured “hundreds of years under domination”
(O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005).
Legitimacy and authenticity are not discussed in interviews per se, but narratives reveal
their underlying urgency for broadcasters. A crucial belief on the part of BD employees was that
to support and inspire hope, imaginings and gestures toward independence, one had to construct
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alternative accounts that created a view of society that could be understood as “nearer the
listener” (Kasparek, personal communication, July 11, 2005). To meet the goal of being
perceived by the listener as their “home” radio, language service broadcasts had to be perceived
as more legitimate or authentic than those of state media. Jan Jun, a listener in Czechoslovakia
who became a reporter for RFE after the fall of communism in 1989, said that during his teens
and twenties, “I never, ever, ever thought about [RFE] as propaganda from the other side. It was
an extremely intelligent kind of broadcasting. It was not based on the verbal doses of propaganda
. . . we were getting from [inside] Czechoslovakia” (personal communication, July 23, 2005).
The mission of RFE, then, as embodied in language service employees’ individual and
collective intentionality as freedom fighting or something “not so deep” as fighting, with the risks
entailed for broadcasters as well as their families and listeners, took form in the construction of
programming that involved doing “something more” for listeners in one’s nation of birth. Without
access to those nations, and given exile broadcasters’ time away from living culture and daily life,
language service journalists who wanted to be "nearer the listener" tried to bridge gaps of space
and time via the use of "true" or "real" language, history and culture. “The job of all the sections
of RFE [was to be the] surrogate institution, the free press for the people, . . . preserving culture”
(G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal communication, July 14, 2005).

Constructing the mediated nation
For exiles, the task at RFE involved both reconstruction of something past, and
construction of something new. “Preserving culture” meant using journalism and program content
as means to ends: Providing news more accurate or otherwise not available inside target states so
that listeners heard not only alternative accounts of the West, but also of their own domestic
condition. Broadcasters aimed to introduce and preserve listeners’ knowledge of attributes of
national cultures, such as language, music, literature, religions and history (J. F. Brown, personal
115

communication, June 30, 2005; G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal communication, July 14, 2005; O.
Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005; C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14,
2005; R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005, S. Wysocki, personal
communication, July 12, 2005). BD journalism aimed to deliver news that was more accurate and
wider-ranging than the communist press, but it also had a broader role via RFE’s mission by
necessity -- to reconstruct past, pre-communist “home” accounts of history and culture.
“Preserving culture” also included countering what was altered or lost under communism.
Broadcasters saw erasure of the very idea of the nation, of discrete ethnicity and culture, from
history to language to music, and religion, even particular notions of “morality”, as a goal of
communist regimes. A Polish Catholic broadcaster who grew up before and during World War II,
spent time in jail under Nazi occupation for building a radio as a teenager, then survived a
concentration camp and an encounter with a Czech soldier who threatened to shoot him after his
release, includes the communist regime in an historical pattern of assaults on the idea of Polish
nationhood.
What does it mean to me to be a Pole? I never thought about it. I am a Pole. [Being
Polish] means…that we have been endangered from the east, from Prussia, Russia and
from the west, from Germany and both of these threats materialized. And the one[s] from
the communists were even worse. They have ruined . . . the country, ruined the people. . .
. I mean that they gave favors and possibilities to people who have…done anything that
they wanted, even if it was not . . . moral. And . . . they have kept people under pressure
in many ways. They couldn’t get better jobs. Their children couldn’t attend universities.
They couldn’t travel abroad. The main idea was to eradicate the nation, that [Poles]
should become ethnics, and eventually Poland would be incorporated into the Soviet
Union, . . . into schools, history, language. (S. Wysocki, personal communication, July
12, 2005)
That recognition of erasure matched the reality that listeners saw inside Poland. For example:
The prewar City Hall was a very important site of Warsaw’s historical identity, arguably
one of the most symbolically charged buildings: the place from which the most
charismatic city mayor, Stefan Starzynski, appealed for the defense of Warsaw in 1939,
and where one of Warsaw’s most cherished poets, Krzysztof Baczynski, fell during the
uprising of 1944. The City Hall . . . was hastily cleared in 1953. The plaza was ‘opened
up’ to the vision of progress. . . . A building that had come to symbolize the Polish
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national resistance and the city’s defiance during the last months of World War II could
not be left standing to broadcast its heavy message. (Chmielewska, 2005, p. 361)
Broadcasters constructed program content to struggle against ongoing erasure of
particular symbolic texts of collective memory. Some notion of “the nation”, of the people, of
being Polish, was necessary as a place from which to launch authentic speech. In this study, that
space of being emerged in narratives of staffers on the Polish desk as history, a quest for
sustained nationhood. For example, the Polish language service intoned the noontime sound of a
trumpeter in the bell tower of a Krakow church that in Polish tradition had been rung to warn
inhabitants of an impending invasion. RFE’s Polish desk re-imagined the pre-World War II
Polish republic by broadcasting historical narratives, music and literature of the period. The
Polish service also broadcast Catholic masses in Polish from London and Rome to listeners for
whom attendance at mass came with risk under communism.
If you are proud that you are proud of being American or a Pole, you are proud of the
past, the history of your base. You could say, ‘I am not fallen from up there with the
rain.’ Our nation as a history had good times and bad times, so we could be proud of this,
but if children don’t learn about it, . . , it’s easier to influence and inform these people,
and of course, the priests couldn’t make sermons. RFE broadcast a mass to Poland, and
the priest’s sermon was as it should be, not political directly. . . . He didn’t say ‘Fight the
communists,’ but . . . encouraged the people to live along religious guidelines. (S.
Wysocki, personal communication, July 12, 2005)
In such crafting of broadcast content, there was a continual consciousness not only of
preservation, but also of the power of suggesting other ways of imagining life inside home
nations.
BD writers and editors were conscious also of the weight of language for authenticating
Polish-ness for listeners. Sometimes terminology – simply the choice of a name for a place,
territory, person or thing -- had political implications. For example, inside Poland, and inside RFE
itself, given its periodically politically tenuous relationship with its host nation, Germany, the use
of names for places historically traded back and forth between Poland and Germany was “tricky”.
Because …the radio was [headquartered] in Germany and the territory was taken from
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Germany in the [Second World War], it was difficult to talk about. In our opinion it was
our country, but the German side says it was German, . . . that they have been robbed, and
[their] people have been moved, thrown out. . . . We used the [names we preferred found
in] foreign press [reports] so nobody could say that the Poles from Radio Free Europe
said this. We used American, French, Italian [reports] . . . . It was of utmost importance
for the Poles in Poland, and in a way it was a check to see if we were true Poles or not, . .
. the people working on the Polish desk. . . . It would show the listener we are like them.
(S. Wysocki, personal communication, July 12, 2005)
Preserving culture also included alternative accounts of the “home” cultural present, such
as prohibited texts, from music to drama and political commentary. To preserve culture meant
countering changes under the communist system that outlawed, controlled, limited or discouraged
performances of particular rituals based on texts. RFE regularly made use of materials including
dissenting political commentary circulated as samizdat, some of it purposely funneled from
broadcast areas in the hopes that it would be broadcast by RFE. Broadcasters maintained
connections to writers, intellectuals, artists, musicians, religious figures whose voices had been
forced underground into a samizdat culture by requirements for permits to form groups or to
publish or perform publicly, but limits on numbers of copies of publications one could carry or
numbers of individuals who could meet in groups without sanction.
Language services also broadcast religious services, including Roman Catholic, Orthodox
and Protestant and/or others, depending on populations and need, in native languages, so that
those who might suffer negative effects if identified as attending church services might attend
privately, without leaving home. Some services, e.g., the Polish, Slovak, Czech and Hungarian
desks, also employed a priest on staff, while others, e.g., the Romanian and Bulgarian desks, for a
time local émigré priests as stringers (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005).
Kopecka recalled a post-revolutionary mass by a Catholic cardinal who had listened to RFE as a
young priest.
The Archbishop of Prague, he used to be a listener. . . . In October 2002, because we
[ended Czech language service] broadcasting 30 September, he said a special mass. . . .
The [Prague] Cathedral was full. He gave a sermon about RFE where he compared us to
the guardian angels of the Czech nation. He was very much persecuted. He couldn’t be a
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priest. He had to wash windows in a Prague street for ten years. (O. Kopecka, personal
communication, July 26, 2005)
Émigrés broadcast telephone interviews with cultural figures, and performed dramatic
readings of plays, fiction and essays on the air, and sent reporters to events in the West in which
individuals permitted travel visas from home nations participated. BD program content included
interviews with prominent exiles living in the West, events like the awarding of a Nobel Prize to a
banned writer, canonization of a Czech as a saint in Rome, speeches and masses by the first
Polish Pope, and live and recorded performances of music that carried historical and nationalist
meanings for listeners, as well as music of the West, including popular jazz music from the U.S.
Broadcasters viewed adding prohibited texts to the public sphere as providing a more accurate,
fuller representation of the nation.
Broadcasters did not view contemporary prohibited texts as culturally avant-garde or
propagandistic material, but instead as otherwise mainstream cultural production that had been
excluded artificially from listener consumption. Getting the material on the air and accessible to
listeners was more important than artistic or technical worries. On the Czech desk, for example,
broadcasters performed dramatic readings of plays without benefit of formal training, whereas the
Hungarian service staff included a former national theater director. "We did the best we could"
(O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005). Czech service staff read the banned plays
and political essays of writer and future President of the Czech Republic, Vaclav Havel.
Kasparek, on interviewing Havel by telephone just after his release from prison during the 1980s,
expressed reservations in advance about veering into talk of politics. He didn’t want to be the
cause of another interrogation or imprisonment for the playwright. Havel told him simply not to
worry about it, and proceeded with the interview (K. Kasparek, personal communication, July 11,
2005). For BD staff, all cultural production was politics, and there was a conscious attempt to
create civil society through the broadcast of news, political commentary, samizdat literature and
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music, to create a sense of what the cultures and nations might be like if permitted access to a
wider sampling of their own contemporary works.
Constructing culture and the nation past and present via radio content enacted a version
of the nation unique and otherwise unavailable to listeners. For example, including Polish history
no longer visible or easily accessible, offering access to the suppressed rituals of nationalist music
and masses of the historically powerful Polish Roman Catholic church, and intoning the recorded
chiming of a bell that had historically warned Poles of approaching invaders, re-enacted history.
Broadcasting content that included prohibited contemporary cultural production and alternative
news and commentary of the present also constructed the first draft of continuity for Polish
history. But for broadcasters on the Polish desk, history was not merely history. “History was the
basis of the [Polish] nation. . . . As regards this, RFE did its job very well” (G. Iranek-Osmecci,
personal communication, July 14, 2005).
Invoking a construction of Czech-ness or Polish-ness, a way of being authentically Czech
or Polish, required also the defense of national and cultural territory via guardianship of language.
A Czech broadcaster who had not visited his country for decades realized the importance of the
authenticity of language use.
I read the [communist] press for two reasons. First, to . . . know what has happened in my
country and to be informed about the reaction of the communist side to different political
and economic problems. The second reason, which probably is mostly being forgotten, is
that the language is frequently changing. There are new terms for new events and
technical areas…I frequently read these newspapers and I registered all the new
terms…used in my country, so that we speak the same language. . . . We had always
probably not a new but an old…art to be nearer the listener than the communist
information . . . because the communists mixed in . . . many Russian terms, especially in
technical or aeronautic or economic things, and the listeners didn’t like this because they
saw behind the . . . Soviet influence of our [Czechoslovak] media. (K. Kasparek, personal
communication, July 11, 2005)
Émigrés in language services paid close attention to the changes in the language, the
identification and exclusion or replacement of what they called “Russianisms” in broadcasts. For
Poles, for example, countering the Soviet-ization of history as well as offering narratives that did
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not include Russianisms entering contemporary Polish speech was a means of symbolically
expelling yet another invader from the idea of a Polish nation.
Knowledge of the contemporary people, culture and nation, including language use,
depended upon replenishment of the émigré staff over time. As the first generation of émigré
broadcasters aged during the 1960s and 1970s, younger generations of émigrés educated in
communist systems arrived to populate RFE desks alongside the older generation. There were
sometimes animosities. Later generations of émigrés had grown up under communism and were
resented by the older guard. “When some Poles were hired, the older generation was retiring and I
know some of the older people resented them because they [felt they] didn’t represent the true
Poland” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). A 1978 émigré from Bratislava
noted that a member of the older generation of editors distrusted those who emigrated after the
1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia (A. Kolina, personal communication, May 1,
2011).
The older generation, many who had lived in nations of origin during brief periods of
democracy between the World War I and World War II, viewed the younger generation with
skepticism relative to their commitment to democratic change. Perceptions of a lesser
commitment to freedom fueled hesitation to trust. Kasparek compared his emigration with what
he viewed as the easier transition of the younger Czechs by noting that he had escaped in the
night, that ”shooting” had been involved, and that his crime had been writing for pro-democracy
newspapers as a medical student. The young Czech language staffers, in his view, were
“communists” who had emigrated by car or train, with government permission and visas. Their
motivation, he felt, was economic gain rather than an affinity for democratic ideals (K. Kasparek,
personal communication, July 11, 2005). That perception of a lesser commitment to democratic
ideals is not borne out in interviews for this study with exiles who joined RFE during the late
1960s through the 1980s, but the perception itself played a part in broadcast desk relationships
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and operations.
One strategy adopted by American management to assist the BDs in the maintenance of
authentic language use, knowledge of current cultural and political environment, was to expand
budgets to allow the hiring of recent exiles or defectors following major political events. BDs
hired prominent journalists, writers and other cultural figures known to listening audiences; some
broadcast using their own names rather than pseudonyms. Listeners learned of defections or
expulsions when their voices surfaced on the air from Munich. For example, the popular Czech
folk singer Karel Kryl defected while attending a music festival in Western Europe. Fellow
Czechoslovak service staffer Agnes Kolina, a writer interrogated repeatedly herself, was also
married to a Slovak writer who had been imprisoned before their emigration. Kolina recalled
being “invited” for a police interview for “incitement” against the socialist state after she had
played a song by Kryl, “Close the gate, little brother” -- a song whose thinly veiled lyrics
symbolized a desire for national autonomy; at the same time, one should be ready to “put on your
shoes” to shield the nation from the Soviets -- for friends in her home during the 1970s (A.
Kolina, personal communication, May 1, 2011).
Former RFE policy vice president Walter recalled the organization’s response to the 1968
Soviet invasion and brutal repression of demonstrations following the Prague Spring reforms of
the 1960s. “After 1968, there was an influx of new blood, including some who had made a
journalistic name for themselves, a very good journalistic name for themselves. So we hired . . .
and went over strength on the Czechoslovak service so we could hold onto some of these people”
(personal communication, July 13, 2005). Shanor (1968) documented, in a content comparison of
RFE and Prague radio broadcasts at the time of the Prague Spring, a change in the journalism of
Czechoslovak state media that was attributed to both the era of reform and the need to compete
with RFE for listeners. Brown recalled that as a research analyst during the 1960s, he watched
members of the Czechoslovak service “walk proudly” at RFE on receiving monitored reports
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from Radio Prague. “Every day there was an interesting article” by a communist journalist who
was pushing the boundaries of coverage and criticism. Following the invasion of August 1968,
the Czech service hired a few Prague journalists who had been “high flyers” and “had to get out”
(J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005).
However, among those hired was also Pavel Minarik, who exited Czechoslovakia less
than a month after the Soviet invasion. He arrived in Vienna not with an established journalistic
name for himself, but after having been trained for an intelligence assignment: obtain work as an
editor in RFE’s Czech service. He succeeded, and returned to Czechoslovakia in 1976 to
denounce the radios and its broadcasters (see Cummings, 2010). RFE had grabbed Radio
Prague’s popular journalists in part to attract listeners, and Czech intelligence had followed, as
well.
By the time Marsh took over as vice president for policy and programs in 1986, divides
among older and younger BD staff members were still relevant, including an alternative
understanding of the generations by management.
The mentality of the people who came out in ‘48 was different. In ’68 . . . most people
who joined RFE/RL were dissidents. The earlier groups were people lucky enough to
escape before the wall went up, and I mean the whole Iron Curtain, not the Berlin Wall.
They chose to leave. The people who came to us after the Prague Spring [1968] were of a
different brand. They were dissidents. Many were people who had worked very diligently
at home against the regimes. (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006)
Exiles on each desk were aware of the political backgrounds and emigration eras of other staffers,
and this knowledge was passed on to new staffers. Kolina, a Slovak language broadcaster who
didn’t arrive until 1978, referred to this crop of desk staff as “the 68-ers” and noted that the older
generation of exiles, albeit with divisions among their generations in any case, was not always
aligned in sentiment with the younger group. Dissidents who emerged as leaders as a result of the
Charta 77 movement, including Havel, were embraced by the 68-ers. But Kolina, who arrived as
Charta 77 gained steam and who was herself a dissident, observed that some of “the older ones
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didn’t believe in Havel and all this ‘crap’” (personal communication, May 1, 2011). “This crap”
included efforts to challenge the regime from the inside, through holding the communist party
and regime to written constitutional guarantees and signatures on the Helsinki accords. Brown,
then overseeing the language services, noted that he also “was blind at the time” to the
importance of Charta 77, viewing what turned out to be a “terrific thing” as “a sell-out to the
communists” (personal communication, June 30, 2005).
Replenishment of language desk staff had important implications for program content,
and, crucially, the maintenance of authentic voice. According to Brown, although some older
émigrés viewed their new staff members as communists and “young scruffs”, the younger
journalists:
would add that little touch of inner on-the-ground knowledge, to make it a very good
program. One of them would come and say, ‘Just say that’ . . . to make the audience
know that this person understands. We’re talking about supreme cooperation here. You
did find it a little. A lot depended on the desk chiefs. (personal communication, June 30,
2005)
Thus, a key conception for understanding “The Exiles” is a “pluralism” as cited by Peciva above.
This pluralism was present experientially, generationally and politically among the editorial staff
of the language services.
Exiles conceived journalism and program content from positions as citizens of the very
nations they constructed and performed via radio, nations to which they invited listeners to
consider as “home”. Émigrés, despite sometimes extended periods, even decades, away from
daily life in nations of origin, wanted to ensure that they not only invoked particular aspects of
history and culture past and present, but also that they spoke a language conceived as authentic
and contemporary, familiar to listeners, but free of Russianisms. That combination of elements
was a constructed, conceptually authentic nation that did not exist in any space available to the
listener other than RFE broadcasts.
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Broadcasters had to not only construct alternative accounts, but to be accountable to
listeners themselves. “To be observable to others is to be accountable to them” (Buttny, 1993, p.
3). BD broadcasters were obviously conscious of the need to reinstate themselves as, for example,
authentically Czech or Polish. Language desk personnel performed news work, invoking culture
and nation, in dual fashion -- as part of their mission as a surrogate news media for alternative
nations and, simultaneously, and, by effect, as self-authentication.
Their position as exiles from listeners and requiring authentication is not unlike that of
bloggers. In considering authenticity and legitimizing voice in terms of the Internet, where
individual voices often speak without the authority of institutional legitimacy, and where speakers
must authenticate themselves while readers “constantly judge the authenticity of voices”, Mitra &
Watts (2002) seat emotion in authenticity, and "tension" in "legitimizing a voice". Authenticity is
"a multi-dimensional construct that includes notions of truth, accuracy, eloquence, and an ontic
connection with lived experience."
An authentic voice speaks of a lived experience in an ethical and accurate genuine way.
In this usage, authenticity is associated with eloquence because the proper application of
rhetorical strategies mobilizes the topoi that are most at stake in an interpretive
community. Eloquence, then, is not simply a well crafted speech; it involves the proper
arrangement and understanding of topical material. The authentic is not just truthful, nor
is it necessarily a complete representation of the lived experience; rather, the authentic
voice represents lived experiences in such a way as to accent the ethical dilemmas and
emotional entailments of community buildings. (p. 490)
“The Exiles” did not differentiate a passion for fulfilling the mission as nation-builders,
doing journalism itself, or broadcasting as voices on the air. “It was a passionate attachment,
because I knew how badly some people were off there, that they were not allowed to study, . . .
that they were hoping that things will change one day” (O. Kopecka, personal communication,
July 26, 2005). A broadcaster described his role as preserver of Czech cultural and historical
texts, provider of access to contemporary texts, counterer of the “lies” of Czechoslovak state
media, and performance in the individual act of telling as a Czech, in one breath:
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A journalist should always tell the truth, as far as it is known to him. If you know the
truth, you should propagate it. In a way, this was a principle of the Czech schools, of
education before the communist revolution . . . . It was formulated for the first time by
Jan Hus, but all school children were taught this adage. The adage goes something like
this: ‘Print the truth’. The Czech presidential banner [now] has words on it about, ‘The
truth will win (or prevail)’. Komenius, the émigré, had the same formulation. It’s a
pivotal [group of words], ‘the truth’, in the Czech culture. In Czech political life, we also
have this in Havel’s [more contemporary] plays and writings. (J. Mekota, personal
communication, July 28, 2005)
The production and delivery of radio program content that constructed a simultaneous past,
present and imagined “home” was bound up with performing news work as a demonstration of
the value of a democratic free press and of contemplating alternative lives. The act of providing
content that required clandestine listening, despite the risk, was at once an act of modeling
liberation that required acts of liberation for consumption. Importantly, this kind of program
content would not only require the listener to move, via listening, away from the current state and
toward an imagined one, but would also help reinstate broadcasters who had been labeled
criminals and traitors in communist-controlled media as citizens “nearer the listener”.
Listeners could not verify directly what they heard from a “home” radio that originated
outside the reinforced borders of their nations. However, a number of Western radios
broadcasting across the Iron Curtain in the same languages; e.g., the Voice of America (VOA),
the BBC, Canadian radio and others, may have been available, dependent on location and state
jamming, during the Cold War (see Chapter 1). These broadcasts offered audiences opportunities
for comparisons of the same or similar stories, or at least repeated confirmation on comparisons
of different discrete stories. Audience awareness that information received domestically via state
media might be incomplete or inaccurate helped international broadcasters gain listeners.
Kopecka recalled her family’s attempts to listen to a variety of Western radio transmissions,
noting that listening through the jamming required tactics of knowing when jamming was less
intrusive (nighttime) and vigilantly adjusting the radio dial as RFE engineers in Europe adjusted
frequencies to evade jammers: “It was a fine art.”
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We were always annoyed at how the Czech radio was lying and distorting the truth and
so on. We also listened to BBC, sometimes to VOA, and we compared how they reported
the same event. Sometimes there was a difference. The BBC was a bit dry. . . . There was
a psychological difference in their ways of presenting things. RFE presented it so that we
understood it better. RFE was more attuned to our way of thinking, I would put it like
that. Of course the BBC, they had only 15 minutes in Czech . . . whereas, RFE
[broadcast] throughout the day. (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005)
Kopecka’s family and friends considered RFE a “home” service. “Well, it was ours. We thought,
‘They are ours, our people, members of the family’” (personal communication, July 26, 2005).
Importantly, RFE alone could not have accomplished its something “more” without these
comparisons, without audience knowledge of and -- albeit sporadic -- access to a wider
alternative press.
Over time, as years in exile lengthened and “home” culture and language evolved,
attributes of sentiment, accuracy and timeliness associated with authentically “being Czech” or
“being Polish” became part of broadcasting service work itself. It was not enough to have grown
up in a particular nation, to emigrated, and then to broadcast a construction of “home”. Lacking
continual access to the nation and culture, broadcasters had to be professionally Czech or Polish,
too. BD employees continually updated not only language use but also cultural knowledge and
popular sentiment via their daily lives in émigré communities in Munich, where recent exiles,
visitors and travelers were available. They also drew on information gained via their own
reporting among dissidents and networks of sources, both people and samizdat, arriving in
Munich or available to BD correspondents in RFE bureaus in European capitals. And, they had
daily infusions of information from the CN’s monitoring unit of the content of the communist
press. Importantly, they had information and analyses from RFE’s research unit, where reports
often were constructed in concert with requests from directors and editors of the BDs (J. F.
Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005). Constructing authenticity was at once personal,
political and professional.

127

Language service broadcasters and journalism
It is important to note that terms like “émigré journalist” and “Western journalist” are
used here necessarily to differentiate groups of journalists within RFE. The separate designations
are not, however, intended to denigrate the journalism of exiles as somehow “lesser”. It was a
different journalism; advocacy journalism performed by individuals whose first profession (for
the most part) was not journalism, but something else, and it was successful. As in other groups
of journalists, there was a range of skill and talent among the employees on the broadcast desks.
Most exiles learned to be journalists and broadcasters on the job. Some broadcast desk
employees were recruited soon after their exits from Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Romania or
Czechoslovakia, and others after working for a time in the West. Some found work at RFE
through recruitment in displaced persons camps (e.g., R. Traycey, personal communication,
December 4, 2010; S. Wysocki, July 12, 2005). BD staff members were hired for language
expertise, and completed writing, voice, and/or other tests. Some had magazine or other writing
experience (e.g. C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005), but most had not worked as
journalists per se. Prior experience in radio newswriting, program development and broadcasting
was especially rare. Roman Traycey, who ended his career at RFE as director of the Bulgarian
language service after holding positions in the broadcast analysis and research departments, had
worked as a journalist for Bulgarian National Radio prior to emigration. He is a member of a
small group of exceptions at RFE.
For the most part, RFE’s language service personnel learned journalism by doing. “I got
it on the go, so to speak” (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005). Some units,
notably the Czechoslovak service, had higher proportions of experienced journalists and writers
on staff as time passed. Exile broadcasters believed themselves, either at the outset or over time,
by training and experience, to be journalists, if not also professional broadcasters. “Later on”,
after a few years at RFE, Kopecka began to think of herself as a journalist. “In 1968, I was sent to
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London to do interviews with people on the street to see what they knew about the Prague Spring.
. . . That was my first realization that ‘I am a journalist’” (O. Kopecka, personal communication,
July 26, 2005). In general, from the 1950s – 1995, as those who learned news practices and
broadcasting techniques on the job honed their skills, and as services also were able to hire
experienced writers and editors from succeeding waves of exiles, the technical quality, style and
program content of broadcasts rose. But according to American management, quality was also
spotty at times and varied broadcast desk to broadcast desk (e.g., M. Bachstein, personal
communication, July 10, 2005).
However, American managers agreed that more attention could have been paid to
training language services personnel. The Radios provided only sporadic formal training during
RFE’s more than 40 years in Munich. “In retrospect we probably neglected journalistic
technique” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). A long-time director of
broadcast analysis composed “several memoranda on the issue of training in journalistic
techniques” because of divergences from broadcasting policy mandating non-aggressive news
and commentary content (M. Bachstein, personal communication, July 10, 2005). Gene Mater,
who expanded news operations while directing the CN beginning in 1959, including the number
of European bureaus that also hosted reporters from the BDs, and who introduced a two-source
reporting rule modeled on the BBC to insure accuracy, arranged training sessions in broadcast
techniques in-house for East-Central European staff (G. Mater, personal communication, August
28, 2006). The CN, for its part, as will be described in the next two chapters, modeled Western
journalism in its practices and its news copy for the BDs, and some émigré journalists like Peciva
visited the CN frequently (C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005).
However, formal training was an ongoing issue, even during RFE’s final decade in
Munich. Marsh, a veteran U.S. journalist who had also worked for the American Forces Network
in Frankfurt, as chief European correspondent for the VOA, director of news at Radio in the
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American Sector (RIAS), and vice president at RFE, was hired in 1986 in part to professionalize
broadcasts.
When you can only hire from groups of émigrés, as we did, very often you take what you
can get. . . . [O]ne quality you’re rarely going to find is broad experience in radio
journalism. We found ourselves hiring college professors, even medical doctors, lawyers,
people who were educated, but whose professions were far removed from journalism.
They didn’t know what to do. They had no idea how to put a radio program together. You
can imagine what it sounds like to translate a script and just read it on the air. My idea
was for people to go back to the beginning, to tell them what radio is all about, so that
they could create listenable programs. . . .
We had in-house training. We brought people over from the States. I brought
people from Berlin, people I had worked with at RIAS. . . . . There was an awful lot of
improvement. We had program reviews. . . . We were looking at what a program sounded
like. . . . How good it is from a radio format point of view? Then, you’ve got written
material, what was broadcast, the feature stuff. . . . We had these program reviews, and
we had classes . . . in journalism that showed, ‘this is the way a story like that should be
covered.’ Radio phonics played a role there. Some of what the broadcast services
produced was amateurish and some was quite good. . . . [But] only 5% of that had to do
with radio phonics. Content was the other 95% of what we were looking for. How were
they putting the program together? Certainly we were looking for accuracy, looking for
balance, looking for all the things journalists look for. It had to be comprehensive. We
were looking for all the good things. If people were missing these elements, we’d talk to
them. (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006)
Journalists in the BDs countered some of the U.S.-style radio formatting and
programming expectations of American managers. For example, when Americans instructed
language staffers to produce broadcast copy that was as brief as possible, to be aired in threeminute commentaries, the Czech desk objected.
We had some lively fights. . . . You can’t do a three-minute commentary. That’s absolutely
nonsense in a Central European mind. You have to have five to seven minutes. First, you
have to explain what it’s all about. Especially since it was an audience that didn’t listen
every day. (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005)
Because jamming of Western radio service frequencies, especially in urban areas, made it
necessary to listen sometimes only at a certain time of the day or on the weekends when many
families left the city to go to country cottages where the jamming was not as effective, rebroadcasting and the accuracy of a story on its first broadcast were important considerations in
BD programming (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005). Listeners who might
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have an opportunity to tune in only once each day would miss a story that was not repeated, or
would never hear a correction issued later for an inaccurate story.
BD directors argued with American management about radio formatting and content. This
included the selection and placement of appropriate music for particular kinds of stories; they
argued, for instance, against the placement of upbeat music or jingles after reports of somber
subject matter. They resisted requirements for the knee-jerk insertion of segments of speeches or
interviews, especially when the source spoke a language other than that of listeners; an interview
segment would consume precious seconds during broadcasts when listeners already might be
listening through intermittent jamming. Desk chiefs and program directors argued for frequent
repeat broadcasts of particular stories or program segments during the programming day to
accommodate the listening opportunities of audiences. Likewise, because listening might not
occur throughout the day or even several times a day, they might argue for repetition of the same
story rather than the composition of a new introduction for a story unless the news content itself
required updates (O. Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005). These and other
formatting concerns related to differences between expectations for the use of standard American
radio programming format and language desk understandings of what served their audiences.
The journalism within each BD included an “OK” system by which two managers from
among the desk director, his or her deputy, and three or four senior program editors, “OK’ed”
texts and scripts before broadcast (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005; O.
Kopecka, personal communication, July 26, 2005). An “OK” review included journalistic
concerns such as writing for radio, sourcing and accuracy, but also internal desk assurances that
there was adherence to RFE broadcasting guidelines. Agnes Kolina of the Slovak language desk
recalled only one instance in which her political block program director spiked a commentary
script she’d written. “He was correct,” she recalled, noting that the commentary had been
“personal”, related to an accusation against a writer in Czechoslovakia whom Kolina had known
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personally (A. Kolina, personal communication, May 1, 2011). But frequent “squabbles” (J. F.
Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005) erupted within desks over proposed content at
times.

Group relationships
Exile status manifest in common sentiment among BD staff, but also in separation from
other groups staffed mostly by Westerners. Language service personnel cited common
experiences and life transitions as important to a common conception of mission at RFE and to
cooperation among staffs of the radios despite other differences. A freelance reporter for the
Czech desk describes a spirit that united East-Central European exiles across cultures.
[At] Radio Free Europe, the people shared something in common, they were all
immigrants from the communist regime[s]. Their parents, families were persecuted by
communists or the Nazis, so there is a long line of persecution. . . . When you are in a
society and you are so persecuted, . . . you say, ‘I am either getting out or I am dead.’ If
they manage to get out, that experience forms them, and everything that was repressed
[can come out]. And for those who didn’t make it out, you have responsibility, just
because you survived, to take action.
[Once you are in the West], you will find out that most people don’t give a shit. They
don’t know about Czechoslovakia. You become outraged. You meet people who think
communism is good; you meet people who think you made it up, [that] you are
psychologically damaged or you have a psychosis. I met many people like that who
thought that I was making it [the torture, the secret police] up, they find it fantastic to the
point that it could not be true. Pretty soon you become tired of this.
But coming to Radio Free Europe, you meet people who have had the same
experience. You fit in. You don’t have to explain yourself. You feel comfortable there.
For the majority who escaped, the established culture in that foreign country, be it
Munich, Washington, London, Rome, or even Vienna for that matter, was too foreign, or
they were too foreign for that place. (Anonymous Czechoslovak language service
stringer, November 7, 2009)
Having a “responsibility to take action” on behalf of those left behind played out in negotiations
within desks and with American management and the CN, but constructing national imaginaries
in broadcasts also meant that broadcasters as people, as groups, were immersed in the their own
histories and languages professionally, and that perhaps contributed to an intensification of group
insularity and rivalries within RFE headquarters.
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As a perhaps overly broad generalization (in reference to the CN in particular) socializing
across RFE groups was minimal beyond daily work interactions. This applies especially to
employees of the language services. It is clear from patterns of referrals during interviews that
BD employees, even those who reported cultivating social ties to others across the organization,
tended to form close, long-term personal relationships only with employees of the same language
service. Mekota, who was recruited for the Czech desk before RFE went on the air in 1951, and
who remained there until after the Velvet Revolution in 1989, observing all phases of the
organization’s change, confirmed the social isolation of the language desks, but also declined to
characterize all individuals in groups.
In a way the radio was a sort of ghetto in Munich. And the contacts between the
particular desks were good, but at the same time, we were living each in some sort of
islands, as islands. But that does not mean that there was complete isolation. The same
applies for the American management and the language services. It depended on
individuals as far as relationships. I would say it was difficult to find a general, a genuine
rule that applies to this question. (J. Mekota, personal communication, July 28, 2005)
Westerners understood their hesitation. “Being an immigrant, says former RFE vice president
Ralph Walter, “is not a happy situation.”
You’re cut off from your country. . . . If you’re in RFE, you’re in communication with
your country, but there were a lot of emotions . . . associated. They lived very much
amongst themselves. They socialized amongst themselves. We had a cafeteria. If you
went to that cafeteria at 12:30, you’d see a Hungarian table here and a Bulgarian table
there. . . . There were also mixed tables. (personal communication, July 13, 2005)
Kolina, who came to RFE’s Czechoslovak service in 1978 after having worked in various jobs in
translation, writing and publishing, recalled her first visit to the main floor “canteen” at
lunchtime.
The Czechs and Slovaks, they sat at separate tables, and nobody was sitting at the
Romanian table. Everyone was sitting apart. Nobody was introducing me to anybody.
And then I realized how difficult relations are with Czechs and Slovaks on the
[Czechoslovak] desk. I thought, ‘I have to figure out who these people are.’ It was so
complicated in my own desk -- how would I find out about the Romanians? I will get into
differences. I thought it was better for me to stay out of it. (A. Kolina, personal
communication, May 1, 2011)
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One exception to any “genuine rule” was socialization among support staff – particularly
secretaries – across groups. Most support staff members (those who were not broadcast
technicians) were women, including Germans and a mix of exiles from broadcast nations. Some
exiles working in support roles joined the staff as relatives, including spouses of BD employees.
The RFE workplace also hosted romances, affairs and marriages among support and employees
of the BDs, the CN and American management (A. Breslauer, personal communication, August
9, 2010; B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005; R. E. Walter, personal
communication, July 1, 2005). Kolina reported being happy to have arrived at RFE during the late
1970s, “after the era of affairs” (personal communication, May 1, 2011) had passed at RFE.
Social ties among exiles across broadcasting services, although more frequent because
exiles tended to speak more than one European language, were limited. English was the language
of management in daily use outside the broadcast desks themselves, but below the rank of
broadcast desk chief and editor, English wasn’t necessarily among the languages available for
common social interaction among language service personnel. All, however, were living in
Munich, and German nationals, along with exiles, Americans and other Westerners, found some
common ground socially in the German language. Kolina, who spoke German, Hungarian,
Slovak, Czech and French, found that RFE employees socialized across ethnic divides while
skiing.
One of main reasons I decided [when choosing a country of emigration] to go to
Germany, and that I was for Munich, was because of The Radios. . . . The other point was
the Alps; I needed to be in the Alps. I skied. . . . So there were secretaries, sound
producers, and [by German labor laws,] the Radios had to have some German employees,
in jobs where language was not a precondition. There were lots of German employees,
Bavarians, so they founded the ski club. . . . In the ski club, I met some Germans, some
Polish and Hungarian journalists. (personal communication, May 1, 2011).
For exiles, the emigration experiences in common may have also co-joined them in a
belief that Westerners, even those in the same organization sharing the same anti-communist
sentiment, were somehow distant, occupying separate spaces of understanding of the work at
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hand that could perhaps not be bridged. There was mutual lack of first-hand knowledge. Unless
they came to RFE as research or policy analysts with knowledge of one or more of the broadcast
areas, Westerners arrived at RFE with no access and little understanding of the exiles’ home
nations. They accumulated knowledge and understanding over time, on the job. The same was
true of exiles’ understandings, particularly, Brown noted, where the U.S. and American culture
were concerned, though exiles “don’t like to admit it” (personal communication, June 30, 2005).
In any case, broadcast desk staff, beyond some who interacted during the workday with
Westerners in management, did not pursue personal friendships with Americans, particularly
policy staff, a few of whom they suspected of being CIA employees.
Characterizations of the relations between desks differ; study participants from Western
democracies recall tensions between groups and personnel of different language desks. Broadcast
desk employees minimize this in their narratives, focusing instead on divisions between the BDs
and all other groups. An editor on the Czech desk recalled camaraderie fueled by mission and
common understandings.
Czechs were always on friendly terms with Poles on the Radio staff. That was strange
because the Polish-Czech relationship in history was not good, but [at RFE] it was
normal that we were allies and friends. . . . We were good colleagues, but then it was not
so easy to have an American friend, an Irish American from the central newsroom. (C.
Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005)
The BDs, for instance, relied on information on domestic social and economic conditions, cultural
change, including law and opposition groups partly through information gathered and analyzed in
the Research and Analysis Department. A British research analyst acknowledged group attitudes
as barriers not only to interaction among the language desk personnel, but also interactions with
Western researchers preparing “Situation Reports” distributed to the language desks, even under
cooperative working conditions.
The research department staff were all western educated, which those on the broadcast
desks weren’t. Broadcasters were hired for their language and communications skills
whereas we researchers were hired both for our knowledge of the region and for our
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writing and analytical skills. . . . Many of us had excellent relations with the [language
desk] programmers and would feed in information as [we discovered it] and when [it
was] demanded. But the programmers did not like to admit this, and they often dismissed
Research as staffed by westerners who did not understand the reality of life behind the
iron curtain. (Anonymous Research and Analysis Department analyst, November 23,
2007)
Socializing with American management was especially problematic. American policy
directors and departmental managers and the directors of broadcast services attended some of the
same RFE social events in Munich, but American socializing did not extend to émigrés further
down the staffing ladder on the desks themselves. Though “most Americans lived in the same
neighborhoods as the Eastern Europeans”, and “had lots of respect for the émigrés” (R.
Cummings, personal communication, July 13, 2005), BD staff did not associate with Americans
beyond the workplace for the most part.
The architecture of RFE’s headquarters in the Englischer Garten and the placement of
departments in relation to one another, and to power, may have influenced relations among
groups, especially the BDs. The headquarters was constructed in 1950-51 as a would-be
"hospital", “so the story goes” (Shanor, 1968, p. 176), to be turned over to the German people
once RFE’s (then-conceived) brief mission to bring down communist regimes had been
accomplished. A central area on each floor had wings extending in long hallways from the center
as intended wards for the sick. The building’s use as a broadcasting operation, however, persisted
for decades.
American management occupied the first floor. The “center of things” (K. Bush, personal
communication, August 2, 2006) on that floor was a conference room where American
management, directors of the BDs, departmental directors of the CN, Research, and Broadcast
Analysis departments met each morning to discuss the news budget for the day. It was also where
American management and the BDs established a “Recommended List” of lead stories for the
day. The CN was nearby, along with Research. The broadcast desks were on the second floor.
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Language services personnel had to pass through American space in order to reach their editorial
desks.
On the second floor, a hierarchy of language services relative to U.S. policy was visible
in each radio’s physical placement. “They were arrayed that way down the corridors” (R.
Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006). The CN’s former London bureau chief
and Munich newsroom editor described BD placement after the merger of RFE and RL to form
RFE/RL during the late 1970s, when new language services had to be fitted into the existing
structure.
There was a pecking order: white men, Americans, Brits, then Poles, then Czechs, then
Russians, then Tajiks and Uzbeks, and Kazaks. Americans’ offices were at the heart of
the hospital, but they could stick Turkmen and Kazaks way down the end of the
corridors. (S. Parrott, personal communication, July 28, 2005)
Resources allocated to each radio by American management also were a visible daily
reminder of each service’s rank among American priorities after the merger, including the
number of staff supported in each service and the number of hours broadcast each day. The
Polish, Czech, Hungarian and (RL) Russian language services, for example, enjoyed larger staffs
and all-day broadcasts. Among the RFE services, American policy priorities and budgeting
consistently emphasized the Polish, Hungarian and Czechoslovak services.
Former RFE Director Brown recalled the Poles as the dominant power among language
services; it was clear to all that “the Poles” -- with around 90 employees and round-the-clock
broadcasting -- “were in charge” (personal communication, June 30, 2005). Robert Hutchings,
Brown’s deputy during the late 1970s and early 1980s, agreed that the Poles “just dominated the
affair. They knew they were the most important in the Radios’ scheme of things. They felt
themselves . . . not exactly as superior to other countries of the region, but weightier.” Hutchings
attributed this to the size of the population and Polish history: “Forty-three million Poles, a
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history of successful opposition to communist rule, a mature country with a strong national
identity” (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006).
Aside from building positioning, policy priorities and resource allocation, American
managers viewed the relative autonomy of the desks as necessary, with “fellow nationals of those
countries who properly were in the drivers seat of programming”, and “an equality of
independence” among desks (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006). But
conversations about, and monitoring of desk programming content, were more frequent at times
when events inside one nation or another intensified.
If anything we exerted more supervision over the Polish service than over any other
simply because things were happening in Poland, not because they were more
irresponsible than anybody else. I was there during the first rise and fall of Solidarity, so I
lived and breathed Poland for much of the first two or three years. But I think all of them
enjoyed a substantial degree of autonomy on purpose. (R. Hutchings, personal
communication, August 11, 2006)
During the Velvet Revolution in 1989-90, the Czech service employed 83 staff (P.
Pechacek, personal communication, August 17, 2004), while RL’s Tajik and Afghan desks had as
few as two journalists each during the 1980s (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13,
2005). A desk with 90 Polish broadcasters may not interact in the same manner with the rest of
the organization as a desk operated by just two Afghani journalists. Polish desk chiefs would go
toe-to-toe with American managers in morning meetings or might walk down to the CN to
complain about a story’s status in the news budget. A pair of Azeri language broadcasters,
however, less sure of their journalistic chops and clearly not a priority for American policy
officials, were less likely to enter into conflicts with Westerners in other departments. When it
came to journalism, however, the staffs of the smaller desks were pleased to be complemented in
a meeting on the quality of their news work by CN journalists (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, July 13, 2005) and CN journalists in turn took their roles as ad-hoc mentors to
journalists learning news work on the job as part of the work expected day to day at RFE.
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Language services’ autonomy and segregation in discrete broadcasting units also meant
that there was little required daily interaction horizontally among the services or with American
management aside from staff at the director or deputy director level (e.g. in morning budget
meetings and discussions about sensitive political topics or daily guidances issued by American
management). Though some émigrés who staffed The Radios also spoke German and/or English
(within a few years of employment), many had so little contact with employees outside their
language services that they were able to work at RFE/RL for decades without learning English,
the language spoken by management, in the CN and the research and broadcast analysis
departments. In the CN at times, however, where BD employees went to clarify questions related
to news items, recalled a former CN deputy chief, an ad-hoc three-stage translation was necessary
(B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005).
Journalists in both the CN and BDs cited another constraint on social tie formation
present in any news organization: the pressure of producing content on deadline. “There were not
so many contacts, because of time. Not because of language. Time was the most important thing
(C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005). There was so little time, that CN deputy
chief Barry Griffiths would begin his day at 5:00 a.m. in order to review his department’s
morning news budget. He did not speak to his wife in the morning for years—and when she
telephoned from home later in the day, he would command her, in military fashion, “O.K., talk”
(B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005). BD program deadlines and content
production demands in particular, by all accounts, left little time for cross-group networking aside
from daily work.
In contrast to other news organizations of the era, however, RFE managers had to cope
with the consequences to hosting “all Europe in one building” (J. F. Brown, personal
communication, June 30, 2005). The placement of the BDs along corridors in the headquarters
building arrayed those “islands” of exiles like nations, offering opportunities to vent biases
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historical, cultural and ethnic. As mentioned earlier, BD employees play down differences in
narratives; they cite having little time to re-enact animosities given their common mission to
challenge state media system “lies” and communism itself. But Western managers and journalists
describe conflict among the desks as continual and contentious. “Hungarians don’t like
Romanians. Poles primarily liked Poles. Czechs didn’t like Slovaks.” There was at one time a
“revolt against the Czech director” because Slovaks felt there was too much ‘anti’ feeling against
“people from the mountains” [of Eastern Slovakia] (M. Bachstein, personal communication,
February 5, 2006). When language service office areas were reconfigured, Slovak desk
employees objected to having to walk through the Czech staffing area in order to reach their
workspace (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005). As new Slovak desk staffer
Kolina had discovered by observing the insularity of lunch table networks in RFE’s canteen,
questions of historical oppression and current political power within Czechoslovakia and among
the nations represented by the BDs were alive and well inside RFE.
National and ethnic rivalries translated into difficulties for Western journalists producing
an internal news wire for broadcast services. The CN’s Canadian deputy chief describes the
difficulty of pleasing desk editors when preparing internal wire stories.
Russians hated Jews. Hungarians and Romanians didn’t like each other. Poles were the
most arrogant race in Europe. Czechs, Slovaks [disliked each other], same goes for
Azerbaijanis and Armenians, Chechens and Russians. And we were writing one story that
had to be used by Chechens and Russians, same with Azerbaijanis and Armenians. (B.
Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
A CN journalist noted that the general atmosphere of contentiousness extended beyond intranational and international rivalries.
A lot of the nationality desks have got axes to grind. The place was furiously rife with
character assassination. It was within desks, against other desks. These were habits they’d
brought with them from under communism. You’ll hear accusations, saying so and so
was a child molester. (S. Parrott, personal communication, July 28, 2005)
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Brown was a frequent arbiter of inter and intra-desk rivalries. “Being director of RFE
also had a pastor role dimension. You were there to stop them from arguing, fighting with one
another. I was in my office enshrined by complaints”. Brown credits American management with
minimizing potential conflicts among and within groups. “RFE in many respects was a pressure
cooker that could burst at any time” (personal communication, June 30, 2005). There were
conflicts within and among desks,
in terms of age, in terms of social background, in terms of all of Europe in one building.
And here one has got to hand it to the American staff. American leadership . . . did
somehow stop the thing from boiling over. They added a kind of human touch. There
were one or two very wise, very good leaders. (J. F. Brown, personal communication,
June 30, 2005)
In contrast, narratives from the broadcast desks do not credit American management with
quelling quarrels. They instead key on American management as the focus of BD conflict. A
Polish editor recalled: “All those people in that building, every ‘desk’ as we called it, had a goal. .
. . For all of them, the number one goal was fighting communists, not fighting Polish with
Romanian . . . . The problem which arose was between the desks and American direction (S.
Wysocki, personal communication, July 12, 2005).

“The Exiles” and “The Americans” negotiate conceptions of mission in practice
Conceptions of mission were similar – broadly -- among employees in the BDs and RFE
management, a group referred to by broadcasters as “the Americans” (M. Bachstein, personal
communication, July 10, 2005). Communism and communist regimes, had to be challenged, even
replaced, in what were, for émigrés, “home” nations, and, for Americans in management, “target”
nations. As mentioned earlier, language service personnel cited goals as simple as "hope", of
keeping fellow Hungarians or Romanians company. American management agreed on this. “This
. . . fits into this broad concept of trying to broadcast into the population expressions of hopes for
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the future, keeping them part of what we thought of as the ‘real world’” (R. E. Walter, personal
communication, July 13, 2005).
According to Brown, “RFE was something they could turn to, not so much for what they
heard, but a voice, because of the history, of the culture, because of Western interest” Listeners
could know that, “This, too shall pass, this being under communist rule, the dark age.”
RFE had a pastoral role to play. . . . We were never off the air. We were there, as a
constant voice, if you could hear it through the jamming. The very fact that it was being
jammed—there must be something good about, it if it’s being jammed. (J. F. Brown,
personal communication, June 30, 2005)
This “contrast” was part of the “adversarial positioning in communist states between the state and
society. “It was known that we were on the side of society. . . . That was the key reason for RFE,
the key justification for it” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005).
However, American management understandings also included, in contrast to émigré
narratives, an awareness that RFE’s mission differed from that of the VOA, the U.S.’s other
international broadcaster. Hutchings noted that not duplicating the VOA’s mission was part of
RFE management culture:
The Voice was the voice of, to some extent, not only of the America generally, but also
of the American government. The Voice did have a mandate to fairly project American
policies, position statements from around the world, so people would understand these
things better. That was not really our mandate. Our mandate was focused on the audience
way over there.
Not everything seen as a priority for VOA was a priority for us. I think we also
had this sense that we could safely, we could broadcast a true picture of the United States,
that is, warts and all, without worrying too much that our audience would conclude that
the communist propaganda -- that America was venal, corrupt, full of crime and violence,
or whatever images they may have had -- [was accurate]. The audience was pretty proAmerican, as we saw it . . . . And to show [in news reports] that people were able to
protest the Vietnam War or the deployment of IMF missiles in Europe, or whatever it was
-- to us, [that] helped underscore what a functioning democracy is like. (personal
communication, August 11, 2006)
A conception of East-Central European nations having cultural affinity with Western
Europe more-so than with the Russian-dominated Soviet “East”, accompanied an American
policy of promoting Pan-Europeanism. “There was a ‘European-ness’. . . . I was always
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conscious that these were émigrés, Poles etc. They felt themselves to be part of something called
‘Europe’” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005). Hutchings completed the
thought: “to which they should return” (personal communication, August 11, 2006). American
management’s pan-European policy was allied generally with the interpretations of broadcast
personnel, but it held a high priority in the narratives of management. And, while broadcasting’s
aim was to challenge communism, and would be “pro-democracy”, American managers arrived at
the need for historical program content via a different narrative route. Broadcasting was:
more than anti-communist. It was pro-democracy, in a very broad manner, it was meant
to try to maintain links in the minds of people to whom we broadcast, to have them . . .
understand where they really belonged -- in the West. That’s why we did programming of
the real history of these countries. (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
Here, “differences” in BD conceptions focused on the nation and American pan-European policy
concerns arrive at the same destination when translating mission into practice – radio
programming and news content would include history.
In terms of parsing the term “propaganda”, American managers, like exiles in the BDs,
parse the term. “People misunderstand what we were up to,” said Marsh (personal
communication, August 22, 2006). In relation to RFE’s mission and broadcast content, being
“pro-democracy” meant “propagating” the “values of a free society” in terms of delivering
“truth” via modeling a free press.
I use it in the same term that the original sense of it, the original sense of the Catholic
Church, to propagate the message. In this case the message was simply unfettered access
to information, to free debate and intellectual discourse. So, what we were propagating
was a very broadly shared set of Western values. That’s where I saw it. Not an American
foreign policy agenda -- that would be too narrow a definition. And certainly not some
preconceived notion of what the future of these peoples ought to be, but the values of free
society.
I never thought of The Radios and still don’t think of The Radios in the other sense
of the word ‘propaganda’, in the sense of a manipulative exercise, that you were really
trying to in a sophisticated way to brainwash the audience by misleading or incomplete
truths, because I don’t think we did that. I mean of course there were broadcasts often
that went on the air that shouldn’t have gone on the air, like any news organization, you
have a bad output on a given day, but . . . the vast majority of broadcasts were not in that
category of propaganda (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006).
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Thus, generally, group aims of language desk personnel coincided conceptually with the
mission of the sponsoring government of the United States. And, on a performance level, the
same work that constituted being fully Polish, as interpreted and reconstructed by broadcasters,
might eventually meet the goals of U.S. policy. “In terms of policy we were interested in the same
things…but with some differences” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005).Those
differences surfaced in day-to-day execution of the mission.
Embodying the mission, authenticating the radios as “home” territory in the BDs meant
re-imagining the nation – and thus a Polish “nationalist” tone may have been part of the
execution. Part of the “policy” task of American managers was to rein political passions of the
exiles in radio content; compliance with broadcasting policy at the radios meant managing on two
fronts. As Peciva on the Czech desk noted, language service personnel were continually reminded
of “the balanced view”, one that met the goal of modeling a democratic free press. The role of
American management was to:
make sure there was nothing that went on the air that contravened the purposes for which
the radios were set up. We didn’t incite to violence, we didn’t broadcast knowing
falsehoods, we didn’t propagandize, . . . we didn’t engage in slander . . . [and] a few other
things of that nature. (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006)
As director of RFE in conversation with BD directors, Brown continually urged a “moderate”
tone and stance for political commentary (personal communication, June 30, 2005). In addition,
RFE’s mission to broadcast as a surrogate domestic free press carried a caveat that content would
be “not inconsistent with U.S. foreign policy”. To be “moderate” in tone and content and to meet
policy goals during the 1960s and 1970s meshed with journalistic reminders of “the balanced
view”.
However, when the American policy approach changed, so did restraints on broadcasting
content. During the first Presidential administration of Ronal Reagan, beginning in 1981, Walter,
Brown and other managers would leave RFE. A harder line, anti-communist management team
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was installed, along with the resurrection of harsher Cold War rhetoric. U.S. policy inside RFE
would shift back to moderation by the mid-1980s, and again, by 1989, “to encourage peaceful
evolution in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” (Pell, 1989). Thus, “the problem” that arose
“between the desks and American management” centered on how to implement RFE’s mission
given American policy goals and “guidance”, given the passions and nation-makings of the
exiles, and given a mandate to settle “differences” via the forms and formats of radio journalism.
Where policy met the production of radio content, risk fueled conflict among groups at
RFE. The foreign policy interests of the U.S. might suffer if émigrés did not follow post-1956
broadcast guidelines (see also Chapter 2). Policy officials had an interest in trusting émigrés to
produce programming according to those guidelines and to daily policy guidance. RFE’s
broadcasting license and its headquarters were also guests of West Germany, and certain
diplomatic, historical and cultural narratives, even specific terms; e.g. names for regions or towns
that had changed hands historically between Poland and Germany, could cause friction between
the US and its ally (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). However, American
policy officials knew that émigrés would produce programs more authentic and more successful
as "surrogates" than Americans could hope to achieve. "They knew their people better than we
did or ever could” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). Policy officials needed
émigrés’ cultural and language expertise, and their passion for political change, and that required
trust -- granting autonomy to the BDs.
The autonomy of language desks indeed increased over time as RFE’s mission evolved
(see Chapter 2). During the early 1950s, American policy officials reviewed scripts prior to
broadcast, but broadcasting hours were few, and the same programming scripts were used
repeatedly throughout the day (Shanor, 1968). RFE assigned an American deputy chief to each
BD, and the “American often behaved as though he were the chief” (p. 20). In addition, by the
mid-1950s, broadcasting hours had expanded and programming varied to the point that
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management could not and did not review every program script before broadcast. The
maintenance of post-1956 broadcasting policy via the establishment of a broadcast analysis unit
in 1959 to review programs – after they were aired – required trust. American policy review was
exercised for “all key political and economic commentaries”. And, “only in very sensitive issues
are scripts translated and checked before broadcast” (p. 20). But American deputy directors still
sat in language services; once those positions were eliminated, language services were selfcontained, with a director of RFE overseeing all radios, and discussions of “differences” taking
place outside rather than inside the services (see Shanor, 1968, and Johnson, 2010).
Shanor’s (1968) analysis, including interviews with RFE employees and content analyses
of broadcasts both by RFE and by state media in East-Central Europe, noted:
The exiles . . . have an opportunity to influence policy during its preparation. Their main
influence, however, is exerted in the way policy is carried out. This is the main area of
dispute between the American directors … and the exile operators. Policy aims for the
most part are identical. How that policy should be applied to one’s own country is
another matter. Nevertheless, both sides agree that differences are surprisingly few.
This runs counter to two popular inside-dope theories about RFE. The theories say,
on the one hand, that the exiles, bitter, out of touch with their homelands, and
representing discredited and perhaps even Fascist regimes, vent their spleen over Radio
Free Europe with little or no restraint from the guileless Americans who pay them; on the
other hand that exiles, sympathetic with their countrymen but helpless, are forced to take
extreme stands by the pressure of the Americans.
Both of these theories cannot be right, and it is clear from watching the Americanexile relationship in action that neither is. The policy making process, in Munich at least,
is one of genuine give and take, and both American policy makers and exile editors
alternate in giving and taking (Shanor, 1968, p. 19).
American management mitigated barriers to trust by instituting a "partnership " (R. E.
Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005, and, see Shanor, 1968) and a mandate that
broadcasting be “not inconsistent with” U.S. policy, rather than demanding subjugation to the
letter of policy guidance. American management and émigrés viewed this "partnership"
differently. Walter, who arrived at The Radios during the 1950s and eventually ran the
organization day to day in Munich until 1982, described the tensions between management and
the language desks.
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We had what we called ‘the partnership principle’, whereby we considered we were
partners with our East European colleagues and we hoped that they were partners with us.
At any crucial event, these things were discussed. [The point was] not to have an
American pounding the table. We worked very closely, called each other at night,
socialized, etc., and there was certainly at the broadcast directors’ level . . . thorough and
agreed understanding of what we were trying to do, based on continual dialogue. It never
ended. (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
In addition to the need for "partnership" in order "not to have an American “pounding the
table", and beyond the historical and cultural tensions across the array of language desks,
differences included ideas how the mission should be manifest in program content.
If there were certain conditions for conflict among us [the peoples of Europe in this
building], they were pacified through the common enemy. This was always the common
sense among us and this was too important, that we have only a few reasons to have
conflicts among us . . . the enemy, communism, was the unifying idea over the problems.
You can imagine the mentality of the people, maybe 25 nationalities or more, each of
them has experiences . . . . He is then planning or recommending a certain style or way or
action, but always the unifying idea is to fight communism. . . . The one group would like
to do it very loudly or very slowly or not so aggressively or the others are against any
compromise with them. (K. Kasparek, personal communication, July 11, 2005)
Walter agreed with that assessment. The “problem” within the BDs as well as between
the BDs and American management included evolving beliefs about the character of program
content. What would constitute modeling a surrogate press for an imagined nation -- past, present
and with “hope” for change? Would a more activist, aggressive strategy be employed?
Not everyone agreed. Some thought we should blast directly the communists. We didn’t
have to tell [listeners] how bad communists were; a lot was a question of tone. It ain’t
what you say but how you say it. Certainly, the leadership of those broadcasts understood
that very well . . . . Some were frustrated because they would have liked to have gone at
them harder. It wasn’t that we were a-critical. . . . We tried not to get into personal
denunciation. . . . The head of the Romanian desk, he suffered so immensely that he
could not go on the air and say, ‘These bastards, Ceausescu and his wife!’ But he could
critique policies and use [stories already reported in the] Western press. (R. E. Walter,
personal communication, July 13, 2005)
At RFE, “interference” was defined not only journalistically in terms of management
influence in questions of practice and content, but also, in a larger sense, as variance from
broadcast desk-centered conceptions of what exiles were doing, why, and how. Not only did
American policy change over time, but the broadcast desks themselves also evolved, via the
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conceptions of desk chiefs, and generational and political dynamics. “In all those years there were
[American] managers and directors that my colleagues and I liked very much . . . . They didn’t
interfere . . . . Then, there were some that did interfere” (O. Kopecka, personal communication,
July 26, 2005). Arguments over the use of a term or the tone of a commentary had implications
beyond journalism as practice.
American leadership also manifest in the Broadcast Analysis section’s memos citing
content violations or nuances of language that pushed program content beyond the bounds of
broadcasting policy. From the late 1960s through the revolutions of 1989-90, American policy
managers exercised close scrutiny of BD political commentary in extraordinary cases, e.g., during
the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 (e.g., Traycey, personal communication
December 4, 2010). As years passed, with RFE employment approaching 1,400 by 1967 and
1,800 by 1988, and with hundreds of program hours broadcast each week, comprehensive
monitoring of whether broadcasting policy or daily guidances were followed was impossible (e.g.
R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). BD directors were also part of policy
discussions at RFE, and “partnership” included conversations between American management
and exiles.
However, the BAD, managed by Americans and staffed mostly by émigrés, periodically
monitored and translated programs into English for analysis following broadcasts. Translations
were reviewed for deviation from organizational broadcasting guidelines (generally established,
published for in an employee handbook) and periodic policy guidances. Language service
broadcasters and their programs were ostensibly held to overarching broadcasting guidelines
including a post-1956 prohibition of overt recommendations for action inside communist nations.
But Cold War polemics remained a part of émigré-produced content by the early 1960s (Shanor,
1968).
As time passed, however, and U.S. policy moved from 1960s “bridge building” to détente
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during the 1970s, BD programming content also shifted. BAD scrutinized translated text as well
as program context and symbolic content. For example, had émigrés slandered or attacked
communist officials? Had broadcasters directly advocated political action? Did inflections,
idioms and other strategies skirt the spirit of RFE's general guidelines? BAD reports also noted
sourcing on program content, e.g. whether it came from the CN news file, research department
briefs, or BD reporting in bureaus. Roman Traycey headed a small Bulgarian unit in the BAD for
17 years. “Occasionally there were problems with some of the broadcasts that would get close to
violating the RFE journalistic code, like the tone being too strident or too aggressive. On the
whole, . . . the content was just fine and any violations were minor” (personal communication,
December 4, 2010).
Sir John Tusa, who directed the BBC’s World Service during the final years of the Cold
War, acknowledged that concerns for risk were similar on the language desks; e.g. at the World
Service’s Czech language service. The “propaganda” in the negative sense, he said, “came in at
the émigré level”.
Even if they were Czech, they were working under the principles of [British] journalism - which are not those of émigrés. It was implicit in terms of the BBC External Service, in
terms of the culture at the World Service. We conducted reviews of broadcasts so we
could check to see that language services were not slipping into the personal individual
standards that an émigré might adopt. (Tusa, personal communication, August 8, 2005)
Tusa observed that the BBC World Service’s program review activities were less robust (at one
time only a single assistant to Tusa) and irregular compared to the routine reviews at RFE
(personal communication, August 8, 2005). At RFE, when the “propaganda” or content that
violated American broadcast policy in the area of political commentary, tone, idiom or word
choice, “came in at the émigré level”, the BAD reported findings in memos to RFE's director and
the American vice president for programs and policy, who then discussed them in sometimes
contentious meetings with émigré broadcast service officials (J. F. Brown, personal
communication, June 30, 2005). However, a former BAD chief noted that even during the 1980s,
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"we let some [violations] slide", omitted them from official memos and relayed them instead only
in conversation (M. Bachstein, personal communication, July 10, 2005.
At RFE during the 1970s and 1980s, staff resources in the BAD were much larger than at
the BBC, but, according to one American deputy director, a “small” department relative to RFE’s
broadcasting output. RFE, “this show” “could not run on any basis other than trust” between the
BDs and management (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006). In the RFE
Director’s chair, Brown put out small fires related to enforcement of policies related to proposed
or already broadcast program content; e.g. BD political commentary viewed as overly strident.
If there was anything [in a broadcast] I didn’t like, or was overstressed, which I thought
was not moderate enough, I would have a chat with the head of the [particular language]
broadcast service. This could lead to . . . contentious feelings: 'Well, Brown’s trying to
interfere.’ (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005)
“At the end of day,” however, said Hutchings, “it was hierarchical, and [the directors of
the BDs] knew we had final responsibility over the broadcast content. But it was also a
responsibility that we’d rarely have to exercise in an open way; it was just understood.” He
recalled an instance, an “exception that proved the rule”, where a desk chief, American
management and BD autonomy parted company. “There was a Polish director named Najder, a
wonderful intellectual . . . . I think he was in many ways a good service director, but he was uh,
very independent.” Najder’s political commentary was strident, and he viewed Hutchings’s
suggested changes as “too soft an attack on communism.”
But in the course of my argument I said, ‘You shouldn’t broadcast this kind of vitriolic
attack.’ This wasn’t our style. He said he took full responsibility for it. And of course
he’s not allowed to take full responsibility for it. I’ve got responsibility for it. He had
responsibility for what goes on at the Polish desk, but I had responsibility for every word
that goes over RFE airwaves; that’s the way the structure works. But aside from him, I
think everybody else ‘got it’. (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006)
Programs and Policy Vice President Walter recalled arguments with former Polish
service chief Jan Nowak. Again, Walter’s observation applies: “In terms of policy we were
interested in the same things…but with some differences,” aside from tone and content. “Nowak
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was more nationalistic rather than democratic.” One subject that held political significance for
German and Polish history was the Oder Neisse Line.
Nowak would call up and say, ‘I’m doing this program on the Oder Neisse Line. We
ought to talk about it.’ I read a translation of that, and I would say, ‘There’s one sentence
you ought to change.’ And he had a terrible temper. If I’d change a word or so . . . he’d
say, ‘Well, if that’s the way things work around here, I’m not so sure I can work here
anymore!’ (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
A consistent restraint that called for moderation in treating such subjects could be
interpreted by “The Exiles” as “The Americans” “defending the Germans” (R. E. Walter,
personal communication, July 13, 2005), but objecting to the change of “a word or so”
illuminates the divergence of common understandings of RFE’s mission when it was put into
practice. A single word might embody moderation to an American might also mean a betrayal of
Polish-ness to a broadcaster’s conceptions of self and audience. When Nowak had “a temper” he
can be conceptualized as defending not only the legitimacy and authenticity of the Polish-ness of
the voices from RFE’s language desk, but also the very idea of the Polish nation itself, its right to
its own narrative of history. Also at stake were the self-making of both broadcasters and listeners
who might not only inhabit the idea of the nation as represented in radio program content, but
eventually act to create and inhabit that nation inside Poland.
When analysts claim that East-Central European revolutions of 1989 might have been
“bloodier” (M. Nelson, personal communication, August 3, 2005) without RFE, or if RFE “had
not changed its approach” (Powers, 2009) it may be that this is key: the battle to decide what the
nation would be had already been fought, the invaders expelled and the idea of an alternative
nation already constructed via media. The nation, or another way of living in the world as Poles
or Czechs, already existed, and revolutions may have been merely outer, public manifestations of
inner, private worlds, in a sense, citizen coming-out parties, an unwillingness to continue
inauthentic, “schizophrenic” everyday life.
In the meantime, inside RFE, the “partnership principle” came into play when current
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political developments in target nations were a focus of exile program content. For example, the
director of the Polish BD and American management officials, both RFE management and policy
staff were in daily discussion during the 1980s “rise and fall of Solidarity”, and discussions might
entertain questions such as:
Where Solidarity is now in its struggle with the communist authorities or whether the
Polish Catholic Church was being much too cautious . . . . These are the things that the
broadcast services and the RFE front office talked about and worried about. . . . What do
you do after the latest government provocation? Do you take a hard line, a soft line, a
middle of the road line? . . . [T]his is a case of when you comment on this, you’re going
to take a line of some kind, and how do you define it? (R. Hutchings, personal
communication, August 11, 2006)
Thus, despite general agreement on mission with American managers, BD journalists at
RFE had agendas all their own; directors and editors on the language broadcast desks, far from
viewing themselves as tools of American imperialists, acknowledge that their work with
American managers was a continually conscious, tentative and sometimes contentious alliance. A
former official in the Polish service characterized the partnership.
The guys were playing on the same team, American management and the language
services. There was no contact between the services. In this sense, they were
independent. But it was like a star system with management in the center . . . . When I say
the star, how it worked, it was like an army unit . . . a general at the top, then the services;
. . . an efficient commanding system. . . . They on top would crush you. So, you play the
game of partnership because you are wise and they are wise, and you both have the same
target. Everybody has their limits. If both sides are wise, you find a compromise and if
someone is unwise the system doesn’t work. We played the same game in a civilized way
for most of the time in our history. (Anonymous Polish language service editor, personal
communication, November 23, 2008)
As noted earlier in this study, the mission of RFE evolved from its early 1950s iteration -Brown’s “crude propaganda machine” or Shanor’s (1968) mix of “good reporting and bad
propaganda” (p. 176) -- with broadcasts that included recommendations for action against the
regime, including sabotage like slow work on collective farms or compromising factory
production lines. First-decade broadcasts also included personal and political criticisms of
individual communist leaders, from national figures through even the directors of particular
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agricultural collectives or factories, interviews at border crossing towns with citizens who had
recently escaped, and the like. It also reportedly included false claims that harmed individuals
within broadcasting areas. For example, in 1952, RFE “wrongly singled [Hungarian Socialist
leader Anna Kethly] out as a resistance leader”, resulting in the tortures of individuals supposedly
associated with her in a “‘non-existent anti-Communist plot’” (Shanor, 1968, p. 26). By the
1960s, those features had disappeared from RFE broadcasting, and the organization saw itself as a
surrogate free press, with that conception evolving in practice over time. The conceptions of BD
staff and American management coincided in the expectation that citizens in broadcasting areas
would decide whether and when and how to take action against regimes. RFE’s journalisms, too,
would evolve and mature, resulting in a hybrid Western-style journalism by the late 1980s.
Across management and indeed inside the CN, there are caveats regarding conceptions in
common of the mission and how that manifest in the radios’ management over time, particularly
during the first presidential administration of Ronald Reagan. Dominant conceptions of the
broadcast tone and content, indeed, even controls set in place to limit “interference” in journalism
practice and to guard accuracy, were challenged. For a brief few years, constraints on political
passions of the BDs as far as the tone of political commentary eased, and that shift will be
discussed in a later chapter.
But the conception of RFE as a surrogate free press persisted through the revolutions of
1989-90 in target nations. Pavel Pechacek, a second generation RFE reporter who moved from
sports reporting to become chief of the Czech Service, a post his father, Jaroslav, had held a
generation earlier during the Prague Spring, describes The Radios’ mission while relating his
meeting a young Czech freelance journalist reporting from Wenceslas Square during the 1989
Czechoslovak revolution under the name “Ludmila Vitkovicova”. Pechacek had managed to
report from a hotel overlooking the square, but was about to be deported. He turned reporting
duties over to two Czechs, including Vitkovicova.
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What was very positive on her…from the day I met her--it was in Civic Forum—she was
very enthusiastic talking about [a] freedom fight against [a] totalitarian regime. Well, for
us, it was also our mission by effect. I don’t remember that we would receive guidance
from Americans during that time, but what I did before the Velvet Revolution, one of my
very few real orders, I asked my people, 83 of them--because they were not patient--I told
them repeatedly, ‘You must not create anything what would be harmful. What is your
job? To inform, to inform, to inform! But I don’t want you to provoke what would be in
the wrong time. It’s up to the people in Czechoslovakia. They will act. Your job is to
inform. Let them know what is happening. It’s absolutely up to them. You must not
provoke. It’s up to them. Your job is to inform.’ We did a good job in that time. (P.
Pechacek, personal communication, August 17, 2004)
A claim of not remembering guidance from Americans does not mean that American
management did not issue guidances to the Czech language service at that time. However, this
passage illustrates some characteristics of the journalism of some of the BDs when access (or lack
of it) to broadcasting areas was critical. The BDs, and the Czech service in particular, had
developed networks of contacts with dissidents and activists who sometimes reported from inside
nations or who relayed information while traveling in the West. Vitkovicova, a young Charles
University student, was a member of the Civic Forum, a council of citizens led by Havel and
others coordinating the revolution. She reported by telephone to RFE, but also was involved in
press relations for the Forum itself.
Vitkovicova thought of herself as reporting during her months as a stringer for RFE; for
listeners, and for those inside Wenceslas Square who at one point chanted “Ludmila! Ludmila!”
(L. Vitcovicova, personal communication, April 23, 2004), it was a view from inside the
revolution. For BDs using such freelancers for eyewitness reporting with full knowledge of
relationships and political engagement, but also without on-the-street access by their own
reporters, was doing whatever was necessary to meet the needs of the listener. A Polish service
editor summed the conceptions of daily work in the BDs.
You have to know what is going on in Poland and what communist propaganda is
sending, and how they work with problems, with actually what is going on. So you could
feel this, and so you could give people what they didn’t get or what they got false from
the communists. This was important. It was not important if you are a journalist or a Pole
or an engineer or something else. What was important was the listener in Poland. . . . My
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first loyalty was not to the Polish director or the American director, but to the Polish
listener. If he tries to hear us with all this jamming, and all his problems, then I have to do
my best for him. (S. Wysocki, personal communication, July 12, 2005)
Following the revolutions of 1989-90, a Polish film crew interviewed Walter about his
role at RFE. Afterward Walter turned the tables, asking the Poles what had been most important
to them about RFE. “The interviewer said, ‘I think Radio Free Europe saved Polish culture.’”
That listener conception confirmed the aims of broadcasting desk personnel. But Walter also felt
that the response confirmed RFE’s success. “We were trying to help those people realize that they
were still what they [had been]. . . . Our goal was to do whatever we could to help these countries
reach a point that they again could reach their own decisions, not conditions dictated by Moscow”
(R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005).
After capitulation of communist regimes and their replacement with fledgling republics,
the previously disembodied voices of RFE broadcasters re-crossed the borders, returning to home
countries to visit or to repatriate. Kopecka was among those surprised at the number of listeners
who approached broadcasters after recognizing their voices (O. Kopecka, personal
communication, July 26, 2005). Peciva described great fear, sweating with anxiety, his heart
pounding, when approaching the border for the first time since his escape; he turned back once
before crossing. But in Prague, he had an encounter typical of ex-RFE broadcasters who returned
to their native countries. “I came to Prague after the Velvet Revolution in 1990 for the first time
and met some of my colleagues. They embraced me. I had known them from grammar school. It
was the voice” (personal communication, July 14, 2005).
In sum, the exiles’ main concern is to contest communism in pursuit of eventual change
in the totalitarian systems in target nations. Countering communism included the provision of
alternative information and narratives about the world, including the West and the domestic
communist world, preserving past and airing forbidden contemporary cultural and historical texts,
and composing original political commentary. Émigrés cite a general intent to construct
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programming to offer information, knowledge, cultural goods, and commentary to populations in
nations of origin in the hopes that such exposure might "unmask lies" (K. Kasparek, personal
communication, July 11, 2005) of communist governments, "defeat communism" (C. Peciva,
personal communication, July 14, 2005), and encourage populations to consider other ways of
being, e.g., Polish (Anonymous Polish language service editor, personal communication,
November 23, 2008), to model a free press that might exist under a democratic regime, but to
ultimately decide for themselves. American managers concur with these conceptions, though as
Brown noted, enunciating such ideals "can sound so utter cornball" (personal communication,
June 30, 2005). But the two groups entered into sometimes-contentious negotiations over points
of mission fulfillment in programming content.
For exiles, reconstructing their authenticity began with separation from the nation of
origin and ended in a process of reconstructing that nation – albeit an imagined one – and, by
extension, repatriating themselves as citizens in good standing. Journalism was the means, and
American management the necessary alliance of resources and autonomy -- limited by
broadcasting policy, “guidance” and “interference” – that allowed exiles to do “more” for their
countries. Authenticity in that regard was on the minds of both Americans and exiles. Autonomy
for the BDs was limited by the American-led reining of political passions and finding a viable
“balanced” political commentary stance “not inconsistent with” American policy, to audiences
known or assumed to have “felt themselves” part of a democratic Europe.
And that model was that we were able to broadcast in a way that was consistent with
American values, the broadcast content were those of a democratic country, to the
audience, which also by and large shared those values and aspirations, we were seen as
authentic, that we were not some entity broadcasting in someone else’s interest, that we
were actually there broadcasting in their interests, we were perceived widely as being
needed. (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006)
Politically partisan Western journalism was, for exiles, at once a model for free press
surrogacy and an embodied, authentic performance of the imagined nation. And, echoing the
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stipulations of Hannerz for situating the conceptions of journalists and the realities of news work
somewhere between the tool of hegemony and the hero, as noted in the introduction to this study,
Czech service editor Jan Mekota summed his work at RFE over four decades. “I did a good job,
but I’m no hero” (personal communication, July 28, 2005).

Language broadcasting services and the Central Newsroom
The relationship between the CN and the BDs and their conceptions of journalism will be
touched on in the following chapters. However, one point relative to mission, journalism and
daily work at RFE must be made at this juncture, and that has to do with the relationship
dynamics among journalists and journalisms at RFE, different conceptions of legitimating and
authenticating practice in the context of RFE, and, most importantly, conceptions of listeners.
Doing what’s best for the listener is at the crux of work for both BD and CN journalists, but also
the source the conflict. A typical scenario that produced conflict follows.
A story arrives in the CN about a tortured cleric in Romania. The story was carried on the
Western wire services, but the CN has discovered after a few phone calls that the wire stories can
all be traced to a common, single source. Was the story a rumor, a plant by “the other side”, or an
accurate news item? The CN holds the story to await a “matcher”, a second source required on a
story of importance, one that might incite reaction on the part of the audience.
A Polish desk editor marches down to the CN to excoriate the Western journalist on the
desk in the newsroom, demanding that the story be released. On potentially incendiary stories, the
CN is wary of the wire service “rip and read crowd”; it is hyper-vigilant, voluntarily bound to
more stringent standards than the AP or AFP, whose journalists and listeners aren’t living inside
totalitarian states. The CN maintains its stance that a second source is required before releasing
the story to the broadcast desks for a top-of-the-hour newscast. The Polish editor complains to
American management.
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RFE’s ongoing war over the two-source rule enters another round. The conflict appears
based in different standards of journalism practice, but practice alone does not explain it – RFE’s
purported gold standard, American-style journalism, isn’t at issue. American wire services, and
indeed other Western wire services, have reported the story. The CN authenticates its journalism
in part by insulating itself and its journalists from the political passions and advocacy journalisms
of the broadcast desks. Accuracy and credibility are paramount for both the BDs and the CN. For
the CN, the top-of-the-hour newscasts anchor its own credibility and the credibility of each
program hour of the BD radio broadcasts, and, its role as a model of a free press both inside RFE,
for the BDs, and for listeners to stories the BDs take from its wire. The Polish editor is concerned
that his service will appear to be withholding the story. Listeners may have heard the item
reported by the BBC’s Polish service or one of the other international broadcasters and wonder
why RFE has not reported it. Are the Poles at RFE really tools of the CIA, American imperialists,
as competing state media claim inside broadcast areas, or, true Poles? Both the CN and the BDs
have audience information needs and well being as well as their own credibility in mind, and both
are constructing and maintaining journalisms rooted in authenticities of differing kinds related
both to themselves and to those audiences.

CHAPTER 5: WESTERN JOURNALISTS AND CENTRAL NEWSROOM PRACTICE
(PART I)
The Central Newsroom (CN) at RFE was a unique internal wire service delivering news
to RFE’s language broadcasting services (to each of the language broadcast desks or BDs) when
no existing commercial news agency produced the mix of news necessary to meet RFE’s needs.
RFE expected the CN to practice journalism on “the American model” while contributing to the
role of the BDs as a surrogate free press for peoples in the totalitarian states of East-Central
Europe. The CN would model journalism for both the exiles in the BDs inside RFE, and for
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listeners in target states. But its model and practice, as constructed and defended by CN
journalists, would be a unique, hybrid and hyper-vigilant one that evolved over 45 years.
In order to understand the necessity of developing a unique, hybrid and hyper-vigilant
practice in the CN, it is important to first understand the conceptions of the journalists and how
those conceptions were translated via the positioning of the CN relative to stakeholder groups:
Western journalism, departments inside RFE including American management and the BDs, and,
most importantly, to listeners in the nations to which RFE broadcast. This chapter will describe
those conceptions and relationships, and establish CN journalists, like their colleagues in the BDs,
as exiles. And, like their colleagues in the BDs, they constructed and adapted a hybrid and unique
practice.
One CN journalist recalled hearing a deputy news director surveying the newsroom
during the 1980s.
Barry [Griffiths] used to look around newsroom and say, ‘This is a self-selected group of
misfits.’ People who like to live in other than their native environment are minority.
Journalists are a minority. Here, you have two subsets of the population, expats and
journalists. He said it in an affectionate way. We were an odd group. (G. Thatcher,
personal communication, August 31, 2006)
RFE’s aim was to practice on “the American model”, as described in Chapter 1, but
RFE’s location in Germany, outside the US media system, necessitated the hiring of available and
willing journalists. Most of those hired at the beginning of RFE’s history, during the early 1950s,
were Americans. Newsroom hires during the middle decades (1956-81) came from a mix of
Western democracies. During the last decade of RFE’s operation in Munich, the majority of new
hires were again Americans, but they joined an international newsroom. During most of RFE’s
history in Munich, the majority of journalists working in the CN had not been trained in
American newsrooms. The supply of Western news workers who chose to work on behalf of
listeners in totalitarian states – and to risk the professional taint of working for a governmentfunded organization -- varied over time, as did the demographics of the CN.
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Western journalists and RFE’s mission and governance
The most common reasons journalists cited for opting to work in the CN are also true of
journalists in general: the need for a job, and a quest for adventure. For CN journalists, adventure
included an ex-pat lifestyle, living in Germany, or in capitals where the CN operated bureaus, and
the prospect of exciting news work in an interesting and international organization.
I was always looking for jobs. . . . I saw something in Editor & Publisher, . . . It was a
blind ad. . . . Tom Bodin . . . in the Washington bureau, he called me and I said to him as
he was explaining this job to me on the phone, ‘This sounds like RFE’, and he said, ‘It is
RFE.’ I had no idea why they didn’t say it was RFE. . . . They offered me the job, but I
had to think about it, because I really had a good job. I was in my early 30s, I’d been an
editor, writer and columnist in my hometown newspaper [Dayton, Ohio], but my wife
and I are kind of like gypsies; we like to get up and move every once in a while. We just
went there for the fun of it. . . . I had a good life [in Munich]; it was a good job. It was my
entry into straight international news. (S. Herron, personal communication, November
22, 2010)
Western journalists were already embedded in the Cold War ideological conflict by virtue
of being of the West. An attraction to a wartime context, to embedding with troops in battle, is
characteristic of a subset of journalists in general, as is a desire to continue or return to wartime
reporting (Tumber, 2004), and the CN was a wartime newsroom. RFE’s physical position in
Munich near the geographical border separating East from West also made journalism in the CN
an exciting, front-line proposition.
CN journalists acknowledged their embedded-ness in Western democratic ideology that
carried an entailment of Cold War opposition to communism – but specifically on the basis of
denial of free speech and rights to information. In conversations for this study, former CN
journalists expressed disgust for attempts to insulate national populations from alternative news
of themselves and of the world. A journalist who worked at The New York Times on the copy
desk before coming to RFE in 1965 explained his rationale.
I’m anti-communist and very much pro-democracy. It was a horrible situation. As a
journalist, also you believe in freedom of the press and free media, and you’re opposed to
dictatorship, so if you can bring news to people who can’t get it otherwise, you’re doing a
good thing with a capital G. (M. Wall, personal communication, August 23, 2006)
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Gary Thatcher, a CN journalist who had had a career at The Christian Science Monitor,
and had lived in East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union, joined RFE more than two decades
later, in 1989, just prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall. He was recruited by an American RFE
executive, and convinced by another to join RFE. He described his decision-making process as “a
long courtship” that included meetings with RFE officials. While living in Russia, he had been
sitting in a park, listening to propagandi blaring from a loudspeaker.
Here were these people who thought they could control the viewpoints, information, of
an entire country that spanned 11 time zones. And I thought, ‘Here’s a chance to make a
difference, for a good cause.’ I found it outrageous that in the late 20th Century, here was
half the continent of Europe under this fraudulent ideology that basically stopped people
from doing what they wanted to do for their own gain, for their own freedom of
expression. For example, on the Black Sea Coast they took every single boat out the
harbor, they’d take off motors, take the boat out of water, lock up the stuff . . . for fear
people would take a boat and get to Turkey . . . . You can’t build a virtuous society by
refusing to give people alternatives. I think I was helping in some ways to show people
alternatives to a thoroughly evil, controlled system. Is that ideology? Well, yeah. (G.
Thatcher, personal communication, August 31, 2006)
While Americans who came to the CN were embedded in the Cold War, they were also
allied to ideals of American journalism, and were aware, as experienced journalists, that those
ideals could be breached in American practice. Henry Hamman, who headed the CN’s London
bureau for a few years, described a familiar route to RFE: restlessness or boredom, inability to
find exciting work in journalism, frustrations with newsroom politics, and an advertisement for an
international reporting or editing position.
I was bored. . . . I was working at The Houston Chronicle on the copy desk. It was the
biggest newspaper between Chicago and Los Angeles – big, but kind of mediocre. I copy
edited and wrote for the world news page . . . . At some point it became clear to me [this
would] not be a long-term career. It was owned by a trust, and the guy who was editor of
the paper would personally vet anybody considered for anything important; the roving
state correspondent would have to write things in certain ways -- kiss the ring. . . .
Somehow I found out there was a new business magazine based in Houston and Riyadh,
“Saudi Business”, backed by Prince Bandar. . . . So I was hired as editor. . . . After two
weeks I realized this is not going to work . . . It was a political and social agenda there
that wasn’t really a news agenda. So, I quit. The Chronicle said I could come back, but I
knew if I did . . . phhht! (H. Hamman, personal communication, November 24, 2010)
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Larry McCoy worked at RFE in two different stints, between jobs in US newsrooms.
Central News was the best newsroom I ever worked in. In ten years at RFE, there were
only a few occasions when management in the newsroom or elsewhere in the company
tried to influence what was put on the wire. In my experience there were more occasions
at CBS News and Dow Jones Newswires when management interfered with the news
production than at RFE. L. McCoy, personal communication, August 13, 2012)
McCoy went back to RFE in part because he found that on returning to American journalism, he
missed the intensity of the front line urgency in the CN. Western journalists in general
acknowledged that after leaving RFE for other news posts, the gravity that accuracy held in the
CN, and for the audiences of the BDs, along with the shared sentiment of doing something of
great importance both professionally and in a human rights sense, were missing.
However, a desire to respond to the information needs, to act as surrogates producing
news for the broadcasting areas, did not include intent to abandon working toward an ideal of
objectivity. Nor did it include hiring overt “ideologists” as described by Gans (1979, p. 191). In
Central News, according to each American manager or news director or deputy with hiring power
interviewed for this study, the journalist who expressed a “mission” to do anything via news other
than provide information -- “straight news” -- was not hired (e.g., N. Kingsley, personal
communication, September 28, 2006; W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006;
G. Mater, August 28, 2006). “Journalists - good ones, anyway - don’t have ‘missions’” (L.
McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006).
As Gans notes was true of Time and Newsweek, the subject of ideology was avoided in
interviews, but if it was brought up or announced by the interviewee, s/he would not have been
hired (Gans, 1979). The CN had a six-month probationary period for new hires; if tendencies to
frame stories or lace copy with ideologically-driven Cold War attitudes were identified on the
job, the writer “would not last long” (T. Willey, personal communication, September 4, 2006).
Former news director Nathan Kingsley recalled a CN sub-editor whose “slanted” accounts of a
communist North Korean leader did not improve, and whose final editorial advisement session
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was responded to with a partisan, anti-communist rant. Kingsley fired him (N. Kingsley, personal
communication, September 28, 2006). The CN, though embedded in the Cold War itself, and in a
government-sponsored organization with long-term policy goals, did not accept daily work
products that revealed a violation of “journalistic values” that demand objective reactions to news
rather than “a priori judgments” (Gans, 1979, p. 183).
It is important at this juncture to distinguish how a generalized affinity with democracy as
an ideology, journalism as a culture, the mission of RFE, and the immediate American foreign
policy concerns of RFE management figured in the conceptions of CN journalists. Western
journalists in the CN report having little regard for American foreign policy save an intent not to
allow policy documents and concerns to intrude on the newsroom or day-to-day decision-making.
Their tactics for keeping “policy” out of the CN, its news production and copy will be discussed
in the next chapter. But it is important also to note that although RFE’s upper management staff
all held American passports, American journalists constituted a minority in the CN for most of its
44 years in Munich and newsroom leaders included American, British and Canadian journalists.
Journalists trained in the practice traditions of at least eight Western nations – Australia,
Canada, the UK (including British, Irish, Welsh and Scottish journalists), the U.S., New Zealand,
Ireland, France, and West Germany, along with a few East-Central Europeans in the central
monitoring unit -- worked together in the CN and its bureaus. Australian journalist Roley
Eggleston, who cut his reporting teeth at four Australian newspapers before moving to the Sunday
Times in Johannesburg and then to Reuters in London, worked at RFE for more than 30 years,
including on-the-ground reporting during the Romanian revolution in Bucharest, and serving as
Budapest bureau chief after 1989. “[N]on-Americans came with no connections to personal
American political prejudices” (R. Eggleston, personal communication, January 4, 2011). CN
journalists were allied instead in their everyday work to the idea of supplying information to
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peoples denied it, and to modeling a free press, rather than to specific U.S. goals for policyrelated outcomes related to Cold War issues or events.
As noted earlier in this study, the goal of journalism as conceived and practiced in the
West is "democratic society” (Dahlgren, 1992, p. 18), and democratic society entails rights to
information and speech. A post-WWII Western-initiated movement for universal rights to free
speech and information exchange, including in media flows, codified decades later in the Helsinki
Declaration of 1975 (“Helsinki Declaration,” 1975) coincided with RFE’s Cold War operations in
Munich. The spirit of this movement connected RFE and its CN journalists in particular, beyond
the confines of the American model of journalism, to ideals of Western journalism as a means of
satisfying the needs of human beings everywhere for information about the world, including
information deemed undesirable by the governments of totalitarian states. Thus, RFE’s overall
mission to act as a surrogate free press for East-Central European peoples who were denied
access to information other than that sanctioned by their own governments, coincided with both
the democratic ends of Western journalism and a movement toward universal rights to
information and speech.
From here, however, RFE’s CN journalists part company with their Western peers. CN
news workers practiced under an external assumption of taint because of RFE’s relationship to
U.S. government, and particularly because of its historical relationship to the CIA. RFE’s
violation of legitimizing organizational structure – independence from government – relegated
CN staff to outsider status at “home “– in the world of Western journalism. CN journalists were
not regarded, like the exiles in the BDs who returned home after 1989, professionally or in their
home nations, as heroes. Nor did they regard themselves as heroes (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, July 13, 2005; S. Parrott, personal communication, July 28, 2005; M. Wall,
personal communication, August 23, 2006)
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CN journalists also worked without expectations for the kinds of professional stature,
including the byline recognition earned by correspondents working for mainstream Western news
organizations, including wire services. Their stories would not be distributed or broadcast in the
West, and listeners in East-Central Europe would never hear their names. “You didn’t have a
product; you didn’t have a front-page byline” (S. Herron, personal communication, November 22,
2010).
But working at RFE offered rewards not available otherwise in Western journalism. An
American journalist who joined the radios in 1987 recalled the overriding conception of mission
of the CN.
We had more of a sense of personal purpose at RFE because it was never forgotten what
the end goal was, and that was to get info to people who don’t have it. I don’t think many
journalists have experienced that feeling that what you’re working for is getting news to
people who have no access to it. That was very prominent throughout RFE. We weren’t
just editors, news writers; we were there for a common cause for humanity. (M. HuberCameron, personal communication, November 16, 2010)
By accepting jobs at RFE, Western journalists embedded themselves with troops -- the
BDs, American management, the Research and Analysis Department, and so on -- not to cover a
war, but to participate in it. CN journalists and the products of their news work were embedded in
a larger work -- the Radios -- and that work had policy and political intent and hoped-for
propaganda or persuasion effects. CN journalists were aware of the effects that supplying
alternative information on a Western model, acting as a surrogate free press, might have in
broadcast areas -- citizens formulating ideas about constructing society differently, in short,
regime change. Here, though, CN journalists part ways with their colleagues in the BDs; they
believed that their role stopped at supplying information and modeling a free press.
In local [U.S.] TV and radio news, we were repeating information. There was no sense of
news being a life changing force of importance to the audience. They could listen or not,
or watch someone else and get the same info, basically. I wasn’t offering any unique
services.
My goal was to be in central news [in international broadcasting] all along. It was
never about any sort of analysis or advancing political ends – that was never of slightest
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interest to me. I didn’t go for political reasons. I wanted to get information to people. My
personal sense of mission was to serve an audience that needed the information and cared
about it, to get information to those to whom it actually mattered. In some cases it was a
matter of life and death to find out what was going on in their own countries.
(Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 28, 2010)
Young American journalists who came to the CN during the 1980s noticed political
passions among the BD staff, but didn’t feel it in the CN or their work products. “I don’t get a
sense for example that there was a strong political feeling, even a strong anti-communist feeling.
You know, these were just journalists doing their jobs” (J. Kirchherr, personal communication,
November 23, 2010). As will be described later, however, younger journalists adjusting to CN
practice during the late 1980s did observe a Cold War gestated, hyper-vigilant style of practice
that differed from the practices they experienced working for mainstream Western news agencies
before arriving at RFE.
The quest for authentic practice in the CN begins at this conceptual juncture: CN
journalists were exiles from mainstream Western practice; modeling Western journalism absent
the legitimacy assumed via organizational, structural independence from government meant that
partitioning the newsroom, its practice and decision-making from both government -- American
management -- and the politically passionate, advocacy journalism of the BDs, were necessary.
CN journalists owed their allegiance not to imagined nations in East-Central Europe, but to a
culture of journalism.
The mission of RFE was the end of the Cold War and the bringing down of the Iron
Curtain. But our mission in central news over and above RFE’s mission, was to be pure
and absolute journalists -- to be broadcasting the truth. And once those who have
censored the truth are gone, to teach . . . the right way to do journalism -- to both teach
and model. There were so many people on the [language] desks who were expats, citizens
of those countries, and we would show the language desk people the right way. And the
assumption was that then they would go back to their countries, that they would be the
forerunners as journalists back in their countries. (C. Smith, personal communication,
December 4, 2010)
Allegiance to a culture of journalism, to the practice of journalism “over and above RFE’s
mission” was a conceptual position assumed across the board by journalists in the CN, one that
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would not only govern evolution of a hybrid, hyper-vigilant practice over time, including the
approximation of a “firewall” between the CN and American management, and between the CN
and the BDs, but also fuel conflict between the CN and other groups inside RFE.
Journalists knew RFE as a private organization during the 1950s (governed by the Free
Europe Committee in New York), a CIA – funded organization by 1967, and a U.S. Congress –
funded organization from 1973 - 1995. But among the journalists in the CN during the early
decades were those who knew (were made “witting) of RFE’s CIA relationship, and many who
suspected government or intelligence involvement before it was publicly known; yet they
continued to work for RFE. After official severance of the CIA relationship, journalists suspected
that CIA involvement continued in some form at some level in any case. Among CN staffers, “the
Brits had a cricket club and played against other clubs in Munich. They called it the Cricketers
International Association: CIA. It was not accidental; it was the 1980s. The [RFE] front office put
a stop to it” (T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010). There was, among journalists in
the CN, “a feeling that a tie with the CIA had never been completely broken. . . . But I never a
feeling that the CIA was trying to run the place, I never got that feeling” (T. Iliff, personal
communication, May 27, 2010).
After 1956, CN journalists responded to that conundrum of murky information about
governance, or to overt knowledge of governance, both of which were aberrant to an “American
model” of practice, in part by constructing a partition between American management and
newsroom decision-making. CN journalists also had to insulate the newsroom and its products
from the political passions of exiles in the BDs. As will be shown in the next chapter, they
instituted controls that included stricter standards than those in their previous practice in the
West, and defended those controls when newsroom decision-making or practice was challenged.
Acknowledging the larger propaganda mission, the political advocacy journalism of the
BDs, yet maintaining a “straight news” position in the CN meant partitioning also conceptions of
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the work. Like the exiles in the BDs, Western journalists were sensitive to the “propagandist”
label, but for different reasons.
I was a journalist and, I think, a good one. You should never let other people define who
or what you are. I was a journalist who worked in the newsroom of RFE. RFE’s main
function was propaganda but straight news was a key part of what the station did. That
doesn’t make me a propagandist. (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 13, 2012)
So, while CN journalists acknowledge, “of course it was propaganda” (L. McCoy, personal
communication, August 17, 2006) in relation to RFE as a whole, they maintained that as
journalists in the CN operating an internal wire service for broadcast desk clients, propaganda
was not their product. “I was responsible for ten minutes of news every hour. In my ten minutes,
there was no propaganda” (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005).
It follows that despite embracing the idea of delivering information to populations denied
a free press, Western journalists went to RFE did not embrace journalism practiced with
American government sponsorship; they went despite the complication of the organization’s
relationship to government. Michael Wall, who joined the CN in 1965, worked in the Munich
newsroom at the time of the revelations of RFE’s CIA relationship, then moved to the London
bureau; he headed the Bonn bureau from 1978-92. He echoed the convictions of many in the CN.
My feeling was as long as we were allowed to do our jobs properly and responsibly, I
didn’t mind. . . . The news operation was a professional operation. I wasn’t working for
one of the broadcast desks or the people who turned policy decisions. I was working for
the newsroom. In fact, I was impressed by the two-source rule, which I thought was
terrific. (M. Wall, personal communication, August 23, 2006)
Part of Wall’s task in Bonn was to report original stories, but most journalists working in
the main newsroom in Munich were fact-checking, source-confirming and rewriting stories
aggregated from news publications and agencies around the globe. They added “intros” that
contextualized stories for the East-Central European audiences of the BDs, audiences that had no
access to and little knowledge of the West. CN journalists who worked in bureaus or in Munich
from the 1960s – 1990s, found little to worry them.
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I did not worry about our autonomy or any interference in how we chose which stories to
cover or how we wrote them. The U.S. government allocated the funding every year, and
as far as I could see, then kept out of journalistic decisions. I don’t remember any story
being suppressed or any story being urged on us that did not meet ordinary standards of
newsworthiness. (C. Damioli, personal communication, January 9, 2011)
Given the state of border-penetrating communication technologies of the Cold War era,
however, international broadcasting was the only means available to Western journalists attracted
to what they saw as a humanitarian task: challenging limits on information in totalitarian states.
At the same time, CN journalists were aware that no matter the realities of newsroom practice,
professionally, their work for a U.S. government-sponsored organization might be assigned what
one journalist called, “not the P-word -- propaganda, but the T-word -- taint” (G. Thatcher,
personal communication, August 31, 2006). Most, like New Zealander Stuart Parrott, former
London bureau chief, found the work worth the professional risk: “Someone had to do this job”
(personal communication, July 28, 2005).
Most reported having initiated conversations during their interviews for positions in the
CN regarding journalistic autonomy, American policy interference, and their credibility as
journalists in the future.
I knew others would feel I was tainted. But I never felt internally that it was a problem. I
asked a colleague [in the U.S.] whether he thought my credibility would be damaged [if I
went to work for RFE/RL]. And he said, ‘Credibility is built up over years and years. . . .
It doesn’t pivot on the name of the organization you’re working for.’ And I used to say,
‘At the end of the day, I could write seven stories that might result in increasing
shareholder value [for an American corporate newspaper], or, ‘I wrote seven stories that
people who don’t have information could have access to.’ (G. Thatcher, personal
communication, August 31, 2006)
Some, like Thatcher, had to be convinced nonetheless, and arrived at RFE with a wait-and-see
attitude toward the realities of newsroom autonomy. However, once inside the CN,
professionalism of the staff and the work routines waylaid fears. As in any news organization,
there was a need to defend practice on recurring grounds – in the CN, e.g., the two-source rule –
and examples of notorious attempts at interference coming from management outside the
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newsroom. Both will be described in the next chapter.
While CN workers did not themselves feel tainted because they knew their everyday
work routines were not only professionally sound, but also more stringent than their previous
routines in Western news organizations, they knew that Western journalism organizations and
journalists assumed taint in any case. In sum, Western journalists came to work in the CN driven
by humanitarian goals conceived in terms of the needs of the peoples of East-Central Europe. "I
knew I wasn't going to win a Pulitzer [Prize], so I tried to do my best, to work harder, faster" (M.
Wall, personal communication, August 23, 2006).

Central Newsroom recruitment, demographics and conceptions of practice, 1950-95
During the first few years after RFE’s founding, a small core of American journalists
joined RFE when its headquarters and its CN operation were located in New York City (A.
Breslauer, personal communication, August 9, 2010). Some of those journalists moved to Munich
when RFE transferred much of its internal wire service production to its new building in the city’s
vast public park, the Englischer Garten.
The CN’s first crop of journalists, mostly Americans, speculated about RFE’s governance
and funding. Arthur Breslauer, who joined the newsroom in 1952, moved to Munich three years
later and stayed for more than three decades. He maintained that during RFE’s earliest years in
the New York office, “hardly anybody knew” (personal communication, August 9, 2010)
specifically about CIA funding and oversight. But journalists talked among themselves, finding it
doubtful that public claims that RFE was financed solely by citizen contributions to its parent
organization, the Free Europe Committee, through domestic U.S. “Crusade for Freedom”
campaigns, could be true. “We knew what our budget was. I thought [RFE] was [financed
through] a presidential slush fund” (A. Breslauer, personal communication, August 9, 2010).
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As noted in Chapter 2, the Hungarian revolt of 1956 was a turning point for RFE, and its
effects extended to the CN. RFE’s Hungarian language service was blamed for inciting false
hopes for Western assistance, and debate on this point continues (e.g. Perlez, 1996; Johnson,
2010). At the time, American policy and FEC officials revamped RFE’s mission, broadcasting
policies and operations, deciding that broadcast programming should become “less American”
and “more European” (A. R. Johnson, 2010, p. 124). The mandate to become “more European”
was understood throughout the organization (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30,
2005); it coincided with the presence in Europe of a ready supply of English-speaking journalists
from many nations looking for international reporting assignments. After 1956, the CN would
become, in terms of the national citizenship and journalism training and experience of its
employees, mostly European, and ultimately its news practices, more European, but also a unique
North American-British hybrid.
Also in the wake of the 1956, American officials hired American journalist Gene Mater
to direct the CN. Mater had led Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) in Berlin and helped to reestablish newspapers in West German cities after WWII. Mater’s mandate was to revise news
practice toward American-style journalism (G. Mater, personal communication, August 28,
2006). For Mater, expectations for American-style journalism included establishing and
protecting newsroom decision-making from outside influences; in short, autonomy. Barry
Griffiths, a Canadian who left London with his roommate, Australian Roley Eggleston, to join the
CN in Munich in 1962, recalled Mater’s influence.
It was he who fought for and established the principle that Central News decided what
was news and what wasn’t. Policy had no say over what went into newscasts. Ralph
Walter, policy director at the time and no fan of Mater’s, disputes this, but I think it is
correct. It was certainly the case by the time I joined the radios in 1962. (B. Griffiths,
personal communication, August 7, 2012)
Mater also introduced a requirement in 1959-60 that the CN would hire only journalists
with at least five years’ experience working in a major news organization, including international
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reporting experience (G. Mater, personal interview, Aug. 28, 2006). Most journalists met those
requirements through experience in Commonwealth nations’ news organizations and/or reporting
and editing posts in Europe. The five-year experience rule persisted – though the international
reporting requirement was sometimes overlooked during the late 1980s -- through the end of
RFE’s tenure in Munich (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006).
By the end of the 1950s and through the 1960s, the CN hired from among an
international contingent of journalists roving Europe, including Americans “out for adventure”
(B. Griffiths, personal communication, May 1, 2011). For example, RFE offered opportunities to
Australian journalists like Eggleston already living in Europe whose Australian training protocol
mandated experience in an international newsroom (R. Eggleston, personal communication,
January 4, 2011; L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006).
The CN’s Western journalist of the 1950s and 1960s eras maintain that although they
speculated about a CIA connection, official public confirmation in 1967 “came as a surprise”
(e.g. L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006). There were “no secrets” at RFE
when it came to speculating about a CIA “interest in RFE” (A. Breslauer, personal
communication, August 9, 2010), and “many guessed, but none knew” (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, May 1, 2011) for certain.
Not so for American management or for those made “witting” by management. Ralph
Walter, who joined RFE during the 1950s, served as director of RFE and vice president for policy
and programs for RFE/RL until 1982, noted that internal RFE correspondence during the 1950s
and 1960s referred in code to CIA representatives as people or friends ”from the South”, or,
simply, “our friends” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005). James F. Brown,
who worked first in Research and Analysis and later as director of RFE, recalled that prior to
public revelations of a CIA relationship, when newly hired American policy analysts arrived in
Munich, they would be summoned to the security office after their six months’ probationary
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period. There, they would be “made witting” (personal communication, June 30, 2005) of RFE’s
CIA link, while signing an agreement not to reveal that relationship under penalty of fine and
imprisonment (Puddington, 2000). The analysts would then promptly share the revelation in the
employee canteen, where, by the 1960s, “everybody already knew” (J. F. Brown, personal
communication, June 30, 2005). Brown recalled that research department employees referred to
CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia as “the pickle factory” and American policy analysts
suspected of being CIA employees as “friends from the pickle factory” (personal communication,
June 30, 2005).
Gene Mater, newly appointed CN director in 1959, was approached by American
“friends” with a recruitment query. Mater told Michael Nelson during research for Nelson’s book
on Cold War international broadcasting, War of the Black Heavens, that he refused the offer
(Nelson, 1997, p. 100). Mater’s characterization of the approach as casual or offhand does not
diminish the fact of its occurrence. It is doubtful in any case that such an overture would have
been made explicit or on the record via an official meeting or a formal written offer on letterhead
stationery. The facts: Mater, the new CN director, was approached; he maintained that he
declined. He barred reports from the Research and Analysis Department from the newsroom
(“Research and Analysis” also having been the name of an international unit of the former World
War II-era American Office of Strategic Services (OSS) intelligence operations).
During the 1960s - early 1970s, American journalists were not beating a path to RFE.
“There were just not enough interested Americans” (R. Eggleston, personal communication,
January 4, 2011). However, a few American journalists working in European offices of American
newspapers found sanctuary in the CN from a volatile industry. By the mid-1960s, a U.S. urban
newspaper “crisis” -- closings and mergers of newspapers in response to rising costs, new
technologies, audience shifts and competition from television -- “held center stage” (D. R.
Davies, 2006, p. 111). At the same time, international editions and bureaus of U.S. newspapers
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were closing or scaling down, setting adrift many journalists with international experience (N.
Kingsley, personal communication, September 28, 2006).
Mater’s successor as CN director, Nathan Kingsley, had been managing editor of the
Paris-based European edition of the New York Herald Tribune (later the International Herald
Tribune) until 1963-4 and associate managing editor of its parent paper in New York for a few
months afterward; he joined RFE in 1965, just after he learned that the Herald Tribune was
failing financially.
If The Trib had survived, I probably would not have taken [the job at RFE]. . . . I knew
that the newspaper could not survive. Circulation wasn’t the problem. . . . We had
400,000 circulation. But we were not getting those things that sit between news stories -the ads. (N. Kingsley, personal communication, September 28, 2006)
Like other journalists who joined the CN prior to public disclosure of the CIA connection,
Kingsley was wary of RFE’s atypical governance. He accepted the position after assurances that
there would be “no interference” in news by American policy officials, relying on management
promises that journalists would be allowed to be journalists and not propagandists.
Trepidations. I had trepidations. I took the opportunity to meet with the RFE president,
John Richardson, and even more with director C. Rodney Smith. . . . I met with them
over a period of several months, and I was impressed with their understanding. I
remember saying to them, . . . ‘I’ll tell you one thing. If I ever find that any one of my
news people is associated with that agency [CIA], there will be two empty chairs, his and
mine.’ And they had no problem with that. (N. Kingsley, personal communication,
September 28, 2006)
During the 1950s and 1960s, American managers’ memos discussing personnel issues
include not only references to “friends” but also to who was “witting” and who was not.
Managers – some of whom were themselves among RFE’s “friends” -- noted whether possible
candidates for particular posts or assignments were “witting” or “not witting”. Memos
referencing the assignment of CN journalists are rare, but, for example, a July 1965 memo from
Chester Ott, Acting RFE director, references the need for journalists to respond to an unusual
request.
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On 1 July Carl Koch, RFE Vienna correspondent, making a regular appearance for lunch
at the 'Stammtisch' of a Vienna restaurant, found himself in the company of Eric Bourne,
(Christian Science Monitor correspondent) and two representatives of the Rumanian
Embassy in Vienna: Messrs. Ion Brita and Ion Dumitriu, respectively Press Attaché and
Second Secretary. Also seated at the same table were Messrs. Dan Hafrey and John
Tuohey of USIS, and Andreas Heltai, MTI (Hungarian News Agency) representative.
(Ott, 1965)
The memo noted that the Romanian officials suggested that RFE send two correspondents to
Bucharest. RFE correspondents were not permitted access to target nations, including Romania.
Ott requested authorization to select a CN journalist to send to Bucharest; he listed qualifications
for the assignment and suggested four journalists.
[He] should have an excellent professional background, knowledge of French or German,
good character, and a high sense of responsibility. A knowledge of the Rumanian
language could be more of a liability than an asset; security-wise, the less the person has
been briefed, the better. Several of our staffers who meet most of the above requirements
are:
James Edwards, RFE Paris Bureau Chief, a long-time employee who has held a number
of responsible positions and carries a British passport, not witting.
Reinhold Ensz, Assistant to the News Director in Munich, recently hired by RFE but a
highly professional newsman who has served in the AP Moscow Bureau, not witting.
William Mahoney, currently RFE Geneva correspondent, who recently covered the
Yugoslav Party Congress, witting.
Nat Kingsley, RFE News Director; the RFE image could well be enhanced by sending
our senior news executive on the first trip. He is witting. (Ott, 1965)
Thus, soon after his appointment as news director, Kingsley was listed as “witting”, while James
Edwards, a British citizen who would eventually obtain an American passport and be made CN
director (following the two-year tenure of Anatol Shub, former Moscow correspondent for The
Washington Post who followed Kingsley), was listed as “not witting”. (Also note that Mahoney, a
“witting” journalist, was sent to communist Yugoslavia; RFE did not target language
broadcasting services to the peoples of that nation at the time, but RFE reporters were permitted
entry and for a time operated a bureau in Belgrade. Mahoney later left the CN, moving into a
public relations position in RFE’s public affairs office.)
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It is important to note that being made witting (with certain knowledge of RFE’s CIA
connection) or having “guessed” (but without confirmation) produced the same response from
CN journalists -- hyper-vigilance. News directors who were “witting”, including Mater and
Kingsley, instituted controls, as did the news directors who followed, to approximate the missing
firewall between the newsroom and management, including barring newsroom exposure to
“advisories” and daily policy guidance intended for BDs. On the other hand, briefing journalists
“as little as possible” left those who wanted to be journalists-with-a-capital-J while doing “good .
. . with a capital G”, toward watchfulness.
Hyper-vigilance included inordinate attention to conscious modeling of a free press, to
“balance” that included reporting on democracy, especially regarding unrest aimed at democratic
change in the U.S. According to Griffiths, who joined the radios in 1962 and later was promoted
to deputy director of the CN:
As long as we were, unknowingly, financed by the CIA I was never aware of pressure
being put on the newsroom to slant news in any way. To the contrary, we considered it to
be vital, if our listeners were to believe us, to be first with negative news . . . about
America. Radio Moscow saying ‘ha ha, RFE hid this news’ would have been a major
blow to our credibility. (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 7, 2012)
Breslauer, who moved to the Munich newsroom from New York City in 1955 and stayed for
more than 30 years, recalled a mix of stories in the CN news file assembled not only in response
to client needs – the broadcast desks – but via the judgment of journalists in the newsroom as to
what constituted modeling a free press.
I thought I was sending decent news to Eastern Europe. We thought we were sending
extremely important, well-written, news that they weren’t going to get otherwise,
particularly about their own country. . . . But one of the great glories of RFE was the
1968 civil rights campaign. . . . We did a job on that. All the beatings and killings . . . ,
we reported on it. And the anti-Vietnam War campaigns. Who was it . . . who said, ‘You
have to show democracy, warts and all’? We did that. Anytime anything bad happened in
the U.S., we had to report on it. If there were riots and killings in Mississippi, we reported
on it. (personal communication, August 9, 2010)
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Public knowledge that the CIA was funding an array of American anti-communist media,
arrived via an investigative report in Ramparts magazine and in The New York Times in 1967.
Confirmation of RFE’s CIA sponsorship followed. Public exposure and subsequent
Congressional hearings and media debate made recruitment of Western journalists more difficult,
and for a time made working in the CN a last resort for American journalists (N. Kingsley,
personal communication, September 28, 2006). “That made it difficult to work for the radios as a
journalist, because every time your asked for an interview, people thought they were talking to a
CIA agent” (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006).
During those years, the escalation of U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, and the
demonstrations across the U.S. (including the civil rights, feminist and anti-war movements) that
the CN also reported, along with the Watergate scandal of the early 1970s may have kept
American journalists tied to adrenaline-producing reporting assignments on the frontlines and at
home.
In the Sixties the focus was all on Asia. Everyone wanted to be [U.S. journalist David]
Halberstam in Saigon. Europe was out. In the Seventies they all wanted to stay home and
be ‘Woodstein’ [Bob Woodward and Carl Bernstein, The Washington Post reporters of
Watergate fame]. In those years we had very few Americans wandering in looking for
work. Thus the preponderance of Aussies, New Zealanders, Canadians, Brits, etc. (B.
Griffiths, personal communication, May 1, 2011)
By 1973, as the Watergate scandal was gearing up, the U.S. Congress officially
established direct legislative funding and an independent oversight board (Johnson, 2010).
Congressional restructuring included a revision of RFE’s mission that mandated that broadcast
content would be “not inconsistent with” American policy. Walter cites this phrase -- as opposed
to a mandate to be “consistent with” policy -- as an advantage that allowed “maximum
flexibility” (R. E. Walter, personal communication, July 13, 2005) to journalists and
differentiated RFE from the Voice of America (VOA). It was clear that this careful wording was
understood throughout the organization, particularly among CN journalists (B. Griffiths, personal
177

communication, July 13, 2005; R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006; L.
McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006) as a protection, a loophole, permitting the
defense of the routines that CN journalists developed and practiced.
However, the phrasing also confirmed that RFE, and the CN within it, would go forward
with not only government funding but also with some relationship to American policy, insuring
that in the world of professional journalism in the CN would continue to violate expectations for
organizational structure that includes distance from government. It also would continue to carry
an assumption of possible taint by outsiders, while requiring continued hyper-vigilance of
Western journalists leading the central news operation.
From the 1960s forward, American journalists were in the minority, with journalists from
Commonwealth nations, especially Australia, dominating the newsroom. Corporate records for
1976 offer a snapshot of CN staffing midway through RFE’s 44-year residence in Munich -- a
few years after RFE’s transition away from CIA funding (June 30, 1971) and policy supervision
(March 30, 1972) to Congressional funding and Board for International Broadcasting oversight
(Johnson, 2010). Records (RFE/RL, 1976) list 29 journalists working central news (excluding
teletype operators, support staff, news interns and the like). Of these, more than half were citizens
of Commonwealth Nations (including Australia, the UK, Canada, New Zealand), with
Australians comprising the largest portion. Of the rest, 38% were Americans, most of longstanding tenure in the CN, and 10% were West Germans. The 29 ranged in age from 27-61, with
a median age of 39.
Halfway through RFE’s tenure in Munich, the CN was staffed with journalists who had
arrived with, on average, more than eight years’ experience working in radio, television,
newspaper, news magazine and/or wire service journalism. They had worked for leading news
organizations; e.g., the wire services United Press International (UPI), Associated Press (AP) and
Reuters, the American radio and television networks CBS and ABC; and newspapers such as The
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New York Times. Most had reporting experience in more than one type of print or broadcast
medium; many had a combination of newspaper and radio or wire service and radio experience.
Their previous reporting and editing posts in news organizations constituted a network of the
major cities of the UK, the US, France, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, Switzerland,
Canada, and West Germany. Many spoke two or more languages, including English, German,
French, Italian, Russian and Polish. By 1976, they had also spent an average of ten years each in
the CN’s Munich newsroom or its bureaus. In 1976, the CN represented an exception to RFE’s
organizational mandate to award leadership posts only to Americans. British journalist James
Edwards directed the CN, and had acquired an American passport. He was assisted by deputies
Barry Griffiths (Canadian) and Larry McCoy (American). Combined, these three held reporting,
editing and leadership positions in the CN for six decades.
Consideration for promotion to management positions (e.g. director of RFE overseeing
the BDs, broadcast desk chiefs, CN news directors and bureau chiefs, and the like) required that
the applicant hold an American passport by birth or naturalization. That requirement was
overridden at times, most noticeably in the CN. The passport requirement was more important
(and more stringently enforced) prior to the 1970s. Edwards, e.g., acquired American citizenship
while serving as CN correspondent to the United Nations, then served as Paris bureau chief, and
was promoted to CN director during the 1970s.
Exceptions to the passport rule for CN posts during the 1980s are numerous. New
Zealand native Stuart Parrott was first denied promotion to London bureau chief during the 1980s
and then awarded the same position a few years later (S. Parrott, personal communication, July
28, 2005). Brian McGill (Australian) ran the London bureau for a time, Ken Wells (Canadian) the
Stockholm bureau, Susan Ovadia (French) the Paris bureau, Alex Ramsey (British) the Paris
bureau, and Barry Griffiths (Canadian) the Brussels bureau (B. Griffiths, personal
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communication, August 7, 2012). Those promoted to bureau posts also had considerable
experience both inside and outside RFE.
The demographics of the CN shifted again during the mid-1980s, toward a higher ratio of
Americans. The early 1980s were turbulent at RFE. During the first administration (1981-84) of
President Ronald Reagan, the U.S. abandoned its 1970s policy of détente, adopting a harder-line
anti-communist stance. That shift brought changes in management at RFE/RL, and, in an ironic
reversal of its 1960s mandate, included charges that the radios had become “too European”
(Brown, 2005, p. 154). During the 1980s, countering accusations that The Radios had become
“too European” resulted in newsroom hiring that again favored American journalists.
American Ted Iliff, who joined the CN in 1978 from UPI, noted that the CN was “always
trying to attract Americans. There were political problems when [American officials] would come
through the newsroom on a tour and hear a lot of British and Aussie accents.” He recalled deputy
news director Griffiths asking, “’Are there any more of you over there?’” (T. Iliff, personal
communication, May 27, 2010).
The CN’s Washington, D.C. bureau chief, Tom Bodin, advertised for and interviewed
applicants in the U.S.
Tom Bodin was beating the bushes in the U.S. for a certain kind of American, a certain
mentality, inclined to work overseas and get that experience, the adventure of it, tend to
stay long and soak up the adventure. There was a good benefit package and salary. The
exchange rate affected our ability to hire. When the dollar was strong, the salary was
stated in German marks, the salary looked low. People would do the math and say,
‘That’s not much’. But if the dollar was weak and the mark was strong, they thought
they’d get a raise. So we’d get a bigger and more diverse pool of candidates when the
dollar was weak. (T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010)
Concern about perceptions of taint among members of the U.S. press was evident in
RFE’s American recruiting. RFE was often not identified in recruiting advertisements placed in
the American magazine, Editor & Publisher, the primary source for job advertisements in U.S.
journalism at the time. Hamman saw an ad for an international news editor, someone to open a
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bureau in Pakistan. The ad did not identify RFE: “I had no idea who it was.” He, like other
American recruits of the 1970s and 1980s, was interviewed by Bodin. “I spoke Urdu. . . . They
were all over me like white rice. . . . I had some idea of RFE as a lot of us did in the news
business back then, that it was propaganda. But I thought, ‘Well, I’ll see’ (personal
communication, November 24, 2010).
At one point I’m in Munich, and I met Edwards, and I thought, ‘This is the greatest.’ I
immediately say, ‘This is going to be a great boss.’ Jim Edwards was the best boss I’ve
ever had in my life. I want this in the story. He was very cool. He was British, he’d been
all around, done all sorts of stuff; he bought an old Cadillac and drove around the States.
(H. Hamman, personal communication, November 24, 2010)
The broadcasting guidelines clause that offered “maximum flexibility” was the focus of
Hamman’s queries about newsroom autonomy and the ability to perform news work with
authenticity.
[Edwards] was a bit of a stickler for real, traditional, good journalism. He was very, very
interested in one other thing, and that was journalistic standards. I said, ‘Jim, this worries
me – [The guidelines say] we will do nothing contrary to US policy.’ I said, ‘What if
somebody says something the policy people don’t like?’ He said, ‘I don’t have a problem
with that. The interests of the US are serviced by telling the truth.’ He ran the thing the
way he thought it should be run, and he didn’t let anything bother him. There was a lot of
pressure on him, for a long, long time. But he stood up to it. (H. Hamman, personal
communication, November 24, 2010)
During the 1980s, editors who joined the CN continued to speculate on CIA involvement
at RFE.
My motivation for going there was having access to people from that part of the world. I
didn’t know what to expect from the rest of the place. It [RFE] had reputation of being a
propaganda instrument, and I wasn’t sure what to expect. My experience was that the
Eastern Europeans that I worked with were extraordinary individuals in terms of
background, knowledge, and etc. The ones I thought were a little bit dodgy were the
Americans running the place. We always had these guesses/wagers as to which ones were
the spooks. You’ve probably heard this from others. Everyone assumed that [a particular
American management official] was CIA. (Anonymous CN journalist, personal
communication, December 12, 2010)
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In the CN, the work itself – the realities of CN practice -- and journalists’ awareness that
newsroom leadership, despite pressure from American management, shielded both daily work
and journalists themselves – contributed to Western journalists’ willingness to remain in the CN.
Journalists like Arthur Breslauer knew that news director James Edwards was shielding the
newsroom during the early 1980s. “He was being harassed by management over some things, but
we never knew [specifics] – we just knew he was pressured (personal communication, August 9,
2010). Likewise, journalists who worked in the CN during the late 1980s and early 1990s felt
empowered to practice by CN standards and according to group interpretation of the newsroom’s
role at RFE.
I never felt like any of my work was being censored or that I had to change it or that it
didn’t promote the American way or whatever. . . . My interpretation was that it was
supposed to be unbiased -- there’s no such thing, but it would be fair reporting to the
people of East-Central Europe . . . who were fed government cadre fodder. They had a
right to know what was happening in the rest of the world -- good, bad, whatever. The
mission was to inform them and have them make choices about how to interpret the
news. (L. W. Akcay, personal communication, November 11, 2010)
Some Western journalists had accepted CN positions intending to remain only a short
time, expecting to move on as soon as employment prospects in mainstream news improved.
Incentives that made eventual departure less likely included an attractive pay scale and perks such
as living in RFE-subsidized apartments in Munich. Journalists who had joined the CN during the
1950s and 1960s were working under contracts that specified salaries tied the exchange rate;
changes in relative currency values didn’t affect net income, and the salaries were high by
journalism standards after long tenures. Long-time staff had what one journalist called “golden
handcuffs” (J. Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010), while those who joined
the newsroom during the 1980s were paid an American salary converted directly to marks. CN
journalists were also acutely aware that a lower pay scale and lack of housing benefits applied to
émigré news workers in the BDs.
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Western journalists also stayed because they set down roots in Munich, establishing
relationships and families with Europeans and especially German nationals. On the other hand,
employment at RFE after 1973 had been subject to uncertainty via developments in U.S. domestic
politics and the Congressional budgeting process. Griffiths (personal communication, July 13,
2005), for example, recalls having to answer questions from his German in-laws after periodic
German media reports on U.S. political discussions about slashing RFE’s budget or closing The
Radios altogether – Would he have a job and be able to support his family?
Western journalists across nations of origin and generations of CN tenure appreciated
German labor laws and “perks” like liberal, mandated holiday leave, additional days off including
Bavarian Catholic religious holidays, and RFE’s four days on, two off shift scheduling. Young
journalists noted that periods of rest, opportunities for brief travel to other nations, and
scheduling, were factors that made their jobs less stressful than their newsrooms at home.
However, newsroom managers worked the kinds of intensive schedules typical of large
news organizations. In 1975, Jim Edwards, on being promoted to CN director, found that his raise
did not amount to much, and complained to RFE Vice President Ralph Walter.
Forget the fact that this is one of RFE's biggest departments. Assume my 50-hour week is
standard for executives. Say that if I take home work it is because I am a bad organizer.
That still leaves duty shifts. News is a round the clock operation. Our own duty list has to
cover all seven days and I have only one executive to share it. I average four nights a
week by the phone.
And that's at best -- if Griffiths is not sick or on vacation. . . . My next night off
will be March 10 -- six weeks from now. It's a tough job and it's hard on family life. And
the increase comes out at $17 a week.
From what I've heard, I believe you have today a News Department that is more
productive, cooperative and responsive than it has been for years. Yet its executive crust
is thinner than it has ever been. The load is on me. I enjoy it, but that's not the point.
(Edwards, 1975)
The “more productive, cooperative and responsive” CN was, as will be discussed in the next
chapter, a CN that had constructed a practice that included ways of appearing “cooperative and
responsive” while maintaining CN practice standards and resisting attempts at interference.
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Young American journalists joined Edwards’s newsroom during the 1980s for the same
reasons journalists from many nations chose to work at RFE throughout its history: first for what
journalists in general seek – a job with adventure – but with the added satisfaction of providing
news to people who had been denied access.
The best part of the job was the opportunity to live in Central Europe. . . . I took full
advantage of that. I visited each European Union country (back then, there were only 12),
plus Switzerland, and Austria (which was not yet an EU country). There was some
satisfaction in working with world news and with bringing news to the people of Eastern
Europe and the former Soviet Union about their own countries and their governments, in
a time when their government controlled news media and kept much information from
them. However, that was not my prime motivation for working at the radio. (C. Damioli,
personal communication, January 9, 2011)
A requirement for international reporting experience was not in force during the 1980s
when most new hires were Americans (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 7, 2012);
many arrived with wire service experience from posts in the U.S. But the five-year experience
requirement remained (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006). According to
Bill Marsh, a seasoned journalist who headed American management at RFE/RL during the late
1980s, his office passed judgment on hires proposed by CN news directors. “Red flags” included:
The inability to write good objective sentences, an inability to see all sides of stories, an
inability to deal with sources to get the story accurate. Accuracy was what it was all
about. If we got the story wrong, we were in trouble. I never interviewed anybody for a
job who didn’t have at least five years of experience, and it had to be with a reasonably
good journalism organization. (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006)
When interviewed by Washington, D.C. bureau chief Bodin or CN news deputies visiting
from Munich, American journalists took a writing test, a “knowledge test”, and sometimes a
language test, if it was appropriate to the post for which they had applied. They recall these tests
as “the usual process” (e.g. J. Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010) and not
specific to RFE. But they also had to fill out forms for security agency clearance. Journalists
remember these security forms as having “ridiculous questions, like, ‘Are you now or have you
ever been a member of the Communist Party?’” (L. W. Akcay, personal communication,
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November 18, 2010). They were not questioned by personnel from any intelligence agency, but
attributed long waits between interviews and job postings in Munich to security clearance and
visa issues, not to their fitness for their jobs. Many journalists who joined RFE during the 1960s
through the 1990s also spent one, two or three days in the newsroom as a “try-out” (e.g., L.
McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006; Anonymous CN journalist, November 23,
2010). In general, the time lag between application and receiving a phone call offering
employment was lengthy, from three to six months or longer.
As to the hiring of women for newswriting and editing posts during the 1950s-1970s,
RFE was not unlike Western news organizations in general: almost entirely male. Even by the
1980s, it was a “macho” newsroom (L. W. Akcay, personal communication, November 18,
2010). Women worked the teletype machines (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17,
2006), but women hires for editorial news slots had been few and far between for most of the
CN’s history (R. Eggleston, personal communication, January 4, 2011; B. Griffiths, July 13,
2005). There were so few women that when one of the very few women walked across the
newsroom during the early 1970s, heads turned.
[Another] New Zealander we had was a lovely, lovely gal, good and competent. But the
thing was, she wore mini skirts, and when I was in my office next to the newsroom, I
would always know when she reached over to get a piece of copy. All the typewriters
stopped. That’s how I knew that she was active in the newsroom. She stayed six to eight
months. She was moving her way through Europe. When the typewriters went silent, I
used to say to myself, ‘Christ, she’s in there!’ (N. Kingsley, personal communication,
September 28, 2006)
Notable exceptions to the few-women-in-the-CN rule included New Zealander Stephanie
Webster, Australian Elisabeth Hooper (“top rewrite on the desk the day the 1970 Mideast war
broke out”) (R. Eggleston, personal communication, January 4, 2011) and American Terry
Willey, who moved to news from the research department and was the only CN journalist
interviewed for this study who, like exiles in the BDs, learned journalism on the job.
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Kirchherr, who joined the CN in 1987, recalled a cadre of “American guys with families”
that had joined the newsroom earlier during the 1980s. But RFE was years behind American
newsrooms in developing diversity. “There was a move to bring more Americans in, and then,
one of things that really struck me, was how few women there were and how difficult it was for
those who were there. It was pretty ingrained.” There was a six-month trial period in the
newsroom, and it was commonly understood that the editors who got together to decide who
would stay and who would go, “were particularly hard on women” (J. Kirchherr, personal
communication, November 23, 2010).
Carol Damioli, who joined three other women in the CN in 1984, recalled approaching
the CN director to discuss the dearth of women.
There was the sexism; when I got there, I was only one of two women news editors, not
counting one woman manager. When I brought this up with the CN director, his exact
words were, ‘What do you want me to do, fire all the men and hire women?’ I told him
that when there were openings, he could hire women until there was a balance of the
sexes in the newsroom. He said that made him worry about ‘reverse discrimination.’ So it
was an uphill battle. There were more women in my later years in the newsroom. I
worked before and after RFE at much smaller, less-well-financed operations, yet they
were much more modern in terms of women’s hiring and advancement. (personal
communication, January 9, 2011)
During the last few years of the CN’s tenure in Munich, Willey, who had been promoted
by Edwards from the former RL central newsroom staff to assistant news director, the number
three position in the CN, was named director of the News and Current Affairs division in 1990.
Most new hires while Willey helped manage the newsroom were young American women,
including the first African American, who joined the newsroom in 1988. “Then it began to feel
more like what a newsroom was supposed to look and feel like” (J. Kirchherr, personal
communication, November 23, 2010).
After the 1988 gains by Solidarity in Poland and the 1989 destruction of the Berlin Wall
and successive revolutions in East-Central Europe and the republics of the Soviet Union, CN
newsroom demographics again shifted. New hires in the CN during this period, while Willey
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directed the division, continued to be young American journalists, including a number of women
(M. Huber-Cameron, personal communication, November 16, 2010; K. Saal, personal
communication, November 21, 2010). The CN of 1995, its last summer in Munich, would be, as
it had been during the 1950s, an American journalist-dominated newsroom.

Generational and group relationships
As in the BDs, there were differences and frictions related to conceptions of the work in
practice among generations of employees in the CN. The commonalities in reasons for coming to
RFE were a desire for an exciting job in journalism, adventure, for international lifestyle, and the
prospect of delivering information to populations denied it. But there was also a “deep disparity”
(C. Smith, personal communication, December 4, 2010) between the long-time journalists and the
American newcomers during the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Marsh, an American former who directed the organization during the late 1980s and early
1990s, noted that the evolution of the organization and CN practice favored the expectations of
the younger American journalists. “Certainly by 1986, there were no constraints; the journalists
were able to function without constraints (personal communication, August 22, 2006). Younger
journalists trained in American newsrooms felt frustration, a “clash” with long-time CN editors
and newsroom managers. “The old-timers were still gnashing nails over the Cold War. The folks
who came over with me were far more objective about what we were doing” (C. Smith, personal
communication, December 4, 2010). The recently hired group of Americans:
were far more interested in presenting and upholding the standards of objective
journalism. I don’t mean that that the old-timers were not objective—I mean they were
focused differently.
That word, ‘passion’, is the best way to put it. We [the new crop of Americans]
were far more analytical than passionate. The excitement of when things would happen in
Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union -- reading TASS and the other foreign wires, and
tripping those guys up on their errors was far more important to the old-timers than it was
to us. Of course, we’d find mistakes, factual, in everything. And yes, you’d point out the
difficulties. We’d say, ‘There are conflicting reports.’ But [the old-timers’] attitude was,
let’s say that ‘TASS is reporting such-and-such, and we say otherwise.’ They were far
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more interested in propping up straw men and then knocking them down. (C. Smith,
personal communication, December 4, 2010)
Younger American journalists came with news agency experience to complement the
CN’s role as an internal wire service, but not necessarily international reporting or agency
experience. In addition, there were differences in conceptions of Western news agencies. The
seasoned CN management and rewrite staff had fact-checked agency copy for decades, and were
aware of its frequent errors and single-source stories. Younger staff, some arriving from those
same wire services, did not approach the work with those experiences or perceptions.
I was sometimes appalled. . . . There were lots of conversations about what the wire
service was doing or not doing, and I would think, ‘You guys don’t know diddly-squat!’ I
considered working for the [Broadcast Analysis Department], where analysts had to write
a summary of everything [in a broadcast]. (Anonymous CN journalist, personal
communication, November 7, 2007)
Another journalist recalled a more recent hire observing, “’RFE brings in a lot of journalists and
then makes them bad.’” “Bad” referred to stylistic differences in CN copy that frustrated new
hires. Straight news was almost devoid of adjectives; young Americans found the subject matter
interesting and being on the front lines of history as it unfolded exciting, but also found the work
of writing itself, as practiced in the CN, boring, not as enjoyable as their previous work. Writing
stories that could be easily and reliably translated meant restraining the urge to writerliness, of
composing compelling prose. In addition, CN stories were sometimes more pedantic, catering to
the needs of the client BDs. Stories were often longer and otherwise a-typical of those of Western
agencies. CN practice had been developed for the needs of the language broadcast service clients
and their audiences; both needed more contextual information. For example, longer meant adding
explanatory and contextual material to make a story about the West, to which BD staff and
listeners had little or no access -- or a story that contradicted much of what listeners had heard
domestically from state media – understandable.
The issue was American journalists trained and educated in specific ways about how a
story is constructed and how to identify sources. When I got there, I was told, ‘No, you
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do the story our way. It was putting the cart before the horse lots of times. I attributed to,
‘These guys have never been out there; they’ve never gathered any news.’ A lot of people
who’d been there a long time had never been out of that newsroom. (Anonymous CN
journalist, November 23, 2010)
Many of the reporters in the Munich newsroom and its bureaus had been out of the newsroom
quite often, but many others had been “rewrite men” in the CN for decades. Some younger
journalists who joined the newsroom during the last ten years that the newsroom practiced in
Munich successfully adjusted; some did not. On factor that contributed to frustration with the
painstaking practice demanded in the CN was lack of access to audience feedback, to concrete
understandings of why practice had evolved in
The CN’s experienced, long-tenured international staff may have been immersed in CN
practice, isolated from the recent mainstream Western journalism experiences that bred
frustration among a new generation of mostly American practitioners who joined in the CN
during its last ten years in Munich. Likewise, younger journalists struggling to understand the
painstaking particulars of CN practice suffered from lack of real-world reinforcement for that
practice via audience feedback.
The audience -- that was one thing that I didn’t have a lot of knowledge about. But I
guess the longer I worked there, the less convinced I was that we were really talking to
the masses. Obviously there were lots of dissidents listening, but I was less convinced
that normal everyday Russians or Czechs or Tajiks were actually tuning in to us. I didn’t
hear a lot of that sort of feedback. Who was listening? It wasn’t like they could call us
and tell us. (D. Williams, personal communication, November 9, 2010)
“The masses” were indeed listening to RFE, but feedback was more likely to be directed toward
the émigré journalists in the BDs than to the unseen, un-bylined journalists in the CN.
One of the problems all through the radios’ history was that you had no idea at all what
your listeners were thinking. And you might think journalists might become dispirited
about it, thinking, “What the hell difference does it make if I write this story?” We had no
idea of the degree to which we were effective or ineffective.
But late in the 1980s we had, we began to receive very definite feedback. People
began to make telephone calls into the newsroom. That hadn’t happened before. We were
able to get correspondents into these areas. In Budapest, from a very early date--we
established a bureau there in 1988. The communists were still in power but we had a
bureau. Things were changing and people were getting a sense of this; when you start to
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get feedback from your audience, it can encourage you. (W. W. Marsh, personal
communication, August 22, 2006)
Like broadcasters on the émigré desks, CN journalist went to work in a group setting of
shared language as well as journalism practice. RFE offered German language tutoring to
employees who came to Munich from any nation, but German was a social language, useful
inside and outside RFE. But inside RFE, English was the primary language of management
discussions with BD directors and the CN, and English was the language of practice in the central
news operation itself. “We were an island there, an island of native English speakers, journalists
in the central newsroom” (K. Saal, personal communication, November 15, 2010). “I went to
work every day in an English language environment. It was kind of an artificial life living there.
It was like going to Chicago” (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006). The CN
wire was written in English, with a small portion of stories rewritten from agency copy in French
and German. But because English was also the language of power at RFE, the language of
American management, a position of English language practice and an understanding of basic
tenets of Western journalism among managers offered the CN an advantage in defending its
autonomy and its practice.
There was a conception among CN staffers that “Central News was American and British
operation” (J. Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010), despite the
preponderance of Australians as perceived by East-Central Europeans on the broadcast desks,
who referred to CN staff as “Australian cowboys” (G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal communication,
July 14, 2005). The CN was, with its international mix of journalists practicing as a single unit, a
culture unto itself at RFE, particularly during the 1960s - 1980s. However, the CN was not
without differences based on group affiliations.
As is true of any workplace, there were social sub-groups among CN journalists based
around preferred activities. As mentioned, Commonwealth journalists played on an RFE team in
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a cricket league. The Americans played softball in the Englischer Garten on Sunday mornings
and found the German habit of designating small areas for public nudity disconcerting.
“Unfortunately, the place we liked to play was a place where there was nude sunbathing. We’d be
rolling balls past people doing the sunbathing so they would get the hint and get up and walk
away” (T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010). An American or two might play cricket
with the British, and a Brit might play softball with the Americans; the CN wasn’t a melting pot
when it came to these sports. However, in terms of socializing across RFE, as among the BDs,
skiing and other activities brought individuals from different groups together. CN journalists
sometimes also socialized as a group; “anytime anybody had a party, everyone was invited”
(Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 28, 2010).
Group differences mattered when it came to news work in the CN. But the talk in the
newsroom wasn’t about ethnicity; instead, group differences played out in “talk about
journalism.”
People at RFE were much more social, a reflection of being expats in a foreign city; in
the newsroom, you were with people who were not just colleagues but also friends, which
made it easier . . . to talk and criticize and in a sense a more friendlier newsroom.
(Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 28, 2010)
There was a “schism” between the British and American journalists including differences that
stemmed from different traditions in news styles (L. W. Akcay, personal communication,
November 18, 2010). “It wasn’t a nationality thing. It was a journalism thing” (T. Iliff, personal
communication, May 27, 2010). There were discussions between American and British and other
Commonwealth nations journalists over what non-Americans saw as too much material in the
news budget about the U.S. There were disagreements about approaches to particular stories, or
about where those stories should go in the budget (L. McCoy, personal communication, August
17, 2006). Other differences included a tradition of editorializing in copy carried over from the
British system of the partisan press.
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Americans who were hired during the 1980s were perceived to have had fewer years of
journalism experience than British hires. “The Brits had the feeling that some Americans working
there didn’t have the international experience to write about some of the things they were being
asked to write about.” The Americans would “complain that the Brits were being a superior and a
little condescending and so on. . . . It could lead to a little tension or comments, never arguments”
(T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010). Americans acknowledge having arrived
knowing “nothing about Eastern Europe, nothing about communist system, the structure or about
how the party works. It was a learning experience. You were always afraid that your ignorance
was going to show when you were doing a news story” (L. McCoy, personal communication,
August 17, 2006). CN journalists compensated, gaining knowledge over time by reading research
department reports and consulting with the staff of the language services and the research
department. In addition, some CN staffers had daily access to East-Central European, French and
German journalists working in the CN’s central monitoring unit.
CN journalists as a group noted rivalries among the BDs. American journalists in
particular, being from a young nation that had historically expanded and acquired territory rather
than ceded it, one that did not have enemies periodically invading and occupying large swaths of
territory, were dumbstruck by enduring European historical rivalries among the BDs. “RFE was
like a little microcosm of Eastern Europe, because all of the territorial battles among those
countries was going on among those countries [inside RFE], too (L. W. Akcay, personal
communication, November 18, 2010). As noted in Chapter 4, tables in the “canteen”, the staff
cafeteria, were peopled by nationalities. The RFE desk staff, Hungarians and Romanians, e.g., sat
at separate tables, and the RL desks did likewise. “They all sort of stuck together.” One could
differentiate “Central Asian republics. . . . The turbans were together at one table, and the fedoras
were together” (L. W. Akcay, personal communication, November 18, 2010).
Many CN journalists interviewed for this study noticed and recalled alcohol consumption
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across departments at RFE, including in the CN. Vodka, beer and wine were sold in the RFE
canteen. During the U.S. Presidential election of 1964, journalist Breslauer recalled seeing the
newsroom director Mater sitting with a calculator tallying electoral votes for Republican Barry
Goldwater and Democrat Lyndon Johnson as reports of state vote tallies arrived in the newsroom.
Mater was a Republican; Breslauer a Democrat. They shared bottles of champagne purchased in
the canteen (A. Breslauer, personal communication, August 9, 2010). But more common
incidents included RFE staff consuming alcohol during the workday and afterward in the canteen
and sometimes at workstations.
Those two characteristics – ethnic rivalries and alcohol -- of life in Munich and at RFE
came together in an incident noted by CN journalists. During the early 1980s, a fight took place
among the staffs of several BDs in the employee canteen where alcohol was being consumed.
“The Tajiks, Russians, and Ukrainians were at separate tables. One Friday, rival groups were
sitting near each other, and a fight broke out” (T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010).
“One guy was pointing a finger at another guy, and the other guy bit off a fingertip” (J. Kirchherr,
personal communication, November 23, 2010). American management “decided to ban hard
liquor in the canteen, but we could keep the beer and wine” (T. Iliff, personal communication,
May 27, 2010). “The beer vending machine was still there in the canteen, but you couldn’t bring
it to your desk anymore” (J. Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010). A new
American hire recalled, “I did find it pretty weird, . . . that just before I got there, they had banned
actual drinking at your desk. And they were no longer serving in the cafeteria.” He’d arrive for an
8 a.m. shift and visit the men’s room, where he’d hear the tops being popped from beer bottles in
other stalls (S. Herron, personal communication, November 22, 2010). “There were still fights,
but they took longer to develop. They were fighting over stuff that happened in the 17th Century.
These folks had way too long a memory” (T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010).
The significance of noting the sometimes intense ethnic and national rivalries among BD
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clients was this: the CN reported and rewrote stories for a single internal news wire that was
distributed to, and had to be acceptable to and usable by, all language services. Language service
editors felt that Western journalists did not understand fully the history of their nations and
peoples. Lack of knowledge – particularly historical knowledge -- of the nations to which
RFE/RL broadcast, was a deficit for many journalists on joining the CN. They found themselves
habitually double-checking copy.
If it said something like, ‘first time ever’, you just knew that there was more than a 50-50
chance that it wasn’t right. . . . In that building, ‘first time ever’ would be shot down in a
matter of minutes. You’d get this from the language service people; you’d get a call . . .
to put out a correction. (J. Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010)
In addition, stylistic givens from prior reporting posts were no longer viable at RFE. For example,
the choice of names in English language news copy for cities, towns, rivers and regions that had
been traded historically among nations represented by the BDs could carry historical as well as
contemporary political meanings. Journalists had to adjust to the CN’s own stylebook, evolved
over decades of interaction with the BDs. Language services personnel also felt that Western
journalists lacked an understanding of life in totalitarian states and the urgency of reporting
particular kinds of news (see Chapter 4). They objected to CN delays in releasing stories awaiting
a second source -- “a matcher” --, while the CN took extraordinary care to ensure accuracy in part
as a check on political passions that might trump journalistic caution in the BDs.
But in general, BD journalists had a positive view of the CN news file and the
responsiveness of the CN to corrections related to cultural and historical points. And BD and CN
journalists consulted with and learned from one another. Some CN and BD employees forged
friendships; however, most were not – with notable exceptions – regularly social outside the
workplace. (See Chapter Four for more on relations between groups of journalists).

Relationships with the Western press
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RFE’s lack of status as an organization representative of a sovereign state posed
credentialing and access problems in reporting venues. The Western press sometimes dismissed
RFE journalists, denying them accreditation or refusing to sell wire service subscription, at least
on an official organizational level. At other times, there was organization-to-organization
assistance. However, at the reporter-to-reporter level, there was often collegial exchange, with
mutual benefits for both parties.
In the early 1980s, years after RFE and RL’s CIA connections were officially severed
and Congressional funding and governance by an “independent” Board of International
Broadcasting (BIB) were instituted, Frank Shakespeare, Chairman of the BIB and former RKO
and CBS Radio executive, complained that American journalists assumed that RFE/RL's
association with government made it not a producer of news but a "propaganda organization"
(Shakespeare, 1986, p. 61) and that during interviews about RFE during the 1980s, journalists
asked him only about propaganda and government interference.
Shakespeare’s complaints were linked to the American press’s refusal (for a time) to
accredit the CN’s Washington, D.C. bureau reporters to cover the proceedings of the U.S. Senate.
He noted that when challenged, representatives of CBS, U.S. News & World Report and the AP
testified in a U.S. Senate rules committee hearing, "that under no circumstances should we even
sit in the gallery with representatives of these organizations" (Shakespeare, 1986, p. 60). At the
same time, the press association credentialed reporters from TASS, the Soviet Union’s
government-controlled news agency. The difference being that TASS was an official press
representative of a sovereign nation, as per Helsinki, a status that RFE, as a surrogate press
broadcasting clandestinely over the borders into totalitarian states, did not possess. On the other
hand, the CN’s Washington, D.C. bureau reporters encountered no resistance gaining credentials
to White House news conferences (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 7, 2012).
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Aside from intermittent problems with accreditation by the U.S. press on U.S. soil, RFE
had greater challenges reporting particular kinds of international events that required
accreditation for entry, such as the Olympic Games or press events when communist leaders met
with the leaders of nations in the West. Some journalists working in the CN’s European bureaus
found themselves reporting the same events and venues as representatives of the communist press
from target states. Former London bureau chief Stuart Parrott recalled that at press events,
members of the communist press harassed CN journalists with hissing and shouts of “provocatsi”
(S. Parrott, personal communication, July 28, 2005). Michael Wall, as Bonn bureau chief, had
been denied – officially -- credentials by Yugoslavian communist officials hosting a briefing by a
Central European dignitary in Bonn, but the same officials then admitted him to the room without
credentials. Wall interpreted this as a ploy, “So they could tell the Soviets, ‘We didn’t accredit
him’” (personal communication, August 23, 2006). During the early stages of talks on German
reunification, Wall could not gain admittance to a press conference held jointly by an East
German official and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. But Kohl’s spokesman asked Wall
for his tape recorder, carried it into the meeting, and “basically, recorded his own briefing” for
RFE (M. Wall, personal communication, August 23, 2006).
Struggles with successive International Olympic Committees to obtain official press
accreditation when Games were held in the West, including in the U.S., and to retain
accreditation once it was awarded, in the face of objections from communist states, recurred
throughout RFE’s history (Johnson, 2010). For instance, the American press tried to deny RFE
journalists accreditation to cover Olympic Games in the U.S. (S. Parrott, personal
communication, July 28, 2005). When CN deputy news director Griffiths attempted to arrange
accreditation for RFE reporters in advance of the 1968 Olympics in Mexico City, the IOC’s local
Mexican organizing committee denied his requests. Individual UPI reporters “gave me all the
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help they could,” but RFE was unable to obtain full accreditation (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, August 7, 2012).
We had accreditation to the main press center (where we could watch TV and the
agencies and write in our little cubicles). I tried almost daily to get accreditation to the
press facilities in the stadiums but always got a Soviet-inspired ‘momentito senor’ [sic].
So we had to buy tickets and sit in the crowds. We were filing over the UPI wire, that is,
we had a deal with UPI that they would transmit our stories to RFE in New York (B.
Griffiths, personal communication, August 12, 2012).
We were blocked out by the Russians. I got so tired of hearing 'momentito senor' [sic]
every day. (But I did manage to get to, and record, Vera Csaslavka's wedding in the
Czech embassy -- with a microphone clearly labeled RFE -- and the Mexico cathedral,
which I considered a thumb in everybody's eye. (B. Griffiths, personal communication,
May 1, 2011)
CN journalists received other help from Western journalists covering the Olympics in Mexico
City; however, Griffiths said, after detailing the specifics of the “help” he received, “I wouldn’t
want to put that help on paper” (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 12, 2012). In the
end, RFE journalists resorted to reporting much of the Mexico City games from among the
spectators.
The same reporting-from-the-bleachers plan was laid prior to the 1972 Olympic games,
when the venue was Munich, RFE’s home city. RFE management continually worried about the
status of RFE and its broadcasting license relative to German domestic politics. RFE’s presence
complicated Germany’s diplomatic relations with nations targeted for broadcast, and The Radios
were periodically made an issue by German politicians.
[T[here was pressure from the Soviets for Munich to do something about RFE – a threat
to boycott the Olympics, a demand that we be shut down or barred from the games . . . .
A segment on a Soviet TV program filmed the RFE building through two wire mesh
fences surrounding a neighboring tennis court, making it look as if the building was
behind barbed wire. One expected to see dogs and guards with machine guns. This was
picked up by German TV. The main Munich newspaper, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung,
which was not a friend of the radios, responded to the controversy by translating and
publishing without comment an entire day’s newscasts of the Polish BD. The point was
to let people read and judge these ‘propaganda’ newscasts for themselves. It was a
brilliant idea. The Polish BD looked very good, and so did we. (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, August 7, 2012)
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Martin Bachstein, former director of broadcast analysis, recalled the extraordinary lengths to
which RFE went to ensure coverage of the Munich Games in the event that accreditation was not
awarded, and given “the negative environment we had to operate in at the time.”
In 1971/1972 RFE was in a difficult situation because even our political friends in
Germany would not want the radios to become the reason for a possible boycott by the
countries in the orbit of the USSR of the summer Olympic Games in Munich. Ernie
Langendorf and I also felt that Willy Daume, then head of the Olympic organizing
committee and the highest-ranking German representative in the Olympic movement
(who did not seem to like RFE anyway), was only looking for an opportunity to openly
join the chorus of those who were in favor of RFE suspending its broadcasts during the
Games.
In case we were only to be refused accreditation, we set up an emergency studio
in the warehouse of a moving company that had been doing business with RFE for a
number of years, located within walking distance of the Olympic stadium. This was to the
place from where our journalists, who were to have entered the sports arenas as regular
visitors, could transmit their tapes to the main building at Englischer Garten. (M.
Bachstein, personal communication, April 30, 2011)
Western reporters, including especially Americans, assigned to cover East-Central
European and Soviet beats by mainstream news organizations, frequented RFE’s headquarters in
Munich. They visited the Research and Analysis Department, the language services and the CN.
They also frequented CN bureaus in European capitals (Brown, 2005; S. Parrott, personal
communication, July 28, 2005; C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005; M. Wall,
personal communication, August 23, 2006). Both Western reporters and RFE employees gained
from such associations.
Reporters from mainstream Western news organizations, unlike RFE’s journalists, could
gain access to Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. In some cases, mutual
exchanges of information occurred. In August 1965, during a period of Cold War consensus in
the U.S. press, an RFE memo documented a Christian Science Monitor reporter passing on
comments by Romanian officials in Bucharest regarding intent to invite RFE reporters to cover
the Communist Party Congress.
Earl Foell, UN correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor, has just returned from
an extended trip to Europe and Africa, including stops in Bucharest, Budapest and
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Prague. He covered the Rumanian Communist Party Congress. In that capacity, he had . .
. contact with Rumanian Foreign Ministry and the Presidency.
He tells me that these officials had told him that the Government had recently
come to the decision to invite two representatives of RFE -- presumably one reporter and
one photographer -- to cover the Party Congress. It was Foell's 'impression' or his 'best
recollection' that for some technical reason no one spelled out to him, the alleged
invitation was not actually dispatched, . . . not directly. But the officials insisted that
Radio Free Europe (and they specifically spoke of RFE, rather than USIA, VOA or any
other western organization) was not excluded from 'normal journalistic functions' in
Rumania, presumably also in the post-Congress era.
Foell checked this claim with resident western correspondents, or those who
come to Bucharest quite often, and they confirmed the story, saying they were told about
it by fairly high Rumanian officials. Among them, Foell says, was Binder of New York
Times.
Foell also had an informal talk in Prague with U.S. Ambassador Outerbridge
Horsey on his impressions regarding liberalization processes in Czechoslovakia. Today
was his first day back at the U.N. desk, so his remarks were sketchy. But we have a
tentative luncheon date later this week to cover his impressions in more detail. (Endrst,
1965)
Foell’s information was forwarded via memo to RFE American policy management. American
management followed up with a discussion of who might be sent to Bucharest. Ultimately, no
reporter was sent.
Mainstream Western news organizations assigning journalists to East-Central European
beats did not have the resources to conduct the kind of ongoing in-depth investigative research,
breadth of media monitoring, and deeply networked source and fact-checking capabilities present
across departments at RFE in Munich. Western reporters had access on request to RFE’s situation
reports tracking domestic conditions, including analyses of government leadership changes, status
reports on dissident groups and samizdat, and reports in which communist government-issued
information was adjusted toward accuracy by RFE-associated economists, demographers and
other country experts. “Journalists going to or coming from Eastern Europe used to call in at RFE
to pick the brains of the researchers and pick up research reports” (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, August 7, 2012).
Western news organizations and journalists mined RFE in other ways. A 1987 memo
reveals journalist-to-journalist cooperation, but also organization-to-organization resource
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leveraging. UPI had hired a former CN editor. News director James Edwards asked language
service directors to offer suggestions for coverage:
An ex-CND-man, Jay Ross is the new Foreign Editor of UPI. He wants some fresh ideas
for Soviet and East European coverage. If you or your department have any requests,
suggestions or complaints on UPI coverage, I’ll pass them on. (Edwards, 1987)
CN journalists were aware of the assumption of taint by journalists unfamiliar with RFE itself;
however, CN journalists did not perceives themselves or their practice as tainted, and news
organizations and journalists familiar with RFE and CN practice saw value.
American reporter David Halberstam, briefly during the 1960s was Warsaw
correspondent for The New York Times, and was familiar with the quality of the CN news file
both as a listener to RFE in Poland and as a visitor to the CN (G. Mater, personal communication,
August 28, 2006). In late December, 1965, Polish officials expelled Halberstam for writing about
“the economic frustration of the Polish people” (Puddington, 2000, p. 206). The day of
Halberstam’s expulsion from Warsaw, the CN issued his offending story to the BDs. Years later,
in 1973, during U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on RFE and RL led by Sen. J.
William Fulbright, whose intent was to close The Radios, Halberstam defended RFE and its value
to listeners I Poland, equating its news performance to that of The New York Times (Puddington,
2000, p. 206).
During the same period of Congressional and U.S. political scrutiny of RFE, Henry
Kamm, a reporter who covered an East-Central European beat for The New York Times, and who
frequented the RFE’s Research and Analysis Department and the CN (N. Kingsley, personal
communication, April 22, 2007), wrote a story describing the CN’s operations as similar to any
Western newsroom (Kamm, 1972). As will be noted here in Chapter 6, in 1984, an American
reporter for The New York Times helped the CN defend practice by investigating a tip from a CN
reporter (Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 23, 2009) on an attempt

200

by RFE’s new American management to interfere with the content of the CN A-wire during the
first Reagan administration (Bodin, 1984).
While journalist-to-journalist relations were good between the CN and Westerners who
had experienced the difficulties of covering East-Central Europe, relationships with Western wire
services were mixed. During the 1980s, when a reporter for the American-run Associated Press
(AP) working in the Los Angeles bureau informed a boss about leaving for RFE, the boss replied,
“Oh, you’re going to work for the spies” (Anonymous CN journalist, November 23, 20012). One
reporter, on leaving an AP bureau in another U.S. city during the same decade, had a conversation
with an editor. “He said something that indicated that if I ever wanted to come back to AP,
[working at RFE] would not rule me out” (M. Revzin, personal communication, November 29,
2010).
On the organizational level, the AP long refused to sell RFE a subscription to its news
service (M. Wall, personal communication, August 23, 2006). Instead, the CN “stole it” (B.
Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005). “We were stealing it off the radio ether” (M.
Wall, personal communication, August 23, 2006); RFE electronically monitored the AP’s
radiocast to Africa (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 7, 2012). The CN’s Central
Monitoring Desk (CMD) featured 15 or so machines churning paper printouts of monitored
media content from the communist world -- and the AP. When a visiting journalist or an
American congressman on an official tour passed through the newsroom, CN editors turned off
the AP printer (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006). Paradoxically, assistant
news director Larry McCoy recalled mutual assistance from individual journalists at the AP.
While AP wouldn’t sell its wire to us, we did have contact with AP. I established a phone
relationship with Robert Reid in Bonn. . . . I would call him if we had only one source for
a story, say UPI or Reuter, and ask him if AP had that story. In return, I provided AP tips
on what their competition had. I remember the day AFP reported that there were Soviet
tanks in the streets of Kabul. No one else had it. I called AP, passed on the word and was
thanked. (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 15, 2012)
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The CN’s relationship with Reuters was mutually beneficial. To enforce its requirement
for two sources on important stories (see Chapter 6), CN editors often telephoned news agencies
to ensure that a single common source; e.g. the same citizen or purported freelancer, had not been
used for similar stories issued by Western wire services. During Kingsley’s tenure and news
director during the mid-1960s through the late 1970s, Reuters assisted the CN’s efforts to verify
that a “matcher” constituted a second independent source, “more than any other” news service (N.
Kingsley, personal communication, September 28, 2006). According to two CN research
participants who did not wish attribution by name for indicting a news service, Reuters, also, for
years, had a loose agreement with the CN going in the other direction -- to receive content from a
few media sources monitored on the CMD. RFE operated a monitoring station in Schlessheim,
West Germany that relayed, among other things, state media content from East-Central Europe
(Radio Prague, e.g.) and the USSR to the CMD in Munich. Some of this content was otherwise
unavailable to Reuters. The agreement was that “Reuters . . . will use what RFE gives them as
‘monitored in West Germany’ but without saying that they got it from The Radios. This was
negotiated with Nat Kingsley and [deputy news director and previous London bureau chief] Tom
Bodin.”
Given the testimony of Western reporters in U.S. Senate hearings on RFE, Western press
officials certainly were aware that some of RFE’s work informed Western reporting. And, clearly,
there is a gulf between the official stance of the Western press toward RFE as a propaganda
organization and the trust and testimony of individual Western journalists who were familiar with
RFE, between assumptions made from a distance, and what working Western journalists knew of
the CN’s journalists, news practices and resources at the time.
Despite the professional taint assigned to working for a government-sponsored news
organization, CN journalists neither felt tainted themselves nor regretted their life’s work at RFE.
Former deputy news director Griffiths dismissed the role of hero, “We were not . . . white
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knights,” while summing the assertions of CN journalists interviewed for this study: “We were all
in it together, and god-dammit we did something” (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13,
2005).
In sum, like exiles on the language desks, as noted in the previous chapter, CN
journalists, too, were conscious of the suspicion of taint at “home”; for CN journalists, “home”
was Western journalism. Even as CN managers struggled to maintain decision-making autonomy
by shielding the newsroom from the influence of American management and policy officials (B.
Griffiths, personal communication, July 12, 2005; N. Kingsley, personal communication,
September 28, 2006), and even as journalists aware of the risk of taint by RFE’s association with
government tried to “work harder, faster”, instituting more stringent controls for accuracy and
other aspects of news work, as will be shown in the next chapter, the perception of taint played
out in an official way in the CN’s interactions with the Western press.
RFE’s outlier positioning sometimes played a role, too, in the careers of individual
journalists after they left RFE. In general, journalists from Commonwealth nations did not report
negative effects of RFE employment on their careers. However, work at RFE adversely affected
American journalists during earlier decades. Some Americans who worked in the CN during the
1960s and 1970s reported having been turned down for journalism jobs on their return to the U.S.
Nathan Kingsley, who led the CN from the late 1960s through the early 1970s, was a finalist for
the position of international editor at The Washington Post. He recalled being told that in the end,
he had been denied that position specifically because of having worked at RFE (N. Kingsley,
personal communication, September 28, 2006). It was a blow to his journalism career.
Others, returning to the U.S. a decade or more between 1960s revelations of RFE’s CIA
connection and 1980s and 1990s job searches, found no such resistance. McCoy moved from
CBS News to RFE and back again.
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I never felt ‘tainted’ working at RFE nor afterwards. . . . I worked at RFE in two spurts.
After being there for about two and a half years, we returned to the States, and I was
quickly hired by CBS News. Never was there a conversation about my being tainted or
damaged goods. I left CBS News as a writer and returned to RFE for another seven and a
half years. After we made the decision to return home, I got on the phone from Munich
and was rehired by CBS News. This time as an editor, a promotion. I don’t call that being
tainted. I worked at CBS News from 1980s to 1998 when my contract wasn’t renewed.
After a year of loafing, I then went to Dow Jones Newswires, where, again, there was no
conversation about my being tainted. (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 13,
2012)
After the end of the Cold War, a few American journalists who left the CN during the
1990s returned to the U.S. and found work in international broadcasting at the VOA (e.g. Alex
Belida, Gary Thatcher) (Eggleston, personal communication, 2011; G. Thatcher, personal
communication, 2006). A few found work in mainstream news organizations like public
television (J. Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010), CBS and the Dow Jones
wire (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006) and CNN (S. Herron, personal
communication, November 22, 2010; T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010; D.
Williams, personal communication, December 9, 2010).
CNN in particular was a destination for former CN journalists following the revolutions
of 1989-90 and during the paring down of the CN during the early 1990s.
I knew others at CNN, [one CN editor] had been the first RFE person to go, then Ted
[Iliff], then me, then Dan [Williams], then Mike Revzin. Mike had been Beijing bureau
correspondent when I was at RFE; I never met Mike till I got to Atlanta. . . . We were
kind of expats who were guaranteed jobs. (S. Herron, personal communication,
November 22, 2010)
Being “guaranteed jobs” referred to what other research participants described as CNN’s need for
American staff with the kinds of international newsroom experience and in-depth knowledge of
other parts of the world that were typical of journalists in the CN but atypical of American
journalists in general.
I felt that finding a journalism job after working for RFE was difficult, but not necessarily
because of a stigma. Instead, it was because newspaper editors, for example, did not
know what my RFE work involved. If I had spent six years at a newspaper, instead of six
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years at RFE, it would have been easier to convince them that I had experience that was
relevant to job openings at their papers.
I ended up being hired by CNN. I can think of about six former RFE journalists
who worked for CNN. CNN had one of the few U.S.-based newsrooms that did a lot of
foreign news, and where our knowledge of international events was valued. (M. Revzin,
personal communication, November 29, 2010)
Dan Williams “went to CNN . . . and then he brought a lot of former RFE people into CNN”
(Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 23, 2010). Others who went to
CNN included Jeff Ofgang, Jerry Goggin, Ron Loggins, and Headline News journalist Kathleen
Saal (T. Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010; M. Revzin, personal communication,
November 29, 2010; K. Saal, personal communication, November 21, 2010).
Journalists from Commonwealth nations found work in mainstream international,
national and local news organizations (R. Eggleston, personal communication, January 4, 2011;
S. Parrott, personal communication, July 28, 2005). And like journalists in general, some
journalists who left the CN during the 1980s and 1990s did not continue to work in news.
Subsequent careers include novelist, minister, fundraiser and international travel organizer. Some
continued to work in the wider media industry, as freelance contractors (e.g., S. Parrott, personal
communication, July 28, 2005) or business owners.

The end of the Central Newsroom in Munich
Journalists who remained at RFE for long periods report being “caught up” (B. Griffiths,
personal communication, July 13, 2005) in RFE’s mission. Being “caught up in the mission” is
characterized by other CN journalists (R. Eggleston, personal communication, January 4, 2011;
L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006; S. Parrott, personal communication, July
28, 2005; M. Wall, personal communication, August 23, 2006) not in relation to American policy
but as an affinity for journalism that mattered to its audiences, that entailed urgency and assigned
gravity to routine decision-making about news content, including selection, sourcing and
accuracy.
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CN journalists had inklings that their brand of frontline, wartime journalism-thatmattered might be coming to an end as target states’ jamming of RFE broadcasts waned during
the late 1980s. In the CN’s two-person London bureau, Hamman and Parrott, who had been
among the first to prepare health precautions for broadcast following the Chernobyl nuclear
disaster, received the news that the Hungarian government had halted signal jamming of RFE
during the late 1980s.
It was sad toward the end. I knew it was time to leave when the Hungarians stopped
jamming us. When they stopped, Stuart and I sort of looked at each other, and didn’t say
anything, . . . because it’s obvious . . . . We were pleased, but at the same time, we said,
‘Ah, shit!’ (H. Hamman, personal communication, November 24, 2010)
Yet, CN journalists’ distance from listeners was evident when mass movements toward
regime changes began to intensify, and newsroom workers were surprised. A CN editor recalled
covering the fall of the Berlin Wall. During the Fall of 1989, East Germans had taken refuge in
embassies in Prague and other cities in East-Central European nations, and had staged massive
demonstrations in Leipzig, Dresden and East Berlin. On November 9, the CN editor attended a
press conference during which Gunter Schabowski, East German politburo member and
spokesman, was handed a piece of paper. Schakowsky announced that citizens would be
permitted to travel. At that time, “it was very complicated to get a travel visa to the West.”
We were all in the room, watching this. So I went back to my hotel, and I filed my report,
which said something like, ‘expect to see huge lines at [police] stations [tomorrow].’
I filed my last story that day at 11 pm, and went to bed. About an hour later, I was in [a]
hotel . . . not far from Checkpoint Charlie. . . . I’m hearing all of these horns honking.
And I remember looking out the window. I see all of these people, and I grabbed my
book and recorder and ran out. I could see a huge flow of traffic coming from [East
Berlin through] Checkpoint Charlie [into West Berlin]. So I spent the rest of the night
interviewing people, covering the fall of the Wall.
East German border guards, they were all poker-faced, sort of looking at each other, just
letting people stream out. . . . [N]ot to make a pun, but – there was a wall of humanity
just pouring forth from the other side. And there was absolutely nothing they could do
about it. (Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 12, 2010)
“Anyone who says they saw that coming, don’t believe them. None of us saw that coming”
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(Anonymous CN journalist, personal communication, November 12, 2010).
During the following weeks, as demonstrations and revolutions erupted in RFE’s
broadcasting areas in East-Central Europe, CN journalists were finding it difficult to be away
from the newsroom and came to work during their off-hours. Interviewees for this study agreed
that the consensus in the CN at the time had been that although other nations were in the process
of toppling communist regimes, Romania would be the exception. Journalists wagered that
Ceausescu would not fall (e.g. R. Eggleston, personal communication, May 1, 2011). The CN
editor who had been traveling back and forth from Munich to West Berlin during the events of
October and November took time off to ski.
It was mid-December, and the [Berlin] Wall had fallen, and Prague had fallen. It was just
incredible. I was sitting at dinner where we’d been skiing with some other RFE people. It
was someone from Ukrainian service . . . and . . . the number two guy in the Romanian
Service. And we were all sort of dumbfounded at the speed of events. We all said,
‘Romilo,’ – that was the guy from the Romanian Service, -- ‘Never mind, we all know
Ceausescu is not going anywhere. There will always be a Radio Free Romania.’ So, I
walk into the newsroom in Munich after a week away, and Barry Griffiths says, ‘Sit
down! They just lined Ceausescu up against the wall!’ (Anonymous CN journalist,
personal communication, November 12, 2012)
RFE’s popularity and credibility came to be known to CN journalists in profound ways
during and after the revolutions of 1989-90. CN and BD reporters would gain regular access to
broadcasting territories. Michael Wall was particularly proud to have been the first CN
correspondent allowed into some of the East-Central European capitals (personal communication,
August 23, 2006). Roley Eggleston went to Bucharest during the revolution. When he identified
himself, there was a shout: “’Radio Free Europe is here!’” However, he was soon led behind a
large building to witness the execution of a man who had betrayed the revolutionary cause the
day before (R. Eggleston, personal communication, May 1, 2011). The CN’s lack of access to
audience feedback, its distance from listeners, had disappeared.
The Cold War newsroom’s battlefront position also disappeared. CN journalists were,
during their last years in Munich, embedded instead in a period in which they served BDs
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reporting on the disintegration of the Soviet Union and government transitions across RFE/RL
broadcasting areas. An entrepreneurial domestic press developed on Western models in transition
states meant that RFE had competition. Some of the tenets of the CN’s hybrid, hyper-vigilant
practice, a practice forged in a standoff with totalitarian regimes, would be challenged.
In addition, the US Congress debated whether the mission of the radios remained viable
for populations in fledgling democracies in broadcast areas raised the possibility that RFE would
cease to exist. Uncertainty about future employment led many CN journalists to retire or to seek
work in other news organizations. By the time Congress approved a reduction in RFE/RL’s
budget and a move from Munich to a less costly headquarters in Prague, along with plans for
closing some of the original language services, American journalists again constituted a majority
in the CN (D. Williams, personal communication, December 9, 2010). And, by the time Kathleen
Saal transmitted the CN’s last brief to the BDs in Munich on June 30, 1995 (K. Saal, personal
communication, November 21, 2010), the newsroom had lost many of its longest-tenured
journalists, including much of its Commonwealth nations staff, to retirement or dispersal to other
nations. While a few CN journalists followed the organization to Prague, many of its more recent
American hires found work in American media. The post-Cold War Prague-based CN would be a
different journalistic organization; thus, the CN described here does not apply to operations in
Prague.
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CHAPTER 6: CENTRAL NEWSROOM PRACTICE (PART II)
Radio Free Europe’s Central Newsroom (CN) served as an internal news wire service for
the East-Central European language broadcast services, referred to as broadcast desks (BDs). The
CN delivered a continuous flow of news, in English, to assist the BDs in the preparation of
broadcast programming in six languages to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and
Bulgaria for the duration of the Cold War. The Munich newsroom and its bureaus, staffed by
experienced journalists from primarily Western democracies, produced a continuous, around-theclock flow of news, features, commentary, and background information and news updates.
Following the 1976 merger of RFE and Radio Liberty (RL) to form Radio Free Europe/Radio
Liberty (RFE/RL), the CN was given divisional status and served the BDs of both organizations.
By 1988, RFE/RL’s internal wire service was issuing news 24 hours a day to 21 radio services
broadcasting in 23 languages (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988,
p. 5).
RFE’s stated intent was to practice journalism “on the American model” (Gene Mater,
personal communication, August 28, 2006). The specifics of that model are never defined at RFE
beyond concepts common to talk about Western journalism in general – accuracy, balance,
credibility and the required autonomy bestowed by a partition between owners and journalists;
however, the mandate to practice journalism American-style was understood not only by CN
employees through the organization’s history in Munich, but by American management and the
BDs as well (e.g. Ted Iliff, personal communication, May 27, 2010; G. Mater, personal
communication, August 28, 2006; James F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005;
Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005). As outlined in Chapter 1 of this study, a
mandate to practice on the American model posed a paradox for CN journalists and their practice.
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RFE journalists and broadcasters arrived with a disparate mix of journalism training and
experience in different nations, different media systems. American style practice was to be
constructed and performed in the CN by Western journalists working in an organization whose
very structure violated the norms of not only an American model but also of journalism in
Western democracies in general. As noted in Chapter 5, for most of RFE’s history in Munich, the
majority of CN journalists were not Americans and did not have American news organization
experience. The CN’s client journalists in the radio broadcasting services, especially during
RFE’s early decades, learned what they knew about doing journalism and being journalists on the
job. The CN would have to corral the practice of its own mix of journalists – a majority of
Westerners and a small minority of East-Central Europeans. It also would have to perform a
modeling function as a surrogate free press both inside RFE for journalists in the BDs, and
outside RFE for listeners. A hybrid American-European practice would emerge in the CN, one
that was unique and peculiar to the contexts of RFE, its mission and organizational structure, and
one that would vie with the authenticity priorities of language service practitioners within RFE.
What did the Munich CN’s unique, hybrid and hyper-vigilant practice look like? For
Western journalists, the risks that flawed practice posed for the CN’s internal clients, the
language broadcasting services, and for its ultimate clients, radio listeners in East-Central Europe,
were critical considerations. The accuracy and, in turn, the credibility, of news at the top of each
broadcast hour, as selected from the CN file and then translated, edited and broadcast by editors
in the BDs, set the journalistic stage for the 50 minutes of émigré programming that followed.
Those 50 minutes of programming also drew on sections of the CN’s news budget. The CN was
to provide credible news to listeners in totalitarian states who risked sanctions in order to listen,
and for whom news was “in some cases a matter of life and death to find out what was going on
in their own countries” (Anonymous CN journalist, November 28, 2010). An inaccuracy in the
file -- news later proved to be false or a plant by “the other side” (B. Griffiths, personal
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communication, July 13, 2005) -- might be repeated to others, or worse, might cause listeners to
react publicly, to make themselves vulnerable to authorities.
The CN practice manual of 1972 contains an introductory essay written by CN director
Nathan Kingsley that strikes an heroic tone: “You stand between a mass of undigested fact,
rumor, misinformation, provocative error and the ear of the listener” (Kingsley, 1972, p. 11). The
CN’s task was to model the Western ideal – at RFE , that meant primarily ensuring accuracy and
protecting the news file from production contexts through its journey to the BDs and ultimately to
listeners. Long-time deputy news director Barry Griffiths maintained: “I was doing my damndest
to give these [broadcasting] desks what I thought they needed or what they told me they needed. .
. . We were a service unit” (personal communication, July 13, 2005).
Editors in the CN kept in mind not only the needs of the CN’s clients, including the
modeling function represented in accurate, “straight news”, but also the humanitarian reasons for
their own participation as Western journalists at RFE (see Chapter 5).
I bought into what we said this should be: the radio news that these people would be able
to hear if they had a free media. In a way that was artificial, because if they had a free
media, they wouldn’t have a lot of the issues we were writing about. But I thought,
‘everyone needs a free press and we’re gonna give it to them good and hard.’ (D.
Williams, personal communication, November 9, 2010)
American foreign policy was not a conscious concern in daily newsroom practice, but RFE
internal policies by extension permitted Western journalists to fulfill goals of providing
information -- the production of “straight news”.
I was just trying to turn out stories that were straight news. . . . We were not writing
scripts for the air. We were writing stories from which scripts would be written for air. I
saw myself as writing straight news, sending information to people with little radios, and
that serves . . . the broad interests of the world -- that people have access to straight news.
Although I never gave U.S. foreign policy a thought, I now have a better understanding
of what that policy is, and part of what policy did at RFE was to give people free reign to
do journalism. (S. Herron, personal communication, November 22, 2010)
But however much RFE offered journalists a chance to perform humanitarian work, and
however much the news file served as “straight news”, as a model of Western practice, and as a
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credibility anchor for broadcast service programming, what the broadcasts desk clients “needed”
was part and parcel of an overall political project. It is to doing journalism, the production of the
news file, and to a position of practice that lay somewhere, like all journalisms, in the gap
between two polar positions -- an unthinking group of automatons working in the interests of
hegemony, of power and organizational “owners”, and the individual journalistic hero working on
behalf of humanity -- that this study now turns.
Absent an assumption of legitimacy granted by the normative structure of mainstream
Western journalism organizations, CN journalists had to establish themselves as journalists in
good standing through their everyday practice. The exile position of CN journalists -- working in
contexts described in Chapter 1, in an organization that violated the structurally sanctioned world
of being journalists and doing journalism in the West, made adherence to journalistic practice
ideals more urgent, and made CN journalists and their practice hyper-vigilant. It also made
constructing an approximation of a firewall between the CN and American officials and the CN
and the BDs a necessary act of fealty – to professional, individual and cultural authenticity.
CN journalists authenticated themselves as practitioners in good standing via intensified
attention to newsroom autonomy, accuracy, balance, and credibility. They tried to construct and
maintain an internal wire service content wary of sourcing and watchful for errors, intentional
falsehoods, and invented news, and to partition the autonomy of CN decision-making about what
was news and the integrity of the news file from the policy and politics of American officials at
RFE and in Washington, D.C., and East-Central Europeans in the BDs. As one CN deputy noted,
“There was a spirit, and when there were people who had their own ideas about what RFE should
be doing, this spirit stood up to them” (B. Griffiths, personal interview, 13 July 2005).
However, the fact – and paradox -- of RFE’s U.S. government sponsorship remains, and
the struggle to establish the CN as worthy of the term journalism lie in the details of constructing
and maintaining practice. Zelizer (2005), in a study of journalists embedded with military units,
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describes a culture of journalism where adaptations of practice push the boundaries of
professional norms in “alternative venues”:
Not only did a very small percentage of journalists become embeds, but a focus on
professionalism failed to predict the messiness that forced other changes and adaptations
in journalism's practice as the war ensued. Such changes and adaptations were key to
considering journalism as a culture. In fact, it was as a culture--through a shared reliance
on meanings, rituals, conventions, symbol systems and consensual understandings--that
much of the coverage took shape. Journalists struggled to make sense of the war in ways
far broader than the guidelines offered by professionalism. (p. 201)
Journalists in the CN worked in such an alternative venue, on the front lines of a Cold War and
beyond the borders of sanctioned practice in an organization with a mission far different from
those of other Western news organizations. The contexts were messy, but the practice constructed
and refined over time was, in reaction, decidedly un-messy; it was hyper-vigilant, as one CN
journalist recalled:
This is a comparison I want to be sure is clear. I’d worked in a half-dozen local
newsrooms [in the U.S.], but when I was in . . . RFE in central news, they were at least as
objective and actually had higher journalism standards than most places I had worked in
commercial news. That surprised me, and pleased me, because they had a reputation of
being propaganda. . . . But it felt like a completely neutral newsroom. (Anonymous CN
journalist, November 28, 2010)

Central Newsroom: Structure and function
RFE created a central news operation—an internal wire service--of necessity. No existing
agency in the West could supply the news needs of language broadcast desks that intended to
fulfill RFE’s experimental mission as a surrogate free press for populations in East-Central
Europe Like any 20th Century news service, the CN issued a news budget for clients. The CN’s
clients were the BDs, six semi-autonomous broadcasting units staffed and led primarily by
émigrés from the five target nations (the Czechoslovak service consisting of two semiautonomous language desks, one Czech and one Slovak). The CN’s news file was intended to be
more inclusive globally, carrying news of Western democracies, but especially domestically, with
news of developments inside target nations. It would also contribute material that helped enable
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an important cross-reporting function that linked developments across the broadcasting areas.
Neither the journalists in the CN or the BDs had reportorial access to RFE’s broadcasting
territories until very late during RFE’s 44-year tenure in Munich. The CN had almost no access to
audiences who heard stories drawn from its news file by the BDs. However, RFE journalists
cultivated relationships with Western journalists who did have access to Warsaw, Prague,
Bratislava, Budapest, Bucharest, and Sofia. And RFE itself was a “building full of experts” (J.
Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010) in the persons of the exile staffs of the
BDs and the academics and area specialists of the Research and Analysis Department (RAD).
CN journalists were conscious that competition played a role in each client radio’s goal
of serving as a “home” news service. The CN supplied all language services with current news of
the world, in particular of the West and of target broadcast areas, including developments in
diplomacy and dissent, in a combination that no existing external wire service could match.
Competition included domestic state-controlled media inside communist nations and also other
Western international broadcasters; e.g. the BBC World Service’s broadcasts in Czech, Polish
and other languages (see Chapter 1). CN journalists wanted to issue news that was more
comprehensive and accurate than that provided by either communist state-controlled media or
Western broadcasters alone. The CN file allowed more robust cross-reporting than was present in
the communist press or in the services of other Western broadcasters, taking pains to unite
listeners in broadcast areas through knowledge of one another, a function that served policy goals
of pan-Europeanism. CN practice combined flows of news, West and East, interrogating both for
accuracy, adding original reporting by CN and BD journalists in CN bureaus and compiling
special news and feature packages that gave listeners broader knowledge of their own region.
To construct and maintain such a wire service required access to a mix of global news
sources, concentrating on Cold War nations arrayed East and West. At its most robust period
during the 1970s and 1980s, the CN drew on 20-30 news agency feeds daily. The newsroom had
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access to leading Western news services, including e.g., Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP),
Deutsche Press Agentur (DPA), United Press International (UPI), and the Associated Press (AP),
combined with major Western publications; e.g. in Germany, the UK, and U.S., including The
New York Times, The Washington Post and the Los Angeles Times. In 1987, for example, the
German press subscribed to and screened in the CN included 20 newspapers and news magazines;
these publications were accessible not only in the CN in Munich, but also in its bureaus and
across the language services (Vaslef & RL Department Heads, 1987).
In addition, the CN’s Central Monitoring Desk (CMD) monitored and translated content
from Soviet and East/Central European news agencies and from state broadcast and print news
media -- RFE's domestic competition. The CN monitored, and later purchased subscriptions to,
state news services of the communist world, including the Soviet Union’s TASS (in Russian and
English) and the services of each of the nations targeted for broadcast. The CMD was staffed by
up to ten language-proficient journalists, including German, French and East-Central European
staff, who translated content from (East) German, Bulgarian, Czech, Slovak, Polish, Hungarian
and Romanian language media and compiled relevant information in “Central Monitoring
Reports”. The CN had access to broadcast media content from these areas via an RFE-operated
clandestine monitoring station in Schlessheim. Each language broadcasting service also had daily
access to media monitored from their target nation (i.e., the Czechoslovak service could listen to
Radio Prague).
The newsroom maintained, for most of its history after the early 1950s, up to 10-13
bureaus in major cities in the West, and in other cities as necessary. During the entirety of the
Cold War, the CN stationed reporters in New York City (including at the U.N.) and Washington,
D.C. The roster of other bureaus expanded and contracted with RFE’s budget. In 1972, e.g., the
CN maintained ten bureaus, in Athens, Berlin, Bonn, Brussels, Geneva, London, Paris, Rome,
Stockholm and Vienna (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972). In 1988, the CN had seven
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bureaus located in Bonn, Brussels, Islamabad, London, Paris, Rome, and Washington, D.C.
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988, p. 95). At times, CN
reporting posts were also maintained in Belgrade and Hong Kong. Language service reporters
from each of the BDs also frequented these bureaus while working on stories, e.g., on diplomatic
developments, on life in communities of East-Central Europeans in the West, or on the awarding
of Nobel Prizes to citizens in target nations.
RFE’s organizational structure permitted the CN to produce its wire content with
considerable autonomy. During the 1950s-early 1970s, the CN, like the BDs and the Broadcast
Analysis Department (BAD), reported to the director of RFE (Radio Free Europe News
Department, 1972). Prior to the mandated merger of RFE and RL in 1976, each organization
operated a central newsroom with its own staff and bureaus, with redundancies in expenses (e.g.,
each paid for Western news agency services). By 1978, RL had completed its move into RFE’s
headquarters building at Number One Englischer Garten; the new CN – retaining its RFE staff
and absorbing a few journalists from RL’s central newsroom -- was made a division of RFE/RL
(rather than reporting to the director of RL or RFE). Divisional status made the CN comparable in
corporate status to the groups of radio services managed under RL and RFE, and to other
divisions such as Engineering and Administration, giving the CN more authority to respond to
challenges to practice. The news division reported directly to the President of RFE/RL (B.
Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005; G. Thatcher, personal communication, August
31, 2006). During the late 1980s, this Central News Division (CND) was incorporated into a new
division within RFE/RL, known as the News and Current Affairs Division (NCA). “Feature”
stories were delegated to the “Current Affairs” portion of this two-unit division, separate from the
core of CN practice, and borrowing or recruiting journalists from the CN, while the CN continued
to produce news around the clock for broadcast at the top of each radio hour, and to provide
background information for BD programming.
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The work products of the CN were essential to The Radios’ programming. The CN
served as a model Western news practice, both in its wire copy style and its practice controls, for
journalists in the BDs who for the most part learned journalism on the job (see Chapter 4). Stories
from the CN A-wire were broadcast during the first ten minutes of hourly broadcasts. CN copy,
selected, edited and translated in the BDs, was issued with limits on its use. To protect accounts
from activist or advocacy preferences of the émigré desks, the CN mandated that copy from the
daily budget could be selected from, translated and truncated, but that language services could not
augment or alter the “straight news” – factually or in tone -- for broadcast during top-of-the-hour
news segments.
Robert Hutchings, assistant director of RFE during the late 1970s and early 1980s,
described management expectations of the CN and its daily news file. “We took Central News for
granted--that at the end of the day, whatever went on in the BDs, you would have this Western
style, straight news at the top of every hour”.
I would say, certainly [Vice President for Policy] Ralph Walter as executive vice
president, and to a lesser extent Jim [Brown] and I [as directors of RFE] relied on
Central News to help us [establish credibility], so that whatever else goes on
during the day, we’ve got this carefully thoroughly westernized central news
division that is not trying to make a point here, that is trying to be basically a
homogenization of The Times of London, The New York Times, the Frankfurter
Alemaigne, the more straight-down-the-middle, established, news organizations.
(R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006)
Thus, for the BDs, the CN functioned not only as a model, but also as an hourly anchor -credible, Western-style news -- for programming content that followed. However, as will be
described in this chapter, the CN not only protected its decision-making and copy from the
advocacy journalisms of the BDs, but also from the policy concerns of American management. In
the process of serving the needs of its clientele and protecting its own autonomy, journalists in the
CN developed a unique, hybrid, hyper-vigilant practice over four decades.

217

Work products and languages of practice
The Munich newsroom issued a continuous flow of news and updates, a news file of
identical content, in English, to all language desks, throughout the day. News and updates were
delivered during the 1950s on paper, and then by Teletype, and, by the 1980s, via a computer
software program written specifically for the CN (A. Breslauer, personal communication, August
9, 2010; B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005). Throughout the CN’s history in
Munich, early each morning, the budget (the news file as it stood at that moment) was printed and
issued to RFE managers and the directors of the radio services (either delivered to their homes, or
picked up in the CN as directors arrived for work) for review in preparation for a daily morning
meeting.
The budget consisted of typical wire service content: stories aggregated, fact and sourcechecked and rewritten from news agency and other published sources, and original news and
feature stories reported and written by journalists in the Munich newsroom and its bureaus. The
budget also contained special packages – news roundups on a particular theme or event issued
weekly or annually, unique special event packages, in-depth trend analysis stories, and diplomatic
developments -- drawn from the mix of sources described earlier, and from original reporting.
The BDs selected news from the A-wire section of this budget for translation, editing and
rewriting for broadcast during a news segment at the top of each hour. Newscasts lasted two to
ten minutes, depending on the program hour and the language service, with ten-minute segments
predominating (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972, p. 69). The total number of minutes
of news broadcast by each language service per day varied because the total number of program
hours per day also varied by language service. In February 1972, e.g., of the five BDs, the
Bulgarian language service broadcast the fewest number of hours per day, including 93 minutes
of news at the top of the hour drawn from the CN A-wire, while the Romanian desk was on the
air 15 hours and broadcast 142 minutes of news per day (Radio Free Europe News Department,
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1972, p. 69). The other 50 minutes of each hour of programming originated in the BDs; however,
some of that content was based on news, features and packages drawn from the B-wire and other
sections of the the CN file (Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988, p.
16; B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005).
The languages of practice at RFE—English and journalism--were among the contexts of
work that influenced the hybridization of a management – intended “American model” of
journalism that emerged in the CN. The “English language work environment” made RFE an
“artificial” “island” in German-language Munich (L. McCoy, personal communication, August
17, 2006) and the combination of English and Western journalism in a newsroom dominated by
Commonwealth nation journalists made the CN an “island” within RFE.
For all of RFE, there was a passport requirement for promotion to directorial positions,
including in the CN, the BDs and other departments (see Chapter 5). For the BDs, this carried an
entailment that managers master English as part of citizenship testing, and language service
directors also satisfied a months-long residency requirement in the U.S. as part of the process of
obtaining U.S. citizenship and mastering English. Thus, at the management and interdepartmental levels, including directors of the BDs, English was the language of conversation, the
language of day-to-day reports and discussions among émigré desk chiefs and American policy
officials, CN directors, and research and broadcast analysis department managers. English was
also the language of work in the CN (in contrast to the languages spoken in the newsrooms of
each of the BDs). English was the language of the news file delivered to the BDs (with a minority
of material in French and German). With or without U.S. citizenship, BD journalists working the
internal (CN) wire and rewrite desks had to read, select, translate and edit stories from English
into broadcast languages for use in programming.
The CN file was also delivered in another language -- Western journalism. As noted in
Chapter 5, the majority of CN journalists arrived from Commonwealth nations and the U.S., with
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considerable previous reporting experience in major news organizations. In contrast, the ranks of
American policy personnel and upper management did not include journalists, with a few notable
exceptions later in RFE’s history (e.g. William Marsh). And, the CN served client radios staffed
by journalists who had intentions of serving as a “surrogate free press” for listeners while at the
same time having had no previous experience in working in newsrooms in democracies (with a
very few exceptions among BD leaders). As described in Chapter 4, most émigrés recruited to
work in the BDs, especially during RFE’s first few decades, arrived from professions other than
journalism and had to learn the practices of reporting, newswriting and editing, and the
requirements or radio program production and broadcasting techniques, on the job. By the 1970s
and 1980s, language desk journalists hired during earlier decades had become proficient, and,
new hires included younger individuals with writing and journalism experience in home nations.
RFE’s intention to serve as a “surrogate free press” meant that the CN, its news file,
practices and journalists functioned – via the languages of English and journalism -- as a model
for the production of Western-style news both inside and outside RFE. The CN’s determination to
fulfill that modeling function, in relation to the learned-on-the-job journalism of the BDs and the
needs of RFE’s listeners, is central to the construction of a hybrid and hyper-vigilant Western
practice in the CN and to some of the struggles between the CN and other groups inside RFE.
When former RFE deputy director Hutchings observed that American management
officials “took for granted the function that Central News performed”, relying on the professional
experience and practices of CN journalists to produce “straight news”, “full stop” (personal
interview, August 11, 2006), he acknowledged that management gave the CN considerable
autonomy. The energies and attention of American managers were focused elsewhere -- on policy
and the content of BD broadcasts. However, like newsroom managers in any Western democracy,
the CN directors had to defend practice from challenges by organizational managers at times
during RFE’s history.
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The color-coded budget
As in most news agencies of the Cold War era, copy was coded by source, time and
version using slugs and the like. However, categorizing the budget was more extensive at RFE.
Along with the limited journalism training of the CN’s BD clients, the mix of languages in use
across the BDs and uneven levels of English language expertise within each desk made
differentiating sections of the CN file starkly, on sight – via color, at least prior to computerizing
the system during the mid-1980s -- imperative.
The color-coding system was established during the mid-1950s by Canadian newsroom
manager Don MacKay (A. Breslauer, personal communication, August 9, 2010). The system was
“altered and strengthened” by news director Mater in 1959-60 (G. Mater, personal
communication, January 15, 2010), and amended over decades as CN practice evolved. When the
budget was printed and distributed as a single identical file to all BD directors and American
managers in preparation for each morning’s programming meeting, it arrived as “a five inch thick
load of reading” (Brown, 2005, p. 93), arranged in categories by color (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, July 13, 2005; L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006; Radio Free
Europe News Department, 1972). Color-coding accommodated not only the need for quick
review by section, but also for differences in English language proficiencies and journalism
experience in the BDs. Prior to an era of electronic delivery of wire copy around the clock from
the CN, the arrival of the budget and news updates throughout the day in the BDs on colored
paper allowed differences in the intended categorical use of materials to be distinguished on sight
and maintained after the file was dismantled and distributed among staff.
Mater’s successor, Nathan Kingsley, recorded this system in a CN manual of “policies
and practice” that he revised in 1967 via his own observations of practices during his first two
years at RFE, and again in 1972 near the end of his tenure (N. Kingsley, personal communication,
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April 22, 2007). Rules narrowing the latitude of what émigrés could do with the categories of
wire content issued by the CN appear in the 1967/1972 manual.
WHITE – Material which as been released for use in newscasts.
BUFF – Material which has not released for news-casts (usually because it
contains editorial opinion or is poorly sourced).
BLUE – Lighter or specialized feature copy, some of which (slugged PAN/CN)
has been released for newscasts and some of which (slugged PAN has not).
YELLOW – Full texts, issued by CMD [Central Monitoring Desk]
largely for analytical purposes
PINK – Advisories addressed to the BDs [Broadcast desks] from the Office of
the Director [of Radio Free Europe, outside the newsroom] (Radio Free Europe
News Department, 1972, p. 19)
The “A-wire”, the main portion of the CN news file, printed on white paper, with stories
slugged “CN – [number]”, contained news available to language service desks for immediate
broadcast. White paper contained source-verified, fully attributed news copy -- “clear” news -available for inclusion in ten-minute, top-of-the-hour broadcasts (Radio Free Europe News
Department, 1972, p. 20).
The printed CN file also contained a B-wire section printed on “buff” or beige paper,
with “Feature File” stories slugged “FF – [number]”, a collection of material “not released for
news-casts (usually because it contains editorial opinion or is poorly sourced)” (Radio Free
Europe News Department, 1972, p. 19). Buff material included stories reported by other news
organizations but not yet confirmed by a second independent source according to the CN’s twosource rule, along with op-eds and other analyses that were considered single-source material.
Buff material could inform BD programming content, and was described as possibly “interesting”
for broadcast desks but perhaps containing “doubtful elements” (p. 21) of perhaps “low priority”
(p. 20), or “poorly sourced” material unfit for news broadcasts (the A-wire) until further reporting
could be accomplished (noted in the manual as “not hard enough for the CN file” (p. 21).
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“Lighter” “feature” (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972, p. 19) stories in the CN
budget were printed on blue paper. Blue and also yellow sections contained not “hard news” but
softer material. This included human-interest stories available for broadcast desk programs (blue),
or the translated texts of interviews, speeches, or other materials (yellow). Blue items slugged
“PAN/CN” included materials for “Panorama” programs hosted by the language services.
Panorama stories gave listeners an overview of non-political developments in their own countries
and across the nations in RFE’s broadcasting region.
Another section of the budget not listed above was printed on green paper. This included
dip-cors, round-ups of diplomatic developments and brief analyses written by CN correspondents
in bureaus (M. McCarroll, personal communication, November 24, 2010).
Material attached to the CN file that did not originate in the CN but in other RFE
departments, e.g. reports supplied by the Research and Analysis Department and “daily
advisories” from RFE policy management to the BDs (pink paper), were appended to the CN
budget (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972, p. 19).
Reports from RFE’s Research and Analysis Department, some lengthy, some as brief as
two pages (K. Bush, personal communication, August 2, 2006) described dissident activities in
target nations, and analyzed and corrected communist state-issued information on domestic
conditions. Research reports noted such as the creation and disposition of dissident groups and
individual dissidents. They noted changes in communist regime leadership, policy and law, along
with reports on cultural developments, economic plans and production, and population
demographics and health (M. Feshbach, personal communication, July 27, 2006). Longer
research unit reports e.g., “country reports”, and briefer “situation reports” and two-page briefs on
particular subjects, along with the CN’s cross-reporting filings, provided critical support for
contextualizing information monitored by nation (state media, e.g., Radio Prague) in each
language service. The CN’s Central Monitoring Desk (CMD) issued reports that supported cross223

reporting. They bolstered the ability of the BDs to allow listeners to compare aspects of the same
story as reported in various communist and Western media (see RFE/RL Programme Policy
Guidelines 1982, in Short, 1986) and also to compare developments across nations in their own
region.
Access by CN journalists below the level of newsroom director (in morning meetings) to
the products of the research department evolved over time. The research department’s “country
reports” were distributed to the U.S. State Department (Shanor, 1968) and to a list of hundreds
and eventually thousands of individuals in academia, government departments, and research and
news organizations in the U.S. and other Western nations (K. Bush, personal communication,
August 2, 2006; T. Willey, personal communication, September 4, 2006). They were, said one
scholar who eventually helped direct RFE, “mother’s milk” and could be seen in “stacks” on the
floors and desks of university professors who had no access to East-Central Europe or the Soviet
Union (R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006). When the U.S. Congress
discussed shutting down The Radios during the 1970s, academics were among those who wrote
letters to the editors of news organizations to support RFE (K. Bush, personal communication,
August 2, 2006). It is important to note that Western journalists visiting RFE made liberal use of
research department materials and consulted with research staff during the 44 years that RFE was
headquartered in Munich; they also consulted with CN and BD reporters and accessed materials
available in CN bureaus.
During late 1950s and early 1960s, news director Gene Mater (1959-65), who was
“witting” to the CIA’s relationship to RFE, banned research department analyses from the CN
because he saw them as tainted, intelligence and policy-related materials. The prohibition on
research department reports is recorded in the 1967 issue of the practice manual: When the
printed budget was prepared in RFE’s duplication room, located in the CN, only two copies of the

224

research department’s daily report could be received, one from which to copy/print, and the other,
an emergency extra, to be discarded immediately after budget preparation.
Mater’s successor as news director, Nathan Kingsley, added a foreground essay to a 1972
edition of the CN manual, but left the research report prohibition entry in the manual unaltered.
However, according to Kingsley himself (personal communication, April 22, 2007), by either the
late 1960s or at least by 1972, he had reversed the prohibition on the reading of research reports
in the CN. Kingsley reasoned that Western journalists had only surface knowledge of EastCentral European nations and needed deeper understandings in order to report, select, and rewrite
stories for the CN’s clients and listeners. Deputy news director McCoy (personal communication,
July 26, 2006) acknowledged that Western journalists arrived in the newsroom with little
knowledge of East-Central Europe and/or the intricacies of the communist system. The CN’s
relationship to the research department changed – a few of its employees became journalists by
virtue of area and language knowledge and writing skill. By the early 1990s, a former research
department and RL central newsroom journalist had risen to the position of news director (T.
Willey, personal communication, September 4, 2006).
Another section of material distributed with the CN budget – “advisories” on pink paper - did not originate in the CN, but in the offices of American management (the director of RFE, or
his superiors in American policy management). “Advisories” contained policy guidance from
American management, intended for émigrés who produced political, economic and other
commentary for broadcast. Advisories were neither distributed to nor used by journalists in the
CN, but were added to the CN budget during the duplication process prior to each morning’s
meeting of department heads.
By the time the final style manual used in Munich in the CN was issued in 1988, the
newsroom had shifted to computerized operations and BD client journalism and programming
had evolved and matured. The 1988 RFE/RL Style and Procedure Manual, completed a year
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before a wave of revolutions and regime changes swept the broadcasting region, retained its
separations of A-wire material (white) that could be selected from for top-of-the-hour newscasts,
and B-wire content, features; and, delineation of CN materials from materials coming from other
departments including American management. Some details, included the color and content
designations used during the 1960s and 1970s, had been revised and refined.
WHITE denotes news material. BUFF is for features. BLUE identifies Panorama
materials. YELLOW is the color of correspondent reports.
GREEN is reserved for instructions and advisory notes from the Office of the Executive
Vice President and the RFE/RL “Daily Report,” which is not for broadcast.
The Recommended Lists issued by the two Radio Divisions appear on PINK paper.
(Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Central News Department, 1988, p. 29)
The budget continued to be printed and distributed using this color-coding scheme through the
CN’s stay in Munich until 1995.

The morning programming meeting: Newsroom relationships to policy and
program control at RFE
The conduct of CN personnel during RFE’s daily morning programming meeting –
during which the news file with its attachments from other departments were discussed –
illustrates the importance of the CN file to RFE operations in general, and the rationale for
newsroom policies and practices constructed to ring-fence the newsroom where no formal
“firewall” existed. RFE’s American vice president for policy and programs chaired the morning
meeting. The director of RFE along with the chiefs of each of the broadcast desks and the
directors of the CN, research, and the broadcast analysis departments, also attended. The CN
news budget – as it stood as of printing prior to the morning meeting – was discussed at this
meeting, along with policy, broadcasting and programming issues of the day. As a matter of
newsroom practice, the CN representative(s) at this morning meeting – the CN director and/or a
deputy -- were in attendance not to participate in discussions of policy or recommendations for
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BD broadcasting content, but to solely to respond to questions related to the content of the news
budget (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005; T. Willey, personal communication,
September 4, 2006).
One outcome of this organization-wide morning meeting included a “recommended list”
of stories that were suggested to language desk chiefs as perhaps important to the day’s
programming, drawn from the CN’s news file. The outcome also included reminders to the BDs
not to broadcast certain content from the B-wire (buff). Former news director Terry Willey
describes these outcomes in terms of their relationship to the content of the CN’s news budget.
[O]ut of all our budget materials from 24 hours, as assembled every morning, a policy
official came up with a list of recommended stories. It wasn’t censorship. It wasn’t saying
this had to be used, or don’t use something else [from the A-wire]; it was just a list. It
might have on it a New York Times editorial on this, or a report on that.
However, it did have items, occasionally, not often, not to be broadcast, or a
notation this or that story or item should be corrected. I didn’t view this as censorship. It
was to help the language desks deal with the massive amount of materials. This [not to be
broadcast material] was not on the white news [CN A-wire] materials. It was on the buff
material, the opinion and editorial material. (T. Willey, personal communication,
September 4, 2006)
Compilation of the recommended list following the morning meeting was an arduous and
unglamorous task often assigned to members of the research department, or to policy assistants
(T. Willey, personal communication, September 4, 2006), or a staff member of one of the BDs,
but not to CN journalists.
The morning recommended list was done for years by an RFE Hungarian named Charles
Andras. . . . Charley used to get up well before dawn to go through the budget and
prepare the list. I think he was even kept on to do it after he retired. Everybody else over
there . . . hated doing the list, hated getting up very early in the morning to read the
damned budget. (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 12, 2012)
Andras was a deputy director in the RFE’s research department who was fluent in several
languages, with in-depth knowledge of broadcasting areas.
It is important to note that throughout the history of RFE’s tenure in Munich, CN
directors and managers declined to participate in the compilation of these recommended lists, and
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that daily lists were not seen by reporters and editors in the newsroom or bureaus (B. Griffiths,
personal communication, July 13, 2005; T. Willey, personal communication, September 4, 2006).
And although American management again requested that the CN assign someone to help
compile the recommended list during the organization’s last years in Munich under the tenure of
news director Willey, she, too, successfully refused (T. Willey, personal communication,
September 4, 2006).
The morning meeting also included discussions of daily “guidances” that were issued by
American management and policy personnel to the language services, but not to the CN. These
guidances should not be confused with RFE’s overarching, standing, written “broadcast
guidelines”. For example, criticism of RFE’s Hungarian language service following the deaths of
thousands in the 1956 Hungarian uprising had prompted an overhaul of broadcast policy. Post1956 policy, among other things, mandated an expected tone for news and programming content.
Among other things, the guidelines prohibited the kinds of overt recommendations for political
action inside communist nations and personal attacks on communist leaders that had been present
in RFE’s propaganda broadcasts of the early 1950s.
But in addition to these standing broadcasting guidelines, as a function of ongoing
American oversight, language services were issued "guidances" or policy recommendations
related to Cold War developments. This kind of “guidance” addressed specific issues or events,
and “special guidances” were issued during crises; e.g., during the 1960s, the nuclear war
brinksmanship of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the invasion of Czechoslovakia that ended the
reforms of the Prague Spring. The ways in which policy guidance translated to BD decisionmaking regarding programming content came as a result of conversations between BD directors
and American management (see Johnson, 2010; Puddington, 2000; Shanor, 1968) (for more on
policy guidance, see Chapter 2). CN managers did not participate in any aspect of policy
guidance, on the production or implementation ends. Periodically, however, if the subject of the
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guidance referenced the CN or its practice, CN directors were included in distribution. For
example, American management periodically issued guidances to remind BD staff to abide by the
CN’s two-source rule (e.g. Marsh, 1989), a critical feature of the hybrid and hyper-vigilant
practice developed in the CN that will be discussed later in this chapter.
The direct of the Broadcast Analysis Department (BAD) also attended the morning
meeting. The BAD periodically reviewed the recorded broadcast desk programming content,
particularly political block programming, to ensure that overarching broadcast guidelines had
been followed. The BAD also functioned as a post-broadcast check more broadly focused,
including at times, the forms and formats of radio broadcasting. The BAD did not review CN
work and played no role in deciding what was news in the CN.
In terms of the morning programming meeting, former BAD chief Martin Bachstein
rationalized the use of a daily recommended list and policy guidances by American management.
One of the greatest achievements of RFE/RL has been its success in turning refugees who
had been teachers, secretaries, craftsmen, and who came from all walks of life and many
of whom not having been trained journalists, into successful broadcasters. This might
explain the need for Recommended Lists and Daily Guidances, and it was a more or less
successful system. Critics might say that lists and guidances limited choices and sources
and, therefore, could be seen as rather restrictive or even manipulative elements. I think
the recognized success of RFE/RL is sufficient evidence that our source classification
system was certainly not a negative but a most helpful and justified management tool.
(personal communication, April 30, 2011)
However, it can be argued that an absence of regular training (see Chapter 4) in the
“American-style” journalism that RFE purportedly adopted as its goal, rendered BD staff less
autonomous than they might have been. Although there was some formal training provided for
BD staff in various aspects of radio program and broadcasting techniques over time, journalism
itself – including larger questions of story selection and approaches to and framing of coverage -was learned on the job. And though the CN played a role in modeling the production and content
of broadcast news copy for the BDs, RFE’s American management invested only in sporadic
training, not in the kinds of regular training that would have rendered the BD desk chiefs and
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their staffs able to claim autonomy on a level that would have made the production of daily
recommended lists unnecessary. The CN issued it's A-wire, and the desks chose from that
material at will for the ten minutes of news at the top of each hour. But the remainder of the
budget (“buff” paper material in particular) was open to recommendations reached during the
morning meeting’s discussions with American management. The “political” at RFE included not
only émigré conceptions of content for broadcast audiences, but also the policy priorities and
judgment of management. BD directors were not reviewed by the BAD on the basis of their
decisions related to selection of stories from recommended lists – what they chose to include or
not include. However, suggestions at the selection level were a daily fact of practice for the BDs.
And insufficient training of journalists in the BDs made it necessary for the CN to continue
controls to guard the integrity and use of materials in its news file.
American management played no regular, hands-on role in deciding what was news in
the CN. Color-coding the budget, barring (for a time) research reports from the newsroom,
refusing participation in the production of each day’s recommended list and not circulating
guidances to journalists in the CN were part of the post-1956 evolved approximation of a firewall
separating politics and policy from CN practice.

Ring-fencing the newsroom and the news file
As in any news organization, vigilance regarding newsroom decision-making autonomy
was important in the CN. Given that news directors were made “witting” to RFE’s CIA
relationship (prior to pubic confirmation in 1967) and were cognizant during all of RFE’s history
of the policy and propaganda goals of American management, vigilance regarding autonomy in
the absence of a formal firewall was critical. To establish themselves as journalists in good
standing in relation to their own understandings of their role in RFE’s mission and of Western
ideals of practice in general, it was necessary for the CN news workers to construct a functional
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safeguard fundamental to the kind of journalism in Western democracies that the CN sought to
model: a partition between newsroom decision-making and practice that excluded potentially
corrupting influences. “There wasn’t a firewall; there was a separation,” observed editor Ted Iliff
(personal communication, May 27, 2010). It should be noted that “firewall” is a North American
term; some former CN journalists referred to it in the language of British journalism: ring-fencing
the newsroom.
The approximated ring-fence or firewall in the CN consisted of controls and practices
mentioned previously in this chapter and in Chapter 5. Both American management and CN
journalists recognized in RFE’s revised mission statement -- mandating output “not inconsistent
with” American foreign policy – as beneficial to newsroom practice. News that was “not
inconsistent with” – rather than “consistent with” – American policy allowed for CN autonomy in
deciding what was news. “Straight news”, including “bad news” of the West, was consistent with
modeling a free press in a democracy, and an argument could be made at any time that “straight
news” was thus good for, and “not inconsistent with”, American policy, no matter what that
policy was at any moment.
The CN cultivated and negotiated with a cadre of executives in upper management who
(for the most part) supported and defended the two-source rule and other mainstays of newsroom
practice. When challenges arose nonetheless, CN directors and deputy directors handled attempts
at interference without allowing knowledge of the specifics to filter into the newsroom to
influence the work of editors and reporters. CN journalists perceived their practice to be protected
by newsroom management.
Our main point of existence was to talk about what was going on inside or things about
their countries other than what they were hearing. Maybe we were rationalizing or
whistling past the graveyard . . . but there was a separation there that . . . Jim [Edwards]
and Barry [Griffiths] would back us up and stand by us. (T. Iliff, personal
communication, May 27, 2010)
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Throughout the CN’s post-1956 operation in Munich, journalists also perceived that
managers maintained a “firewall between the language desks and the newsroom” (C. Smith,
personal communication, December 12, 2010). Newsroom managers refused requests to
participate in the production of a list of recommended stories of stories distributed to the BDs
following morning budget meetings. Insistence on high levels of Western news organization
experience – and the expectations for autonomy that accompanied that experience -- for CN hires
heightened differentiation of CN practice from the practices and political passions of the BDs.
Controls on the production of copy in the CN helped maintain continuity of accuracy, tone and
meaning once the file reached the BDs for selection, editing and translation. Controls on the
budget itself, including color-coded print versions, restrictions on the use of material from
particular sections of the wire in broadcasts, and limits on the editing and use of A-wire copy in
top-of-the-hour newscasts, all combined not only to assist the self-trained journalists in the BDs,
but also to ensure the integrity of carefully vetted and constructed CN news copy.
Other means of partitioning the newsroom were also enacted. For example, during part of
the CN’s history, Research and Analysis Department documents – as products of a department
with a name identical to that used in the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS),
precursor to the CIA -- were barred by “witting” news director Gene Mater from the newsroom
except as attachments to a budget printed for morning meeting and management use. A
succeeding news director – also made witting -- later allowed Research documents to be
consulted by journalists seeking background on broadcasting territories and culture (see Chapter
5).
Mater also maintained in an interview that he barred “policy” personnel from the
newsroom during his tenure, beginning in 1959, meaning that he barred American management,
including suspected CIA operatives, from influencing newsroom decision-making. Canadian
journalist Barry Griffiths, who had been working in the UK when he was hired by Mater to join
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the CN in Munich in 1962, maintains that, “people were walking through the newsroom all the
time – they had to: they picked up their printed budget from boxes in the newsroom. They were
colleagues; some were friends. They chatted, but never tried to influence the news file.”
However, there were exceptions. During particularly heated Cold War events, a “policy
man” might enter the newsroom to monitor incoming wire service information to filter rapidly
developing and possibly erroneous information.
And, actually, during the Czechoslovak invasion [1968] and martial law in Poland there
were policy people sitting in the newsroom so they could vet material like [wire] agency
reports before they were issued on the non-news B-wire so that they could mark these
reports for use, or not, before they got in the hands of broadcasters, who might otherwise
have done a rip-and-read before the "don’t use" message got out. But they did not judge
news stories [for the A-wire]. In fact their presence was welcomed because of their
knowledge of the [broadcast] area. (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 12,
2012)
The rare fact of policy personnel entering the newsroom during crisis events to forestall BD use
of non-A-wire news -- questionable material -- deserves further explication.

The two-source rule and “getting it right” rather than “getting it first”
The hybrid and hyper-vigilant practice evolved in the CN included the two-source rule
and valuing accuracy over speed; both were adaptations that diverged from the “American
model” of commercial practice of the time. Competing for audience allegiance, where RFE and
its language service voices started from a position of illegitimacy, made establishing and
maintaining credibility crucial. That, in turn, made the accuracy of stories in the news file
distributed to client BDs -- being more accurate than the competition, including both communist
state media and other Western international broadcasters -- critical to CN practice. Most
importantly, inaccuracies might put listeners at risk.
The two-source rule required at least two independent sources on important, sensitive or
potentially inflammatory stories before releasing them to the BDs on the A-wire (white paper).
Deputy news director Larry McCoy cited the two-source rule as a check on Western agency
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practice, a means of subordinating speed to accuracy, in which “getting it right the first time
would be more important than getting it first” (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17,
2006). The newsroom practice manual describes this as a “higher” standard than mainstream
American news practice (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972, p. 2)
The two-source rule was imported from BBC practice by American journalist and news
director Gene Mater in 1959-60 (N. Kingsley, personal communication, September 28, 2006; G.
Mater, personal communication, August 28, 2006). Mater’s strengthening of the news practices in
use up to the period immediately following the organizational earthquake of RFE’s implication in
the Hungarian uprising of 1956 included: “Two-source confirmation for weaker stories of
possible interest, holding to basic journalistic ethics when occasionally asked to allow
unconfirmed or opinion items in news broadcasts, etc. -- all to insure accurate, objective news”
(G. Mater, personal communication, January 15, 2012).
The two-source rule was not a standard feature of American journalism at the time, nor
was it common even by the mid-1970s during the Watergate scandal. Tuchman found that,
“'[R]eporters implicitly cited a key factor in the maintenance of credibility—the mutual
determination of fact and source”, with the source being a “point of origin” (Tuchman, 1978, p.
84). The use of a two-source rule during the reporting of Watergate by American reporters
Woodward and Bernstein at The Washington Post was considered “extreme”, a “level of
substantiation relatively rare in newswork” but “required because of the political power of the
web of conspirators” (Tuchman, 1978, p. 85). The two-source rule protected both the news
organization and the news consumer.
At RFE, too, the two-source rule served not only to protect the radio listener but also the
organization itself (from, e.g. poorly sourced stories of events that might inflame the audience, or
the post-1967 recurring concerns of the U.S. Congress and the American public regarding
propagandistic content). But the two-source rule’s primary intent was to safeguard the CN
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journalists’ intent to produce news for populations in East-Central Europe that was more accurate
than that provided by communist state media, and also more accurate than that produced by other
Western news organizations -- including news agencies supplying the Western press and
broadcast into East-Central Europe by other international radios. That a “single source report . . .
does not qualify for immediate release” (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972, p. 6) was a
periodic flashpoint for conflict among CN, BD and American management officials.
Implementing and defending the two-source rule, according to one newsroom manager, “saved
us” (T. Willey, personal communication, September 7, 2006) on numerous occasions. The
practice prevented grievous reporting errors that would have degraded the accuracy of the CN
file, and by extension the credibility of language desk broadcasts and RFE itself.
The two-source rule was one impetus for Kingsley’s codification of CN practice in a
written manual, issued in 1967 and revised in 1972. The two source-rule in that sense was
indicative of the need to corral journalists from across the West toward a unified conception of
practice.
When I first got to RFE there was no [written] style manual. We needed one;
turnover was not rapid but when new people come in—I hired from primarily
news agencies…British journalists from Reuters…., Canadians. . . I wanted
them to understand that whereas most western news agencies, because of the
pressure of time, there isn’t the pressure of detail and accuracy that there was at
RFE, but we had to be right. If we made a mistake, all too often people in the
West or also in the East, people would ascribe it to an attempt to skew the
news. We needed something in writing for them to refer to.
I told the [newsroom recruits], you are broadcasting to people who have been lied
to for a millennium. When they sense that you are trying to distort events for your own
purposes, even if its accidental, an error of the newsroom, that will destroy the ability of
reaching an audience, of making an audience believe in you. (N. Kingsley, personal
communication, April 22, 2007)
Enforcement of the two-source rule was also related to RFE’s “taint” and as a
“propaganda” station, as characterized in reports in the communist press (see Chapter 4) and in
perceptions among members of the Western press, especially the U.S. press (see Chapter 5). The
inclusion of fake news planted by “the other side”, or repetition of inaccuracies reported in media
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East or West might fuel assaults from parties outside RFE. Inside RFE, inaccuracies in the CN
file might open the door for interference in newsroom practice by American management.
Most importantly, potentially inflammatory or false or rumored stories might carry
consequences for listeners in totalitarian states.
Regardless of validity of the charges against the Radios on the Hungarian Revolution,
and regardless of the way that most people associate propaganda with (pardon my
language) screwing around with the facts, I was determined that that newsroom would be
the most objective in the world. If there was a story in the newsroom that came in on one
agency’s wire which could possibly put in danger any individual or any number of
individuals in our broadcast areas, such a story must have "a matcher". . . . If there was a
story on UPI that people were marching on the cardinal's palace in Prague, another of the
other [wire] services to which we subscribed was immediately notified and asked to
provide a matcher. I remember the then director of Reuters telling me that their records
showed that my newsroom requested confirmation matches more than all their other
clients combined. (N. Kingsley, personal communication, September 28, 2006)
In view of listener risk, the CN attempted to minimize the need to issue corrections. Mainstream
Western radio, TV and print news outlets competed with one another to break a story first, and if
an error had been broadcast, a correction could be reported in succeeding broadcasts or print runs.
But Western news organizations produced content for audiences that could tune in regularly, at
will. RFE’s listeners, forced to listen clandestinely, with access complicated by the loud noises of
state signal jammers, might hear only the CN’s mistake, and not the correction.
In most Western news agencies they emphasized speed. The AP [Associated
Press] slogan was, “A deadline every minute”, . . . with the hidden assumption
that this is not critical. You can catch up on the next cycle. You’d send a
correction. . . . In our [RFE] newsroom, news was every hour on the hour. . . .
We never knew which newscast the audiences could listen to through . . . all the
monitoring, jamming, the secret police. …That particular newscast could be the
only one they could hear the whole day and get away with it. (N. Kingsley,
personal communication, September 28, 2006)
According to a long-time CN deputy director, the rule was perceived by both CN journalists and
RFE management (with notable exceptions during the first Reagan administration, 1981-84), “as
an extremely useful safeguard against irresponsible information getting into newscasts” B.
Griffiths, personal communication, August 7, 2012). As one editor noted, “I found it honorable
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that the one thing we didn’t have to abide by was issuing a story before we were sure. Corrections
were a big no-no” (L. W. Akcay, personal communication, November 18, 2010).
RFE director James Brown, overseeing the language broadcast services during the 1970s
and until 1982, agreed with CN caution and supported the two-source rule on the grounds that
inaccuracies in broadcasts would damage listener “trust” and the reputation of RFE, damaging its
ability to compete with communist media as a more credible source, and its mission to be a
surrogate, domestic “home radio” (J. F. Brown, personal communication, June 30, 2005). Yet
broadcast desk directors and, at times, particular American managers, fought the two-source rule
on the same grounds: credibility. Enforcing the rule entailed sitting on some stories, and that
constituted grounds for conflict at times during RFE’s history (J. F. Brown, personal
communication, June 30, 2005; B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005; G. IranekOsmecci, personal communication, July 19, 2005; T. Willey, personal communication, September
7, 2006).
BD directors and editors complained about the rule to the RFE director or the American
policy and programming vice president, or to CN staff, repeatedly, over decades. They cited
instances where other news organizations had reported particular stories in the West or via
international broadcasters to audiences in target areas, while at RFE the CN had delayed or had
not issued the same story on its A-wire for the broadcast desks (although the story may have been
issued on “buff” paper as an item awaiting a second independent source, but unavailable for
broadcast). Émigrés worried that delays would cause listeners to doubt The Radios’ credibility
and reinforce the characterization of RFE broadcasters as traitors to their nations and pawns of
the CIA.
CN deputy director Griffiths recalled that such stories might include, e.g., the torture of a
cleric or another incident of great importance to the BDs and their listeners. Émigrés wanted to
broadcast such events as reports-about-reporting, in other words, to issue a story informing
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listeners that UPI or Reuters or the BBC World Service had reported the torture of a cleric. CN
journalists tried to avoid mistaking the same news story arriving via two or more wire services as
confirmation of a second source. As described in a discussion of relationships with Western wire
services in Chapter 5, CN personnel checked routinely with wire services to identify sources for
similar stories about potentially incendiary events inside target nations, often learning that such
stories had come from a single, questionable source. In such cases, the CN suspected fake news, a
successful “plant” from “the other side” (Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005), or,
simply Western news agency errors, and held the story.
Griffiths recalled one such instance during the first presidential administration of Ronald
Reagan, when members of RFE’s management team that had supported the two-source rule were
fired or resigned (e.g. Ralph E. Walter, James F. Brown) and were replaced with political
appointees including George Urban as director of RFE.
Urban was going ballistic over our failure to report that the International Society for
Human Rights in Frankfurt had issued a report saying some Romanian dissident was
being tortured in prison. He called [CN News Director] Edwards and I onto the carpet in
front of all the desk chiefs and raged that if we did not understand that that was news, we
did not understand what the radios were about. We replied that our own research
department said the guy was released weeks ago. He was not in prison. The IGFM was
wrong. To which Urban said – and this should be put on his gravestone – ‘That doesn’t
matter. The IGFM said it. So it’s news.’ (B. Griffiths, personal communication, May 11,
2011)
Aside from such outright affronts to the integrity of CN practice, other types of attempts
were made, particularly during the first Reagan administration, to encourage the CN to include
reports in the file despite insufficient sourcing. For example, the practice of reporting that a
statement had been made by someone -- without interrogating the content of the statement for
veracity -- or reporting that some other news organization had reported something that could not
itself be verified, was conditional in the CN.
If an agency was quoting say an American president or British prime minister saying
something which he would logically say at a press conference or in parliament, or an
agency was arriving a Polish minister in Paris for a visit, you didn’t wait until another
238

agency had it. . . . If a story concerned something sensitive in our target area, or
something odd which needed confirmation, then, sure, we waited for more sources. But
there was no don’t-use-anything-which-doesn’t-have-a-second-source rule. You just used
common sense. If you have Radio Warsaw saying the harvest is good/bad, that’s one
source, but the story is not that the harvest is whatever, but that Radio Warsaw says it.
There were stories, like the fighting between Azeris and Armenians (we
broadcast to both) where two sources were not enough, and when we had more, the story
was not the fact of what was being reported, but the fact that agencies were reporting it . .
. . (Not "six people have been killed in . . ." but "western news agencies say people have
been killed in . . .") Also, there were times when two, or three or four, sources were not
enough. . . . Our caution, our insistence on having confirmation, and sometimes much
confirmation, of stories affecting our target area, saved us from issuing stuff which was
wrong (like the BBC reporting during Polish martial law that people were being thrown
down wells). (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August 7, 2012)
Though Central News managers resisted this kind of “relocation of facticity” (Tuchman,
1978, p. 90) when it related to important or controversial stories, it was in regular use at émigré
desks (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005; T. Willey, personal communication,
September 7, 2006) and during political block commentary programs in particular. CN journalists
saw émigrés as having Tuchman’s political “axe to grind” (1978), and as practicing journalism on
occasion with lesser commitment to accuracy and other fundamentals, especially when political
passions were running high, and/or during critical events.
In general in the CN, a single-sourced Western wire service story would not be taken at
face value without hesitation, a categorical check. Western agency reports, one CN director
noted, were often “so outrageously wrong” that the CN would “hold stories” routinely (T. Willey,
personal communication, February 8, 2008). Journalists arriving in the CN from other nations and
other agencies or news organizations, had to adjust, and many journalists who came to work in
the CN in Munich were introduced to the two-source rule for the first time.
[T]he whole idea of a two-source rule -- that’s where I learned it. When I started at RFE,
it was the first time the two-source rule was drummed into my head. When you’re doing
your own reporting, you only need one source; you’re doing the reporting, you know
where you got it. When you’re taking news from the wire, you may not be sure where it’s
coming from. (S. Herron, personal communication, November 22, 2010)
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Herron voiced an observation common among CN journalists: In the CN, he learned “to trust
different wire services more than others.”
We always had doubts about the [Agence France Presse]. They could be strong on Africa
and the Middle East, but Eastern Europe? AFP seemed like it would shoot from the hip a
little bit more. The two-source rule was iron-clad, except for features stuff – that went out
straight [from the wires]. (S. Herron, personal communication, November 22, 2010)
The BDs had access to news from sources other than the CN file, but were prohibited
from constructing news items in “rip-and-read” broadcasting-style from what they saw arriving
from Western news agencies or heard in monitored media from broadcast areas; they were
supposed to await news vetted by the CN and issued on the A-wire for inclusion in hourly
newscasts. For example, a 1984 memo issued by the CN to seven language service directors
regarding Sarajevo Olympics coverage requested a meeting, both to find out how the CN could
better serve the BDs (“interested in any complaints an observations about what we did or didn’t
do”), but also noting that desks had broadcast from Western wire service copy directly rather than
awaiting A-wire material fact-checked in the CN from many sources.
Some desks, for instance, were using agency material directly instead of from the A- or
B-wires. This is a risky practice, because the agencies were frequently wrong, but if it
was general then we were wasting our time processing agency copy. . . . [The] Los
Angeles [Olympic Games], with more sports and a time difference putting most major
events into the Munich overnight shift, is going to be harder to cover. If there were any
lessons for Los Angeles in our Sarajevo coverage and the use you made of it, we’d like to
know about them. (Griffiths, 1984)
The CN’s insistence on delays, it’s emphasis on “getting it right” over “getting it first”,
was sometimes interpreted by émigré broadcasters not as evidence of a “higher” standard” of
news production (Radio Free Europe News Department, 1972, p. 2) in the CN, but rather as
obstructionism, or as an indication that Western journalists were not as committed to the
“mission” of RFE as conceptualized by BD staff (see also Chapter 4). When desk chiefs
periodically petitioned American management for elimination of the rule (T. Willey, personal
communication, September 4, 2006; B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005),
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American management mostly supported the CN; however, management sometimes responded
with pressure on the CN (B. Griffiths, personal communication, May 11, 2011; R. E. Walter,
personal communication, November 30, 2006).
For example, during the first administration of U.S. President Ronald Reagan (1981-84),
a return to an American hardline anti-communist foreign policy stance was welcomed in the BDs
but resulted in added pressure on the CN. Ralph Walter, an American manger who had defended
the two-source rule during his tenure as Vice President of The Radios, was forced to resign
during an initial salvo in what employees called “The Charge of the Right Brigade”, a “massacre”
of key staff that had embodied a firewall for CN. Walter noted that CN director James Edwards,
when asked by new American management to compose a memo justifying elimination of the twosource rule, “to his credit”, instead composed a memo containing the reasons for maintaining it
(R. E. Walter, personal communication, November 30, 2006).
A Polish service editor recalled a conflict with a CN manager over a story withheld from
the A-wire for insufficient sourcing during that period.
When Solidarity was at its height, an event occurred (I don't remember which), of which
we knew and waited anxiously for it to appear on the A-Wire. And the Central News
Room was doodling. I went there and spoke to the editor in charge, a young woman. . . . I
gave her a very brusque dressing down, and asked what she thought she was doing, while
all Poland waited for this news! I went back in a huff. Shortly after, the deputy director of
the Central News Room barges in to my office, and asks me whether I am the chap who
had just been rude to one of his editors. To which I replied, rude or not, she deserved it
and if he wants to make a case of it he jolly well can. Then he went out in a huff. By the
time he got back to the Central News Room, a real, proper dressing down was waiting for
him. My director had phoned the top Director of RFE and complained in no uncertain
terms about the delay. (G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal communication, July 13, 2005)
CN managers were aware of this attitude among a minority of BD directors, and yet stood their
ground when holding a story. However, the BDs, at times, in response, attempted to engineer a
second source on their own. CN news editors were prepared.
We also had to be aware of feedback from our [language service] areas. The Poles
were particularly fierce at demanding that this that and the other be issued for
newscasts because we had it from two, three, four sources. Sure. They knew about
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our rule on sources. Their source in Warsaw would call his aunt in Stockholm,
who would call her brother in London, who would call his friends in Paris and
Vienna, and they would all call their friendly Austrian or Swedish or whatever
[news] agency contact, and bingo! There was a one-source story coming at us from
all directions. We became quite good at recognizing this sort of manipulation. (B.
Griffiths, personal communication, December 30, 2007)
Thus, the CN had to institute practices that insulated newsroom decision-making not only from
American management’s policy concerns, but also from the political passions and different news
practices of the BDs.
The CN continually negotiated practice with the BDs, and, aside from contentious
interactions related to the two-source rule and specific stories, relations with the BDs on the
whole were good. There was alignment in general with the CN on fundamental questions of
journalistic “how-to”, and, generally, trust in the contents of the CN file (O. Kopecka, personal
communication, July 26, 2005; C. Peciva, personal communication, July 14, 2005). CN staff
“would bend over backwards to help” the language desk journalists (B. Griffiths, personal
communication, July 13, 2005), while the BDs, aware that many CN journalists had little
knowledge of the languages and cultures of East-Central Europe, answered the questions of
Western journalists. The same Polish editor who complained about CN delays in issuing stories
also noted that, “In fact sometimes [CN editors] politely asked me to come along and help with
the formulation, or translation of items they were dubious about” (G. Iranek-Osmecci, personal
communication, July 13, 2005).

Style as model and safeguard for accuracy and objectivity
CN practice included safeguards beyond the two-source rule; rules for news file use and
stylistic conventions also helped prevent political passions of BD journalists and potential
problems related to language translation from seeping into top-of-the-hour newscasts. The BDs
were allowed to select, translate and edit A-wire content, but could not add stories to news
segments that were drawn from sources other than the A-wire. Restricting the BDs to the CN’s A242

wire ensured enforcement of the two-source rule -- important stories had already been vetted.
Editing could include truncation of stories but not the addition of new reporting or adjectives that
might alter accuracy or objectivity (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13, 2005). These
conventions and other specifics of CN practice served a dual purpose: to fulfill the CN’s intention
to model Western practice for others, and to protect the contents of its news file on its way to
listeners.
CN managers were conscious of the modeling function that the CN news file posed for
the BDs, both in learning the language of Western journalism and more specifically writing for
broadcast.
We are not writing for newspapers but for the ear. Sure it’s going to be translated, but we
should try to set an example of good radio copy for those who are doing the translating. It
could rub off. Like leading with WHO said it, instead of, [news] agency fashion, WHAT
he said. (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006)
The Czech service’s Political Bock editor during the 1980s, Ctibor Peciva, noted that training
provided by RFE management to the BDs was insufficient, and that the CN helped fill the void.
Journalism training conducted by under Boston University and lectures from Florida
University in radiophonics, and then we had American colleagues. I was in frequent
touch with the central newsroom; they were American and Australians and Canadian
journalists, and when they received news from Czechoslovakia, it had to be from two
independent sources or from three sources. They mostly called us, or my colleagues, to
hear our opinion [on sources]; we had to be very careful, and in this way I learned a bit of
carefulness. But I learned the principle to read and to use materials never in a hurry, and I
could watch the American journalists--that was a sort of school, too. Almost every day I
was a couple of minutes in the central newsroom because there was a very close
cooperation between national newsrooms and the central newsroom. (C. Peciva, personal
communication, July 14, 2005)
Conventions in the CN that differed from the previous practice experiences of Western
journalists in news agency, newspaper and broadcasting organizations extended beyond valuing
accuracy over getting a story first. Journalists had to abandon the goal of composing a pithy lede.
Writing to serve the needs of the BDs meant writing to allow for quick and easy translation that
would maintain both accuracy and meaning across many languages.
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You could take a lot of time. . . . If you like theses sorts of challenges; it was a great place
to work: To be as clear and simple and accurate as possible. . . . It wasn’t to write the best
lede, because the best lede in English wouldn’t necessarily translate to the best lede in
[languages of the broadcast desks]. It was detail oriented: Number one, make sure it’s
correct and number two, that it can be translated. The priority was not to get it first, but to
get it right. (J. Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010)
The CN rewrote English and German-language wire service news for use by staff in the
BDs whose native language was not -- with a very few exceptions -- English. CN practice
discouraged the use of Western idiomatic expressions that might not be understood or might defy
translation across the languages and cultures of the BDs, and encouraged the routine use of words
that could be translated without prompting questions of word use that might alter meaning. One
editor recalled adjusting from wire service and urban broadcasting station practice to daily work
in the CN.
At RFE, everything we wrote was cleaned for translation. We wrote more basic, straight
news accounts. We were supposed to avoid idioms and anything that might cause a
problem in translation. In a sense, that made it even more objective, because you were
writing it for clarity, more clarity than usual, and that required being very precise, making
sure sourcing was clear, and avoiding any chance that it could be misinterpreted.
(Anonymous CN journalist, November 28, 2010)
Editor Charlie Smith recalled a newsroom dustup over a single word. “One of the space shuttles
had difficulty with a hatch not closing properly. I wrote the story, and turned it in.” An editor
“was going on and on…about how I should say ‘door’ instead of ‘hatch’.” A language desk editor
had responded to the story, questioning the term “hatch”, and the CN editor had come back to
Smith. “He sided with the language desk” (C. Smith, personal communication, December 4,
2010).
At times, adjusting to CN practice was difficult for journalists new to RFE. Smith, who
left UPI to join the Munich newsroom during the 1980s, recalled that news directors and senior
editors at both UPI and in the CN “would ride us hard”. But at RFE, the pressure was related to
the CN’s hyper-vigilance to accuracy and objectivity, and to a style of writing that could make
work boring for new recruits.
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I know I was very frustrated, and so were . . . others. There seemed to have been an
attitude that when we rewrote copy and gave it to the [supervising] editor of day, there
was an assumption that they were going to slap it back to us and say, “You need to check
this.” Sometimes it was ridiculous things. I know I rolled my eyes a lot while I was there,
thinking, “Why in the world am I wasting time on this?”
I always felt as if I was being asked to write in second grade English. It was a huge
frustration. I argued with the editors more than once. I said, ‘We need to give these
people [in the language services] the benefit of the doubt.’ He’d say, ‘We need to write so
they can understand.’ I‘d say, ‘But we don’t need to dumb it down that much. They have
dictionaries.’ . . . (C. Smith, personal communication, December 4, 2010)
Journalists new to the CN routinely lost such arguments.
In Western commercial practice, a story might be rewritten for a subsequent broadcast,
even when no new information was available. The CN avoided this practice. “The language
services weren’t saying, ‘Hey, give me a new version of that story’” (J. Kirchherr, personal
communication, November 23, 2010). Desks had to translate stories from English, and would
repeat those stories in broadcasts for listeners who might be able to tune in only once a day.
Rewriting stories when no new information was available made unnecessary work for BD
staffers. However, when new information was available, the CN prepared “intros” – updated
additions to running stories. “It gave us a way of getting new information out quickly without
having to repeat all the lower-down background” (B. Griffiths, personal communication, August
7, 2012).
Thus, carefully written copy that was metaphor, idiom and adjective-free, while offering
enough contextual material to promote understanding met a CN goal of objectivity at the same
time it met the needs of language service journalists from many nations who had to translate
quickly and accurately. And, prohibiting the BDs from making adjustments to the CN’s hypervigilant Western-style news – in particular, altering the minimal use of adjectives in rewriting (L.
McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006), served another purpose. By protecting Awire copy, it also preserved CN journalists’ intention to model a free press.

245

Two stories of practice
Two cases illustrate the convergence of CN autonomy, the two-source rule, getting it
right rather than getting it first, and learned skepticism regarding news reports coming over from
news agencies East and West. In the first case, Henry Hamman and Stuart Parrott ran the CN’s
London bureau when the Chernobyl nuclear power plant began its meltdown in Ukraine in 1986.
Communist state media did not acknowledge the accident or the extent of the danger to
populations in the region for almost three days. RFE reported the disaster first. Hamman and
Parrott took on the story, reporting from the UK’s National Radiological Protection Board in
London, and via the World Health Organization in Geneva, producing a stream of information for
BD radio program content that explained the event and advised listeners on the protection of
family members, food safety and tactics to mitigate exposure to radiation. “Chernobyl became
our story,” recalled Parrott (personal communication, July 28, 2005). Hamman agreed. “Pretty
soon, we were doing almost nothing but Chernobyl.” And, on that story, “we had to be both right
and first” (personal communication, November 24, 2010).
In the second case, Jim Kirchherr, a senior editor, sat alone in the slot in Munich on the
night of November 17, 1989, the first day of what would come to be known as Czechoslovakia’s
Velvet Revolution. A massive student memorial march in Prague that day had ended in a bloody
assault on demonstrators in Wenceslas Square. According to reports, police beatings during the
crackdown had resulted in the death of a student, one “Martin Smid”. Unknown to Kirchherr, a
dissident in Prague had heard and passed the story of Smid’s death to Western international
broadcasters, including RFE’s Czechoslovak service. Unknown to the dissident, the crackdown
had been planned and rehearsed, and both the student and the story of his death were fakes
planted by a faction within the regime (L. Vitkovicova, personal communication, April 23, 2004).
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In the CN, Kirchherr did not have access to what the Czech and Slovak language desks
might decide to report from their own sources during program hours. His job was to decide what
to release to the BDs on the A-wire for news at the top of the hour.
The reports were coming in and I was looking at those, and just waiting. There was a
report of someone being killed, and it may or may not have been true, but it was the sort
of thing we sat on for a long time. For me, it was the first time in my life that I learned to
read a wire story and could sense whether the reporter knew what they were talking
about. The other things that I thought we also got very good at was seeing the same
sources through the wires. The New York Times would be quoted, then AP, then Reuters.
Those were the skills that I never needed when covering local news, identifying that
multiple sourcing. . . .
I remember reading these stories and thinking, ‘One way to get a crowd worked
up is to say that someone has been killed.’ You’re looking for confirmation, not
unconfirmed reports being repeated in wire services, and counting that as confirmed. The
level of responsibility in that newsroom probably was something I’ll never see again. (J.
Kirchherr, personal communication, November 23, 2010)
Indeed, demonstration organizers in Prague believed initially that a student had been killed; a few
would spend the next days investigating both the planned police assault and the rumored story of
Smid’s death (L. Vitkovicova, personal communication, April 23, 2004). However, true or not,
the story was reported by news organizations East and West. Those reports helped fuel larger
demonstrations – and the revolution itself.
Its an interesting journalism question: At some point, if it didn’t happen, and it’s affecting
events because people think it happened, then it’s a news story. But our job was not to be
the ones who reported the false report. When I read about the fact that it didn’t happen,
years later, I thought, ‘Damn it! I knew it!’ (J. Kirchherr, personal communication,
November 23, 2010)
In the first case, listeners had been denied information of life and death importance by
governments, and journalists knew that listeners needed information that was not only accurate,
but also timely, and that delivery of that information to the BDs for broadcast was critical. In the
second case, news services East and West, along with Western international broadcasters, had
reported fake news while the CN editor sat on the story, rightly suspecting a plant. Both
instances, arbitrarily plucked from 44 years of CN practice, illustrate the need for a journalistic
response to the precarious positions of listeners denied access to accurate information, and also to
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the difficulty of culling accurate news in the Cold War context in which the RFE’s internal wire
service and its journalists practiced. The need for hyper-vigilant routines was contextual to the
era, to the organization and its target broadcasting territories. But CN practice also required more
than mechanical attention to performance. Working in the CN meant that Western journalists
followed routines of practice as if every story mattered to journalists in the BDs and to their
audiences. Understandings of the need for hyper-vigilant practice came only through experiences
and judgment honed over time inside the CN itself.

Recurring struggles for newsroom autonomy: Two memos, a generation apart
Interviews with American management personnel and archival documents illustrate the
continuing need to for CN vigilance in order to maintain “a separation” between American
management and CN practice, and also the degree of independence afforded CN operations. Two
examples cited by participants repeatedly, and confirmed in memos issued a generation apart,
illustrate continual efforts to ring-fence the newsroom from American policy concerns, even as
the organization’s relationship to government -- structure of its governance and the source of its
operating funds -- and American foreign policy itself evolved over time. The first occurred in
1965 while RFE was still funded clandestinely by the CIA. The second occurred in 1984 long
after RFE funding had shifted to the U.S. Congress with RFE’s oversight governed by an
independent board, and six years after the merger of RFE and RL, when the CN had been made
an organizational division on a par with – rather than subject to management by -- RFE and RL
(management units governing the language broadcasting services).
On November 10, 1965, not long after Kingsley had arrived from The New York Herald
Tribune to take over as CN director, having received assurances that there would be no
interference in newsroom practice, a “lengthy discussion” (R. E. Walter, personal
communication, January 13, 2007) occurred involving Kingsley, RFE director C. Rodney Smith
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and American policy director Ralph Walter. Their discussion concerned the relationship – or
Kingsley’s insistence on the lack of one -- between policy and news. On a Sunday afternoon
eleven days later, the CN issued an A-wire story that “the U.S. had approached Rumania about
possible Rumanian mediation in the Vietnam war” (Walter, 1965). Later that day, the CN issued a
correction: North Vietnam had approached the Romanian government, which in turn had
contacted the U.S. embassy in Bucharest. In a November 23 letter referencing both the first
discussion and the subsequent failure of CN personnel to bring the Romanian story to the
attention of the American policy officer on duty before releasing it to the BDs, policy director
Walter complained to Smith about the CN’s insistence on autonomy. The memo addressed the
“Policy-News Relationship” and was stamped “Strictly Confidential”.
I do require that policy’s role and authority be fully understood and accepted once and for
all. . . . No one who knows . . . my attitudes can believe that I want to manipulate news.
But I insist that news is as much a part of RFE as any other department, hence, subject to
the same restrictions – and working toward the same goals – as are we all.
I am, furthermore, genuinely concerned that one of these days we are going to be in
very considerable trouble indeed if news continues to go its own way. And, I am getting
fed up with having to devote so much time and energy to questions which need not arise.
. . . RFE is not simply a Western news agency ‘like any other’ (to quote Nat Kingsley). It
is a political organization, with political goals, and facing political hazards. It should
hardly be necessary to reiterate this to the News Department every ten days or two weeks.
...
[N]othing will be achieved if every time a sensitive question arises, the News
Department . . . starts belaboring questions of news ‘objectivity’ and news
‘manipulation.’ (Walter, 1965)
Kingsley, new to the job of news director at the time of the discussion and memo in 1965,
nevertheless remained a thorn in management’s side. Kingsley was succeeded by Anatol Shub,
who held the position only a short time before departing and recommending James Edwards to
take his place (Shub, 1974). Walter noted in a memo the pros and cons of making Edwards
director of the CN:
I have some reservations about Jim, these being the following: 1) Earlier tendencies to
accept the doctrine (religiously fostered by Gene Mater and at times evident in Nat
Kingsley) that CNR should conduct itself as somewhat above normal RFE rules and
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regulations, subject only to its own authority; 2) Anti-Americanism, which . . .got into
some of his writing during his stay in Paris. . . .
On the positive side, Jim is a capable and normally hard-working journalist. . . .
According to all I hear, he is greatly respected by his colleagues in CNR. . . . My
impression--hopefully a correct one--is that Jim has matured and grown out of some of
his early uncooperative attitudes. . . .
Jim is a British subject, which I think should make no difference to us in
considering whether to make him a department director. (Walter, 1974a)
Characterization of Edwards as exhibiting “anti-Americanism” concurs with CN journalists’
memories of management criticisms of Edwards as filing too many stories from the Paris bureau
on anti-American protests during the Vietnam War (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July
13, 2005). A month after writing the above memo, Walter notified the staff of the appointment of
Edwards as news director (Walter, 1974b).
The second memo, generated a 20 years later on September 10, 1984, 11 years after the
U.S. Congress had taken over the RFE’s funding and established an independent governing Board
of International Broadcasting (BIB) and six years after RFE had merged with Radio Liberty to
become RFE/RL, is from deputy CN director and Washington, D.C. bureau chief Tom Bodin.
Bodin’s four-page memo was addressed to BIB official Ben Wattenberg, who at that time was
also affiliated with the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank. Bodin and
Wattenberg had met days earlier to discuss complaints from the CN to the BIB about RFE
director George Urban’s intrusion into the newsroom to assert that editors should have withheld a
ten-line story from its news file. The story concerned a comment made by Reagan before a
speech during his re-election campaign earlier that month. Reagan had pretended to test his
microphone, and, not realizing that it was live, joked that the U.S. would begin bombing the
Soviet Union in a few minutes.
Urban, a Hungarian-American appointed by Reagan to direct the RFE division of
RFE/RL, had already challenged the management and practices of both the language services and
the CN. On this occasion, following Regan’s speech, he had demanded that the language desks
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refrain from using the CN story. Both the Western and communist print and broadcast media and
wire services were alive with the news, but Urban took CN to task for releasing it to the BDs on
the grounds that listeners in communist states might not realize that the statement had been a
joke. CN news managers found the assertion ridiculous. Soon after, a CN editor leaked the details
of the breach of autonomy to a New York Times reporter in Europe (Anonymous CN journalist,
personal communication, November 23, 2009), and both The Times and the Dallas Morning News
carried stories of not only news manipulation related to the story on Reagan’s speech, but also of
Reagan era management changes at RFE that had altered the working atmosphere and threatened,
in pre-1956 RFE Cold War style, to integrate clandestine-like operations with news practices.
Bodin’s memo followed on his conversation with Wattenberg. He complained that Urban
had tried to kill the Reagan joke story for political reasons during the president’s re-election
campaign, without having first read the actual content of the CN’s A-wire release to the BDs.
When you were in your devil’s advocate mode the other day, . . . I took exception when
you referred to RFE/RL newsmen as ‘a priestly class,’ but on reflection am willing to
accept that. In an atmosphere that is frequently emotionally and politically charged, you
need a few priests around who will not line up with one side or another and whose only
purpose is the fulfillment of what they regard as a sacred trust. (Bodin, 1984)
Bodin and his boss, CN director James Edwards, along with other CN managers, were
known to RFE’s American management officials as sticklers for news practice, for the separation
of CN decision-making from American foreign policy concerns, and from the political passions
of the BDs (Brown, 2005a; R. Hutchings, personal communication, August 11, 2006; W. W.
Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006; R. E. Walter, personal communication,
January 13, 2007). Before taking on the job of leading RFE/RL during the late 1980s, William
Marsh had been warned: Edwards “resisted every attempt by members of the board to skew the
news. I heard about it after I arrived because the people on the [BIB] broadcasting board that I’m
talking about [during the Reagan administration] were still there. I heard about Edwards from him
and from others” (W. W. Marsh, personal communication, August 22, 2006).
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Edwards would continue to lead the CN for another four years following the Reagan
speech incident, but he was forced to leave in January, 1989, when Marsh was acting president of
RFE/RL. Edwards had been offered a return to a post that he had held during the 1970s -- Paris
bureau chief -- but had declined. The CN’s logbook, a stop for journalists arriving for their shifts,
included this note from Edwards to CN staff:
I am no longer leaving for Paris. I am just leaving. This was my last day.
I couldn’t accept the terms offered for the switch to Paris nor various other
suggestions that were made for continued employment, so I am being terminated. I’m not
contesting it. It’s what is called a mutually agreed termination. All this came to a head
this week.
I’m leaving with mixed feelings of course. It will be great not to have the
telephone ringing, the budget for breakfast, the thousand and one bits of bureaucracy.
But I’ll miss most of you. You are a fine bunch of hard-working, conscientious
professionals. For years you have brought me more credit than I deserve. You may
grumble, scrap among yourself [sic], pound on my desk, call me a schmuck, but you
always get the job done. You are the most efficient element of this operation and have
seldom received the recognition you deserve.
Barry [Griffiths] and Terry [Willey] will be running things. They’ll have an
awful lot to do. Give them all the help you can. (J. Edwards, CN Log Book Entry,
January 13, 1989, obtained for this study via private papers contributed by CN editor
Daniel Williams)
Three weeks later, Marsh issued a memo to all RFE/RL staff: Kenneth Thompson would
direct the recently formed News and Current Affairs Division (W. W. Marsh, “To the RFE/RL
Staff”, February 9, 1989, private papers of Daniel Williams). Thompson had a background in
newspaper journalism, mainly editorial writing and editorial page editing rather than reporting.
He had also been press secretary for a U.S. Senator and director of policy at the Voice of
America. During the previous year, he had been RFE/RL’s director of corporate affairs in
Washington. In general, CN journalists did not view Thompson as a “straight news” replacement
for Edwards, one who would maintain a separation between policy and CN practice. Thompson
remained in the position only briefly, followed by the promotion of CN manager Terry Willey in
1990 (see Chapter 5).
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In the new News and Current Affairs Division, the CN retained its autonomy, but a new
current affairs unit that focused on in-depth feature stories was established, with its own director
and staff. During interviews for this study, CN journalists hesitated to comment in depth on the
operations of the current affairs unit, and when they did comment, it was sometimes with disdain.
There was some resentment that some of the CN’s best journalists, including Roley Eggleston
and Stuart Parrott, had left the CN for the new unit. In reference to Gary Thatcher, a respected
journalist who had worked at The Christian Science Monitor was chosen to head current affairs,
one journalist said, “He did some things.” He declined to respond to what those “things” were.
Parrott, while discussing the Czech revolution and the rise of Vaclav Havel, asserted that while
working in current affairs, “building up Havel – that was part of my job” (personal
communication, July 28, 2005), but he appeared alarmed at having said it. At the beginning of our
interview, Thatcher himself established a ground rule: He would “not talk about” the latter few
years of RFE’s operations in Munich, and the intense divisions within the CN and RFE
management over the creation of the current affairs unit and its operations (G. Thatcher, personal
communication, August 31, 2006). It is unclear how much of the enduring angst evident in
interviews was related to issues common to adjustments and rivalries following significant
change in any organization, and how much pertained to journalistic practice specific to the CN at
RFE, or to the relationship between news and policy. This issue requires further scrutiny if a
reliable history of the CN is to be completed.

More on generational differences and practice
As described in Chapter 5, CN practice that evolved over 40 years would be challenged
as more American journalists jointed the newsroom during the 1980s. Generational differences
had manifested in the language broadcast services as political differences (see Chapter 4); in the
CN, generational differences surfaced among the more recent, younger, American hires and long253

time Cold War era editors. RFE’s organizational memory, its post-1956 reform and caution, were
rooted in Cold War battles over delivering truth, in being more accurate, and in not inciting
populations via news content.
A journalist who joined the CN during its last decade in Munich noted the change in
conceptions: Long-time CN editors were “very deliberate and adamant that journalism be done
right.”
During the biggest crises, the shelling of the parliament building, and Gorbachev being
held hostage, as things are popping, all the editors and particularly the old timers are
deliberate in making sure we have things done right, erring on the side of, ‘Let’s hold this
for a few minutes.’ . . . You’d always hear someone say, ‘Let’s not repeat Hungary,’ and
it would be an old-timer. (C. Smith, personal communication, December 4, 2010)
Not repeating Hungary also meant not reiterating Cold War rhetoric, respecting both the listener
and an ideal of “balance” in the ways that nations, ideologies and leaders were characterized in
copy. Mike Revzin, who moved to CNN following work as an editor at RFE, recalled the irony of
practicing according to more stringent standards of objectivity and balance in the CN while at the
same time being aware that the Western press regarded RFE journalists as propagandists.
We were not allowed to call [Romanian President] Ceausescu a ‘dictator’. Everyone else
in the world – The New York Times, AP, etc. – referred to him as a ‘dictator’. We had to
use the form term for him. We had a stigma about putting out propaganda, but we had
more restrictions than the other press. (M. Revzin, personal communication, November
29, 2010)
Younger journalists trained in American newsrooms during the 1980s experienced a
“clash” with long-time CN editors and newsroom managers related to objectivity when they
arrived during the last decade of CN practice in Munich.
The old-timers were still gnashing nails over the Cold War. The folks who came over
with me were far more objective about what we were doing, . . . I think [we were] far
more interested in presenting and upholding the standards of objective journalism. I don’t
mean that that the old-timers were not objective—I mean they were focused differently. .
. . We were far more analytical than passionate. The excitement of when things would
happen in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union--reading TASS [Soviet Union wire
service] and the other foreign wires, and tripping those [state media] guys up on their
errors was far more important to the old timers than it was to us. Of course, we’d find
mistakes, factual, in everything. . . . We’d say, ‘There are conflicting reports.’ But [the
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old timers’] attitude was, let’s say that ‘TASS is reporting such-and-such, and we say
otherwise.’ (C. Smith, personal communication, December 4, 2010)
One CN journalist acknowledged the differences in generational attitudes about what was
necessary in practice – the hyper-vigilance developed regarding accuracy, skepticism toward
news agency copy both East and West, painstaking attention to the needs of broadcast desks in
terms of language that eased translation and satisfied quests for objectivity: “The older guys were
the ones flogging it out” in the past. “They did the hard stuff. I got to be there for the party”,
covering the revolutions and transitions toward democratic states, and later, the drama of events
surrounding Yeltsin and Gorbachev (K. Saal, personal communication, November 21, 2010). No
matter the generation in the CN, however, ring-fencing the newsroom and defense of the hybrid
and hyper-vigilant practice were necessary and defended – for the most part successfully -throughout RFE’s tenure in Munich.

Central Newsroom practice: Conclusion
By its language use and news practices, a strategy of protecting the CN file from
tinkering by émigrés -- on the front end, via the vetting of content before issuing it, and on the
client end, via rules about what could be done with copy once it was received -- allowed CN
journalists to compartmentalize their work not only materially, but conceptually. The CN could
conceive of itself as partitioned from the policy concerns and advocacy journalism in the rest of
RFE while achieving its goal of modeling a free press by supplying accurate, credible news to
listeners who might not otherwise have it. Thus, one deputy news director could say, “Well, of
course it was propaganda!” (L. McCoy, personal communication, August 17, 2006) in reference
to the effects of RFE’s organizational mission as practiced in general, and another could say, in
reference to the work of the CN in particular, “I was responsible for ten minutes of news every
hour; in my ten minutes there was no propaganda” (B. Griffiths, personal communication, July 13,
2005).
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The predominance of the English language in daily decision-making at RFE and
Western-style journalism as RFE’s product gave the CN, as the sole department working both in
English and journalism, and with news experience unmatched elsewhere inside RFE, a modicum
of the autonomy “jealously guarded” (M. Schudson, 2005) in Western practice. It allowed CN
journalists the authority to set standards of practice both alternative to and more vigilant than
those of Western commercial news organizations, and to successfully defend those practices
(with a few infamous exceptions) despite internal organizational rancor. It allowed the CN,
through its routines and the content of the budget, to serve as an internal model of Western
practice at RFE and to ensure the credibility of news broadcast at the top of each hour by the
BDs. It allowed the CN to manifest, through production values and practices and controls on the
content of its budget after it left the CN, its own conception of RFE’s mission to serve as a
surrogate free press on behalf of listeners in East-Central Europe.
In short, the CN was a wartime newsroom charged with constructing and maintaining
practice in an organizational context aberrant to Western journalism. The context was “messy”,
but the practice routines and style developed in response were anything but messy. CN practice
was not “American model” practice; it was instead a unique, hybrid and hyper-vigilant practice
developed over more than 40 years by and for journalists from Western democracies who
occupied a narrow space between their own humanitarian and democratic reasons for
participating in the RFE experiment, and the policies, politics and journalisms of their colleagues
both inside and outside RFE.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Any story one may tell about anything is better understood by considering other possible ways in
which it can be told.
-- Bruner, Life as Narrative, 2004, p. 709

Journalism’s outcome, as Timothy Garton Ash (The Frontline Club, 2010) observed,
ultimately rests with the choices made by individual journalists themselves. This study aimed to
give voice to individual journalists who chose to join RFE during the Cold War, and to describe
group conceptions of their roles, their status as exiles in islands of practice from which they had
to negotiate with power in order to perform news work on behalf of populations denied access to
information.
RFE employees constructed, selected, edited and delivered forbidden texts, including and
alternative news narratives, to peoples denied access to such information by governments in
totalitarian states of East-Central Europe during the Cold War. RFE’s two groups of journalists –
its exiles -- practiced in spaces not charted in sanctioned territories of possible professional lives.
They operated outside the menu of available positions from which authentic journalistic work
could be accomplished. For example, the Polish “émigré” or “exile” from Krakow broadcasting
from Munich as a “surrogate” journalistic voice, hoping to be perceived as speaking from an
alternative, imagined, democratic “home” Poland, could not assume audience perceptions of
authenticity. Inside Poland, s/he was construed in state media as a tool of American imperialism,
of the CIA, and as a criminal, a traitor to the people and to the project of communism. Likewise,
the Western journalist employed in a government-funded and policy-governed, intelligence
agency-tainted “news” organization worked beyond the boundaries of norm-sanctioned
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journalism in democracies. S/he worked for, in a phrase uttered by an American editor, “that
propaganda outfit” (O. Kopecka, personal communication, August 17, 2004).
Early on in this study, after only a few interviews with individuals who had worked in
different departments at RFE, it was clear that conversations with research participants that
focused on journalistic lives and news work would be constructed necessarily in relation to the
tellers’ consciousness of outlier status. Participants’ stories are narratives of active and continual
repositioning, of (re)constructed authenticities, both in the ways they conceived of what they
were doing, and in the ways they translated those conceptions into practice. This study would be a
story of what it meant to be a journalist and to do journalism outside the realm of possible
journalisms, in liminal space where assumptions of legitimacy conferred by “citizenship” in a
nation and by news organization structure in both Western democracies and communist states are
absent, where every news worker was in some sense and “exile”, and where all worked to
construct alternative paths “home”.
Here, “home” is an imagined space where journalism’s ultimate end, democracy, and the
quality of news and journalism itself, were products of inter and intra-group difference,
cooperation and negotiation. At RFE, both groups of journalists had to choose to step into
forbidden territory in order to do the work, and, once inside RFE, both groups found ways of
negotiating with power and with each other to construct practice and provide program content
according to their own conceptions of journalism and of their role in RFE’s mission.
Language service staff members talk about doing journalism, and about their lives,
nations and audiences, e.g., fellow Poles and Czechs left behind, all bound inextricably to their
own conceptions of fulfilling RFE’s political mission through broadcasting. Employees of the
language broadcasting services were referred to collectively as “émigrés” or “the exiles”, and by
ethnic or national origin. The term “exile” recognizes both their position and their task: they
could return “home” only via radio, and they repatriated themselves via voices first – as Poles,
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Czechs, Slovaks, Hungarians, Bulgarians or Romanians speaking languages in common with their
audiences. They constructed content and broadcast programs using journalism as a means to ends.
Inside RFE as an organization, “exiles” were arrayed in “islands” of ethnicity and
language as broadcasting units, and together in an East-Central European community where
national, historical, cultural, political affinities and animosities past and present were alive in the
halls and meeting rooms. In order to negotiate construction of radio content, exiles finessed
relationships with American managers who granted autonomy but also reined political passions.
Journalism was a profession taken up as a first choice by some, but by most as a secondary act of
necessity, a way of earning a living in the West where other options for native language
professional work were extremely limited, and as a way of doing “more for my country” (M.
Kocourek, personal communication, August 10, 2005) in an international broadcasting
organization whose mission was to serve as a surrogate domestic service.
For exiles in broadcasting services, preserving the past and reporting the present in all its
historical and cultural iterations constituting also undoing the present – challenging power in
communist states -- and opening the way for listeners to think differently about the future. They
hoped to become the “home” radios for listeners, to perform authentically, not as criminalized
traitors, as RFE broadcasters were portrayed in state media reports inside target nations, but as
citizens in good standing. The invited audiences to join them in nations that they themselves
imagined and constructed through hyper-vigilant attention to authentic use of language and news
narratives and other programming about the political and cultural past and present. Exile voices
embodied self-constructed “homes”, acting as surrogates, stand-ins for free media in future
democracies. In the process, they constructed for listeners unique ways of being, for example,
Hungarian or Bulgarian, that were unavailable anywhere but the mediated spaces of RFE
broadcasts. In so doing, they repatriated themselves. They were also, within RFE, politically
partisan press workers who developed a unique “OK” system of practice that differentiated them
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from Western journalists in the same organization.
For Western journalists in the Central Newsroom (CN), RFE’s internal wire service,
national origin is a starting point for life narratives that chart paths via individual experiences and
news work to and from RFE. They talk of journalism first, while national origin is a placeholder
for journalism education and experience, and for membership in an overall Western-ness.
Western-ness entails a belief in a human right to information, and the value of a free press to
inform citizens who in turn are empowered to make decisions about how to construct everyday
life. For CN journalists, news work was the nation and culture in common. At RFE, they
conceived their role as modelers of a free press both inside the organization, for East-Central
Europeans learning news work on the job in broadcasting services, and outside RFE, for listeners
in totalitarian states. They describe themselves as performing work with an intensity of
guardianship beyond routine maintenance of journalistic norms in democracies, and the
mechanics of their practice confirms that hyper-vigilance. Journalism at RFE offered an
opportunity to join forces in an alliance to challenge limits on information and speech in
totalitarian states. But that opportunity also required collaboration in a government project that
tainted their passports as citizens of Western journalism.
No matter their national origins, years of news experience, reasons for accepting work at
RFE, or their era of Cold War employment, CN journalists acknowledged the paradox – and
challenges -- of working in an organization sponsored by one government in order to redress
denial of information to citizens by other governments. That paradox contributed to the
positioning of CN employees as journalistic émigrés. CN journalists were conscious of their
status as practitioners beyond the boundaries of norm-sanctioned Western news work. They had
found the jobs and adventure – expat lives and front-line wartime reporting -- they sought, along
with the satisfaction of providing news to populations denied access to it. But in the process, they
had to construct practice and perform news work in a thin space of between-ness, between the
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illegitimacy assigned to them by the Western press, and the ears of listeners in East-Central
Europe for whom the consumption of CN news file-derived content was taboo.
CN journalists ring-fenced an island of practice between the policy concerns of American
management and the political passions and learned-on-the-job journalism of the émigré broadcast
desks. They faced a mandate to produce American-style news while situated in an experimental
organization outside the American media system. They had to corral the training and experience
of journalists from many nations to supply news to clients from other nations of which they had
little or no knowledge and no reportorial access. The thinness of that space rendered CN workers
professionally stateless, residents of an island of journalistically uncharted territory, and made the
construction of a unique, hybrid and hyper-vigilant practice necessary. As exiles they provided
accurate, credible news to clients in the broadcasting services and ultimately to listeners. In the
process, they repatriated themselves and the products of their newsroom.
RFE pierced borders with cutting edge technologies of the time. For RFE’s two main
groups of exile journalists, fulfilling RFE’s mission required border crossings, national, cultural
and professional. An experimental mission to model a free press as surrogates made group
cooperation and negotiation necessary. RFE’s journalists had to construct practices in an
experimental organization as it evolved away from its 1950s iteration as a “crude propaganda
machine” toward its late 1980s iteration as a news organization with a political and humanitarian
mission. News work at RFE was journalism that mattered, both to its journalists and to its
audiences. As RFE’s two groups of exile journalists produced news as surrogates for imagined
democracies, they also tiptoed into a future globalized media world where technologicallyenabled border crossings of many kinds characterize practice; where trained-on-the-job
journalists and professionally schooled and experienced journalists must collaborate; where fake
news, rumor, lies, half-truths and “truths” swirl together on equal footing in news feeds that must
be parsed; and where politically socially activist individuals and organizations, journalists,
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dissidents, intelligence operatives, states, and non-state “nations” of diaspora, are in conversation,
participating in the construction of content in contested spaces of media flows, while vying for
credibility and audiences. RFE succeeded, and it succeeded in part because of the successful
struggles of the its two groups of stateless journalists, “exiles” who constructed, maintained and
defended different journalisms and embodied different journalistic authenticities. Interrogating
RFE beyond the surface assumption of its journalistic illegitimacy by way of its government
sponsorship, its political and humanitarian mission, reveals adaptations of practice, hybrid and
hyper-vigilant, that have much to say to contemporary journalists and journalism.
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